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The right of minorities to participate in public life often poses great 
challenges to states. Several disparate approaches have been developed in 
modern liberal democracies to address the claims of national or ethnic 
minorities to have influence on the political life of the country. Whenever 
political cleavages emerge along national identity lines in a state, 
minorities, being in a structural minority position without any chance to 
attain power through democratic elections, may need special arrangements 
granting them effective participation in public life. This was reaffirmed in 
different international documents on minority rights adopted after 1990. In 
some cases, domestic constitutional developments led to new forms of 
participation and political recognition of minorities, and in other cases, 
international organisations played an important role in the evolution of 
domestic legislation. Following the international community’s interventions 
into violent inter-ethnic conflicts, especially in the case of Yugoslav successor 
states, the situation of minorities was a key issue in post-conflict 
arrangements. Even in other post-socialist European countries, the 
implementation and adaptation of international minority rights standards 
influented domestic developments, particularly through membership 
policies adopted by Western international organisations, The ‘new 
democracies’ usually tended to adopt strict rules regarding identity issues, 
and minorities often feel threatened by the national majority’s political 
dominance. Nevertheless, either as a result of post-war compromises that 
emerged in the post-Yugoslav context or as a response to international 
concerns, none of these states opted for a repressive nationalist 
 
 
constitutional model. They usually recognise the existence of minorities in 
their constitutions, and most of these states joined both the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. Fundamental issues 
relevant to the participation of minorities in public life have been settled: 
people belonging to minorities usually do not face citizenship problems, 
equal voting rights are granted, and minority parties have been granted the 
freedom of association. Even more, in the parts five to ten years specific 
representative arrangements have been developed or modified in many of 
these countries. The chapters of this book intend to give an overview of 
these changes. The political dynamics of minority-majority relations 
appear often more decisive than the legislative changes in this field. In the 
following chapters, the authors address these important questions about 
the effectiveness of the existing representative or consultative institutions 
and the discernable gaps between law on the paper and in practice. 
    
The original idea to research new developments in the field of political 
participation and representation of minorities in South-Eastern Europe was 
stemmed from the editors’ work at the Institute for Minority Studies, 
Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
Between the autumn of 2012 and the autumn of this calendar year, the 
National Research, Development and Innovation Office of Hungary, under 
the OTKA K-105432 project, sponsored a research project on “[t]he right 
of minorities to political participation in Europe - analysing new 
perspectives and practices in Central and South-Eastern Europe.”1 
Although during the years the structure of this final volume has changed 
in many details, it still reflects the results of this OTKA project. 
 
The original goal of our research was to identify and exlpore the 
theoretical, legal, and political problems related to the political 
patricipation of minorities based on existing international standards. The 
main concerns and recommendations regarding minority political 
participation reflected in various UN, OSCE, and CoE documents are 
usually seen as offering guidelines for the establishment of new political 
and legal institutions in the region (territorial power-sharing arrangements, 
non-territorial autonomy, and consultative rights). The solutions 
established in recent years and their related political and legal discussions 
in the countries selected for case studies (mostly ex-Yugoslav states) offer 
 
1 http://kisebbsegkutato.tk.mta.hu/a-kisebbsegek-kozeleti-reszvetelhez-valo-joga-
kutterv accessed on 28 September 2016 
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new examples for the investigation of effective participation of minorities 
in public life. The research findings contribute to a better understanding of 
the social integration of minorities. 
  
In addition also the new Hungarian Act on Nationalities was thoroughly 
analysed. We asked ourselves two initial questions before starting the 
research years ago: How do participatory rights enable the social and 
political integration of minorities in the countries in question, and how are 
these examples in line with the relevant international standards? And 
further, what role can internantional organisations play in the 
improvement of national legislation in this field? We were also curious 
about the effectiveness of certain special rights (reserved seats in 
parliaments, consultative rights et cetera) and different models of the 
separation of powers (in particular, non-territorial or cultural autonomies)2 
in representing minory self-interests and potentially guarantee the peaceful 
co-existence of the majority and minority populations. In its first part, the 
book frames the topic by touching upon the general theoretical aspects of 
the issue. Markku Suksi’s article explains how the OSCE High 
Commissioner’s Lund Recommendations of 1999 have been affecting and 
improving the European norms and praxis relevant to minorities’ effective 
participation in public affairs and public life. Balázs Vizi focused on the 
international legal standards from a bit more of a practical viewpoint in 
the context of European integration. This chapter offers an overview of 
conditionality policy within the context of European Union enlargement 
and its effects on minority rights and participation in public life. The 
volume’s second half provides case studies. In the chapter on Croatia, 
Maria Dicosola convincingly argues that following a period of active 
involvement of international organisations, in the last ten years 
democractic consolidation improved the situation of minorities, including 
their political rights in the country. Even in light of the concerns 
formulated by the European Union during the accession process, Croatia 
proved to have become more responsive to accommodate political claims 
of minorities living in the country. Hungary was considered to be a model 
for granting a special framework of representation through minority self-
governments under its 1993 legislation. László András Pap analyses the 
new developments following the adoption of the new Act on the Rights of 
 
2 See also on this from a broader perspective Tove Malloy – Alexander Osipov – 
Balázs Vizi (eds.) Managing Diversity through Non-Territorial Autonomy. 




Nationalities in 2011. In addition to critiquing a reform of non-territorial 
autonomy, the article offers an analysis of the newly established institution 
of minority spokepersons elected to the parliament. Stevo Pendarovski, 
Ivan Dodovski, and Marina Andeva give an analytical overview of the 
political consequences of the implementation of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement for minorities living in Macedonia (FYROM). Their 
contribution sheds light on the political difficulties under internal and 
external pressure that lead to a more stable accommodation of minority 
political claims. Kosovo seems to be the perfect case to analyse 
international intervention in developing minority protection legislation. 
Adrian Zeqiri gives a positive evaluation of this process, and highlights 
the lasting problematic issues regarding both granted seats in parliament 
as the consultative rights of minorities. Norbert Tóth provides a legal 
analysis of the situation of the National Minority Council in Serbia. We 
intended to follow new directions and methods to provide some new 
information about minorities and minority rights in this region. But first 
and foremost, we hoped to give an account on recent developments related 
to the rights of minorities and their participaation in public life.  
 
The editors are grateful to the contributors to this volume. They were 
always responsive and very patient with us during the editorial and 
publishing process. Special thanks are due to Zarije Seizović who – 
following the unexpected withdrawal of one of our colleagues – promptly 
accepted our very late invitation for contribution and still managed to keep 
the tight deadlines. We also thank the series editors of the European 
Academy Bolzano, Francesco Palermo and Günther Rautz for accepting 
our book proposal in the series “Minderheiten und Autonomien,” and 
Beate Bernstein for patiently guiding us through the editing process at 
Nomos Verlag. 
 
This book could not have been realised without the support of the Tom 
Lantos Institute (Budapest), which offered financial support – among 
other forms – for the language editing process. We thank Anna-Maria Bíró 
and Máté Fischer for their smooth and friendly co-operation.  
The editors would like to thank in particular Faith Bailey for providing 
language editing and for taking the burden of providing copy-editing 
support; we are truly indebted to her for the prompt and precious work.   
 
 






EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF MINORITIES IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
AND PUBLIC LIFE – EUROPEAN NORMS AND PRAXIS EVALUATED 




In the beginning of the 1990s, nationalism grew more aggressive and even 
violent, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. Many (but by no means all) of 
the newly independent States or States that became free from Socialist rule 
were actually reconstituted as full-fledged nation states functioning on the 
premise of ‘one people, one language, one state’. As a consequence, the 
treatment of minorities grew more hostile in parts of Central and Eastern 
Europe and South-Eastern Europe.3 
 
The international community became increasingly willing to recognize 
minority rights for groups of persons who tried to survive under the pressure 
of dominant majority cultures.4 The effort to establish minority rights was 
started by the Conference (later Organization) for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, which in 1990 enacted the so-called Copenhagen Document with a 
provision in Para. 35 on the effective participation of minorities.5 The United 
 
3 The research towards this article was carried out during a research leave funded 
jointly by the Pool of Professors and Åbo Akademi University, and travel to 
Emory University, Atlanta, was funded by the Finnish Society of Sciences. The 
author wishes to thank the funders for the grants. 
4 When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the UDHR) was adopted in 1948 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations, a provision concerning 
participation in the government of one’s own country was included in Article 21. 
However, at the same time, in a separate resolution appended to the UDHR, the 
issue of minorities was detached from the discourse of general human rights and 
left in a waiting room of pending issues that should be looked into in the future. 
See GA Res. 217 (III). International Bill of Human Rights, where Part A contains 
the UDHR and Part C a resolution entitled the Fate of Minorities. 
5 In combination with the right to participation in Article 25 of the 1966 Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter: the CCPR), Article 27 CCPR on rights of 
minorities did not bring much relief to minorities and their relatively common 
exclusion from meaningful participation in public affairs. However, the drafting 
history of Article 25 CCPR suggests that the drafting committee of 1947 
originally proposed that “every one has the right to take an effective part in the 
government of the State of which he is a citizen”, although the term “effective” 




Nations followed suit in 1992 with its non-binding Declaration on the Rights 
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and National 
Minorities, which includes requirements of effective participation in Articles 
2(2) and 2(3).6 
 
The Council of Europe accompanied the UN by adopting a binding treaty, the 
1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(hereinafter: the FCNM), which contains a reference to effective participation 
in Article 15. In addition, the European Court of Human Rights has passed, on 
the basis of Article 3 of the First Protocol in 1950 to the European Convention 
of Human Rights (hereinafter: the ECHR), a number of judgments that relate 
to effective participation of minorities. Thus in the European space, there exist 
two binding norms at the international level which, in light of the 1999 Lund 
Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in 
Public Life (hereinafter: the LR), contain prescriptions on effective 
participation of national minorities in public life. 
 
Within the general framework of participation, what does effective 
participation of minorities entail under European regional international law? Is 
effective participation a procedural requirement or a material notion, or 
perhaps both? How have interpretations of the main treaty bodies in Europe 
evolved with respect to effective participation of minorities in light of the 
Lund Recommendations? 
 
These questions will be examined on the basis of the different dimensions 
concerning effective participation of minorities contained in the Lund 
 
preparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, pp. 469-478. In 
spite of proposals from the drafting committee in 1947 and from some states to 
include vertical rights for minorities in Article 27 CCPR that could have 
facilitated participation, the final formulation of the Article is mainly recognizing 
the freedom of persons belonging to minorities to engage in horizontal 
relationships of all sorts with persons in the same group. See Bossuyt 1987, 
Guide, pp. 469-478, 493-499. 
6 Concerning the contents of effective participation of minorities in the UN Minority 
Rights Declaration, see Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty-seventh 
session. Working Group on Minorities, Eleventh session, 30 May-3 June 2005. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2, 4 April 2005., pp. 8-11. 
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Recommendations.7 Interpretations of relevant treaty bodies, in this case 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and recommendations of 
the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities8 are reviewed within the dimensions of effective 
participation contained in the LR. It is recognized that judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: the ECtHR) and 
recommendations of the Advisory Committee (hereinafter: the AC) have very 
different legal impacts on States,9 but that both are nonetheless to be 
understood as authoritative interpretations of their respective conventions (and 
from time to time, they make reference to each other’s praxis). The praxis of 
the AC is particularly important, because Article 15 FCNM contains the term 
“effective participation”, which the ECHR does not.10 The categories 
 
7 The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in 
Public Life & Explanatory Note. September 1999. The Hague: OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, 1999, at 
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/30325?download=true (accessed on 8 February 2016). 
8 The materials used come from compilations of opinions of the Advisory Committee 
by article, in this case Article 15, that the secretariat of the Framework 
Convention has produced for the first, the second, the third, and the fourth cycle 
of state reporting at www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/compilation-of-opinions 
(accessed on 8 February 2016). See Compilation of Opinions of the Advisory 
Committee relating to Article 15 of the Framework Convention. First Cycle. 
Strasbourg, 4 July 2011. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2011; Compilation of 
Opinions of the Advisory Committee relating to Article 15 of the Framework 
Convention. Second Cycle, Strasbourg, 2 February 2016. Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe, 2016; Compilation of Opinions of the Advisory Committee relating to 
Article 15 of the Framework Convention. Third Cycle. Strasbourg, 29 June 2015. 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2015. In addition, for the Fourth Cycle of state 
reports, this article uses the ones published by 12 February 2016, which were 
Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Slovak Republic and 
Spain, as indicated by paragraph references to the recommendations made by the 
Advisory Committee. 
9 The impact of the recommendations of the Advisory Committee is enhanced if the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe incorporates them in its 
resolutions concerning the State in question. However, the Committee of 
Ministers often does not become as explicit in relation to the States as the 
Advisory Committee. 
10 Because the research materials in part consist of praxis of the AC, literary sources 
concerning Article 15 FCNM or effective participation of minorities are not 
referenced here. For good comment, see Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities in 
Europe: A Commentary, passim., Weller with Nobbs (eds), Political 
Participation of Minorities, passim, and Weller, Article 15, passim. See also 
Myntti, A Commentary to the Lund Recommendations on the Effective 




expressed in the LR are thus used as an analytical tool to bring out the 
structure of interpretations concerning effective participation of minorities. 
Although this chapter will address issues of minority representation, the 
intention here is not to delve into the definition of a minority. 
 
2. Ordinary Participation as the Starting Point 
 
In the European arena of nation states, the starting point for an examination of 
effective minority participation is constituted by the case of G. and E. v. 
Norway,11 in which the European Commission on Human Rights examined 
the allegations that rights guaranteed by the ECHR had been violated when 
persons belonging to the indigenous Sami population had been exposed to 
negative impacts of the construction of a hydro-electric dam in Alta river in 
the northernmost part of Norway. In this case, the European Commission on 
Human Rights concluded the following in a dictum:12 “The Commission 
observes that the Convention does not guarantee specific rights to minorities. 
The rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention are, according to Article 1 
of the Convention, guaranteed to ‘everyone’ within the jurisdiction of a High 
Contracting Party. The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms in the 
Convention shall, according to Article 14, be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as, inter alia, association with a national minority.” 
 
Non-discrimination was thus the starting point, but the European Commission 
went on to say the following: “The applicants are Norwegian citizens, living 
in Norway, and under Norwegian jurisdiction. They have, as other 
Norwegians, the right to vote and to stand for election to the Norwegian 
Parliament. They are thus democratically represented in Parliament, although 
the Lapps have no secured representation for themselves.”13 
 
From this procedural rule enforcing a majoritarian point of democracy, a 
 
11 Applications Nos. 9278/81 & 9415/81 (joined), Decision of 3 October 1983, p. 
Decisions and Reports 35, p. 30. 
12 The application did not deal with Article 3 of the First Protocol, but with other 
provisions of the Convention. The Commission nonetheless discussed also 
participation of the Sami through elections. 
13 It is necessary to recognize that the application did not claim any violation of Article 
3 of the First Protocol. This means that the right to vote in parliamentary 




position that the ECtHR qualified at a later point of time in another context,14 
the European Commission moves to a more material conclusion: “The 
applicants are thus entitled to enjoy the guarantees of the Convention. They 
are also bound by Norwegian law and obliged to comply with decisions 
lawfully taken.” 
 
Therefore, because the Sami of Norway were (and still are) so few in numbers 
and thus less likely to be able to vote in their own representative to the 
Norwegian Parliament, their hopes are directed towards a parliament 
primarily consisting of the majority population for passing national 
legislation, such as zoning law and, law on reindeer herding, with particular 
impact on Sami interests. Therefore, in the 1980s, such a minority was 
expected to be content with the regular scheme of parliamentary 
representation and to work with the political institutions under the prevailing 
circumstances. However, the reference to the fact that “the Lapps have no 
secured representation for themselves” may be understood in several ways. In 
addition to a meaning according to which they might remain without 
representation in the national parliament (although the Norwegian Sami have 
several times had one representative in the Norwegian Parliament), the 
sentence could also be an indication of the possibility to create special 
representation for a minority by allocating, for instance, one seat to the 
minority population. In fact, the ECtHR has had the chance to express itself 
on such special seats designed to promote the position of minority groups and 
on other issues that can be connected to effective participation of minorities 
(see below, section 5.2.).15 This has been done against the background of 
Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights: 
 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at 
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will 
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice 
of the legislature. 
 
14 The ECtHR held in the case of Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom 
(ECtHR, Jdg. of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 25, § 63) that, although 
individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, 
democracy does not simply mean that the views of the majority must always 
prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment 
of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position. 
15 There may be a link to effective participation here through language in the Preamble 
to the ECHR, according to which fundamental freedoms are best maintained by, 
inter alia, an “effective political democracy”, which may, depending on the 




The provision is about the general right to free elections, originally formulated 
as a duty for the State to hold free elections. It does not specifically apply to 
minorities, although there is a possibility that a minority dimension is 
supported by Article 14 ECHR. Persons who may be members of a minory 
group and also political parties that represent minority points of view have, 
however, used Article 3 of the First Protocol to bring cases to the ECtHR. 
When resolved, such cases become part of a praxis that is relevant within the 
categories of effective participation of national minorities itemized in the LR. 
 
3. Obligation of the State to Ensure Effective Participation 
 
Similarly to the Copenhagen Document of 1990, Article 15 FCNM, adopted 
in 1995, makes reference to the concept of effective participation of national 
minorities. Article 15 FCNM stipulates the following: 
 
The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective 
participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, 
social, and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those 
affecting them. 
 
The provision is very general and does not, at least formally speaking, create 
any right for persons belonging to minorities to effective participation, but 
instead a duty on the part of the State to create conditions that are necessary 
for the effective participation of minorities. Therefore, on the basis of the text, 
the States have a positive obligation, but persons belonging to minorities or 
minorities as a collective do not have any prima facie rights on the basis of the 
article. The provision also makes an interesting material distinction between 
effective participation in cultural, social and economic life, on the one hand, 
and in public life, on the other, adding to the latter an emphasis for such 
public affairs that affect the persons belonging to national minorities. It seems 
reasonable to think that the term public affairs has, in Article 15 FCNM, the 
same reach as identified by the HRC in General Comment no. 25 for Article 
25 CCPR, namely the legislative, executive, and administrative powers in a 
State and institutionally all aspects of public administration in a State, 
including the formulation and implementation of policy at the international, 
national, regional, and local levels. What effective participation entails in a 




According to the Explanatory Report to the FCNM,16 Article 15 FCNM aims, 
above all, to encourage real equality between persons belonging to national 
minorities and those forming a part of the majority. Therefore, de facto 
equality, not equality de jure, is the focus of Article 15. In order to create the 
necessary conditions for effective participation by persons belonging to 
national minorities, the Explanatory Report mentions that the States could 
promote – in the framework of their constitutional systems – a variety of 
measures. Here, the internal constitutional systems of the States seem to set 
the framework for what can be expected of a State: in some countries, the 
constitution may be more permissive, whereas in other, the constitution may 
be less so. Examples of measures that are available could be, according to the 
Explanatory Report, inter alia, the following: when Parties are contemplating 
legislation or administrative measures likely to affect minorities directly, 
consulting with these persons, by means of appropriate procedures and, in 
particular, through their representative institutions; involving these persons in 
the preparation, implementation and assessment of national and regional 
development plans and programmes likely to affect them directly; undertaking 
studies in conjunction with these persons to assess possible impacts of 
projected development activities; effective participation of persons belonging 
to national minorities in the decision-making processes and elected bodies 
both at national and local levels; and decentralised or local forms of 
government. 
 
The AC has produced lines of interpretation about what effective participation 
of minorities could and should entail against the background of Article 15 
FCNM. The legal situation concerning effective participation of minorities 
has, while keeping these original features, moved at least some from this 
starting point. 
 
4. Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National 
Minorities in Public Life as a Background 
 
In 1999, an expert meeting convened by the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities developed the Lund Recommendations on effective participation of 
minorities within the framework of para. 35 of the Copenhagen Document. In 
doing so, the expert meeting used the open-ended nature of para. 35 and 
 
16 Explanatory Report appended to the Framework Convention on National Minorities, 
para. 80, at 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?
documentId=09000016800c10cf (accessed on 8 February 2016). 
 
 
elaborated recommendations and outlined alternatives in line with the relevant 
international standards of participatory forms that could be effective for 
minorities beyond “ordinary” participation.17 Therefore, the CCPR and the 
FCNM as well as the UN Declaration were included amongst the relevant 
international standards considered when drafting the LR. However, the LR do 
actually not depart from a right of minorities to effective participation, but use 
a language which instead seems to emphasize the obligation of the State to 
ensure effective participation for minorities. In this respect, the LR deviate 
from the point of departure of Article 25 CCPR, Article 2(3) of the UN 
Declaration and para. 35 of the CSCE Copenhagen Document and show an 
affinity with Article 15 FCNM. Still, the LR should be understood as a further 
development of the right to effective participation mentioned in para. 35 of the 
Copenhagen Document. In doing so, the LR go on to develop a more 
comprehensive listing of alternatives in two prongs, one being participation in 
the governance of the State as a whole and the other self-governance over 
certain local or internal affairs.18 
 
In the first prong, participation in the governance of the State as a whole, the 
LR list the following broader categories (with more specific subdivisions not 
necessarily mentioned here): arrangements at the level of the central 
government, elections, arrangements at the regional and local levels, and 
advisory and consultative bodies. In the second prong, other self-governance 
over certain local or internal affairs, the LR list the following broader 
categories (with more specific subdivisions not necessarily mentioned here): 
non-territorial arrangements and territorial arrangements. 
 
Below, these categories will be used to indicate how the cases resolved by the 
European Court of Human Rights and the recommendations issued by the 
 
17 In the case of Grosaru v. Romania (ECtHR, Jdg. of 2 March 2010), the ECtHR 
makes reference to the Lund Recommendations in para. 25 of Section II, entitled 
Relevant Domestic and International Law and Practice: “C. Lund 
recommendations on the effective participation of national minorities in public 
life. 25. The Lund recommendations were adopted in Lund (Sweden) in 
September 1999 by a group of international experts under the aegis of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). The relevant parts of those recommendations read 
as follows: […].” The Court then quotes part B on the elections, that is, paras. 7 
through 10 LR. This means that the LR have at least in one case of the ECtHR 
received recognition by the Court in a manner that enhances their status and bring 
the concept of effective participation of minorities into the context of free 
elections in Article 3 of the First Protocol. 
18 The Lund Recommendations, Introduction, p. 6. 
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Advisory Committee to the FCNM fit into the framework of the Lund 
Recommendations. From a methodological perspective, the LR are used here 
as a yardstick or a measurement tool to measure the possibility to create a 
profile for the concept of effective participation of national minorities in 
public life in the European space through considering the praxis of the ECtHR 
on the basis of Article 3 of the First Protocol ECHR and the praxis of the AC 
on the basis of Article 15 FCNM. 
 
5. Participation in the Governance of the State as a Whole 
 
5.1.  Arrangements at the Level of the Central Government 
 
The ECtHR has dealt with special representation of national minorities or 
other forms of guaranteed participation in the legislative process relevant to 
para. 6 LR in the case of Danis et l’association des personnes d’origine 
turque c. Roumanie (ECtHR, Jdg of 21 Apr. 2015). In the elections of 2004, 
two organisations representing the Turkish population were competing over 
the one seat dedicated to the Turkish population. The other received a greater 
number of votes and thus its representative was seated in the Romanian 
parliament as representative of the Turkish population. In the election of 2008, 
the incumbent was considered automatically registered, but this “incumbent” 
minority organization of the Turks in Romania was treated favourably 
because of a relatively late change of rules that required the other organization 
to fulfil certain criteria. In turn, the significant competitor was rendered 
incapable of filing candidates under the new registration requirement. The 
Court found a violation of Article 14 ECHR in combination with Article 3 of 
the First Protocol: minority parties or political organisations competing about 
the one seat in the Parliament must be treated equitably. 
 
The AC has provided relatively general recommendations under para. 6 LR to 
a large number of States during first,19 second,20 and third21 cycles of 
monitoring. In fact, it appears that these more general recommendations 
 
19 Altogether 21 States: Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland. 
20 Altogether 27 States: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, UK. 
21 Altogether 16 States: Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Kosovo, Norway, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK. 
 
 
constitute the largest portion of recommendations during the three monitoring 
cycles, although during the third cycle, they seem to be fewer. These 
recommendations deal with general opportunities for minorities to have an 
effective voice in the central government. For instance, in the first cycle of 
reporting concerning Romania, the AC was identifying similar problems as 
the ECtHR around organisations represented in Parliament and/or the Council 
of National Minorities that enjoyed a preferential treatment in comparison to 
other organisations representing minorities. It recommended that the 
Government, in the allocation of state support, proceed not exclusively 
through the organisations represented in Parliament and/or the Council of 
National Minorities, but also through the channel of other organisations 
representing minorities. In the second cycle, Bulgaria received the 
recommendation to “take measures to improve minorities’ representation in 
elected assemblies, by removing all undue obstacles, including those 
enshrined in law, to the effective participation in public affairs of persons 
belonging to national minorities. Substantial efforts should be made to 
promote a better representation of the Roma at all levels. Particular attention 
should also be paid to the representation of persons belonging to numerically 
smaller minorities.”22 During the third cycle of monitoring, the AC invited 
Slovenian authorities “to ensure timely and effective consultation of 
representatives of the Hungarian and Italian minorities, especially when 
preparing new legislation of concern to them, in order to make sure that their 
views are duly taken into account”.23 
 
In addition, para. 6 LR contains four sub-paragraphs that deal with special 
arrangements to create opportunities for minorities to have an effective voice 
in the central government. Necessary and situation-specific special 
arrangements are outlined in a non-exclusive list of four sub-paragraphs. 
Taken together with the above general recommendations under para. 6 LR, 
these sub-paragraphs make the entire para. 6 LR the largest in terms of AC 
recommendations to States (followed by AC recommendations concerning 
para. 12 LR on advisory and consultative bodies). 
 
The first sub-paragraph of para. 6 LR incorporates recommendations by the 
AC to the States during the first,24 the second25 and the third26 cycle of 
 
22 Second Opinion on Bulgaria, adopted on 18 March 2010, FCNM/II(2012)001, paras. 
188, 189. 
23 Third Opinion on Slovenia, adopted on 31 March 2011, para. 128. 




monitoring for special representation of national minorities, for example, 
through a reserved number of seats in one or both chambers of parliament or 
in parliamentary committees; and other forms of guaranteed participation in 
the legislative process. Interestingly, the number of recommendations in this 
sub-category was relatively large during the third cycle. In the first cycle of 
monitoring, the AC noted concerning Hungary that, “to date, domestic legal 
provisions concerning the possibility for national minorities to be represented 
in Parliament have not been implemented through the adoption of relevant 
legislation” and recommended “that Hungary take appropriate action towards 
implementation of these provisions”.27 In the second cycle, a recommendation 
was issued to Hungary in the same vein, but there was also a recommendation 
for Poland to “examine, in consultation with the representatives of the 
national minorities, legislative and practical measures which would create the 
necessary conditions for the political representation of minorities in the Sejm 
and the Senate to reflect more adequately the composition of Polish 
society”.28 During the third cycle, the above recommendation concerning 
Hungary was repeated, and a similar recommendation was issued for Kosovo. 
 
The second sub-paragraph of para. 6 LR can incorporate AC 
recommendations to the States during the first,29 second,30 and third31 cycles 
of monitoring on formal or informal understandings for allocating to members 
of national minorities to cabinet positions, seats on the supreme or 
constitutional court or lower courts, and positions on nominated advisory 
bodies or other high-level organs. This category is not particularly well 
developed in the AC praxis, but contains some concrete proposals. One 
example is from the first cycle concerning Latvia, when the AC found that the 
role of the Council for Minority Participation in the decision-making process 
was too limited regarding measures affecting national minorities. The AC 
considered “that the authorities, in co-operation with the minorities’ 
representatives, should identify ways of making it more effective”.32 For 
Lithuania, the second cycle contained, inter alia, the recommendation to 
 
25 Altogether 4 States: Cyprus, Finland, Hungary, Poland. 
26 Altogether 11 States: Armenia, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Kosovo, Poland, Russian Federation, Ukraine. 
27 Opinion on Hungary, adopted on 22 September 2000, p. 16. 
28 Second Opinion on Poland, adopted on 20 March 2009, ACFC/OP/II(2009)002, 
para. 194. 
29 Altogether 4 States: Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Poland. 
30 Altogether 3 States: Ireland, Lithuania, Poland. 
31 Altogether 4 States: Albania, Cyprus, Finland, Italy. 
32 Opinion on Latvia, adopted on 9 October 2008, ACFC/OP/I(2008)002, para. 203. 
 
 
permanently maintain the post of Minority Advisor within the Prime 
Minister’s Office in order to make full use of the potential of the Permanent 
Group of Experts and to consult with it on a more regular basis. In the third 
cycle, Albania was recommended to review and revise, “preferably within the 
framework of the adoption of a comprehensive law on national minorities, the 
composition and the functioning of the institutional bodies responsible for 
minority issues, with a view to establishing regular dialogue and effective 
decision-making between, on the one hand, a government body enjoying 
decision-making power and, on the other hand, organisations which truly 
represent the various national minorities”.33 
 
During the first,34 second35 and third36 cycles, the third sub-paragraph of para. 
6 LR resulted in relatively few recommendations by the AC concerning 
mechanisms to ensure that minority interests are considered within relevant 
ministries through, e.g., personnel addressing minority concerns or issuance 
of standing directives. The recommendation for Croatia during the first cycle 
was to continue to pursue initiatives aimed at improving the effectiveness of 
these bodies and, in doing so, ensure that persons belonging to national 
minorities have a central standing in the resulting organisational structure. In 
the second cycle, the United Kingdom was recommended to keep its new 
project-based approach to consultations under review and to ensure that the 
closure of the Race Relations Forum and other standing consultative 
structures has not had any detrimental impact on the opportunities for 
minority ethnic communities to participate in public life. In the third cycle, 
Ukraine was urged “to re-establish a specialised and stable government body 
with sufficient financial and human resources to co-ordinate all issues relating 
to national minority protection, in order to ensure transparency and build 
confidence that adequate levels of attention are paid by the state to minority 
protection issues”.37 
 
Finally, the fourth sub-paragraph of para. 6 LR concerning special measures 
for minority participation in the civil service as well as the provision of public 
 
33 Third Opinion on Albania, adopted on 23 November 2011, ACFC/OP/III(2011)009, 
para. 171. 
34 Altogether 7 States: Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, 
Ukraine. 
35 Altogether 3 States: Germany, Switzerland, UK. 
36 Altogether 6 States: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Denmark, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Ukraine. 




services in the languages of the national minority resulted in a level of 
attention from the AC to recruitment (including the judiciary) during the 
first,38 second39 and third40 cycle of monitoring which is perhaps overall 
somewhat higher than for the other three sub-paragraphs. In the first cycle, the 
AC used, for the first time so far, a sharper language usually found in treaty 
bodies like the ECtHR when concluding for Croatia that the situation 
concerning minorities in public service employment is not compatible with 
Article 15 FCNM. The AC recommended that Croatia “closely monitors the 
situation in all sectors with a view to ensuring that no discriminatory measures 
are taken and introduce additional positive measures aimed at eradicating the 
persisting negative consequences of the past practices”.41 In the second cycle, 
recommendations for Serbia are relatively concrete in calling upon the 
authorities to take vigorous measures to address the under-representation of 
national minorities in public administration and in the judiciary, particularly 
for the Albanian and the Bosniac minorities, and asking for specific attention 
to be paid to ensure an adequate representation of the Bosniacs in Sandžak’s 
police force. These recommendations were renewed for Serbia in the third 
cycle, and similar ones were issued for Macedonia, requesting authorities to 
ensure that “posts which are offered to persons belonging to national 
minorities have clear duties and remits associated with them which allow for 
the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in the 
economic life of the country”.42 
 
The entire para. 6 of the Lund Recommendations, including the four sub-
paragraphs, covers the largest material part of the AC’s recommendations 
within the framework of the three completed cycles of monitoring. In the 
fourth cycle, the AC’s comments relevant within para. 6 LR have so far been 
issued for Cyprus43 and Slovakia.44 From this, it appears as if the line 
 
38 Altogether 13 States: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Italy, Latvia, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, UK. 
39 Altogether 12 States: Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Moldova, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Switzerland, UK. 
40 Altogether 9 States: Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Serbia, Slovakia. 
41 Opinion on Croatia, adopted on 6 April 2001, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)003, p. 21. The 
only other reference to incompatibility was included in a recommendation for 
Estonia concerning election issues during the first cycle. See Opinion on Estonia, 
adopted on 14 September 2001, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)005, para. 55. 
42 Third Opinion on “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, adopted on 30 
March 2011, ACFC/OP/III(2011)001, para. 174. 
43 Cyprus:  Para. 77: “The AC calls on the authorities to further strengthen the 








Para. 7 LR focuses on the electoral process as a channel for effective minority 
participation. In the case of Ofensiva Tinerilor c. Roumanie (ECtHR, Jdg. of 
15 Dec. 2015), a political association claiming to represent the Polish in 
Romania was denied registration in parliamentary elections, in part because 
the registration of a new political association was opposed by another 
organization already representing the Polish. The Court was of the opinion 
that the denial was based on unclear legislation and was actually arbitrary. 
The lack of clarity in the election law of Romania on how it would be applied 
to national minorities, as well as the absence of sufficient guarantees for the 
impartiality of the bodies charged with examining the applicant’s nomination 
of candidature, both violated the guarantees afforded by Article 3 of the First 
Protocol. Although the case dealt with the nomination of candidates to the 
minority seat, here relevant for para. 7 LR, it bears an affinity with the 
allocation of seats in the case of Grosaru v. Romania (see below, section 5.2.). 
 
Total exclusion of certain minority groups from participation in elections 
obviously runs counter to the guarantees of Article 3 of the First Protocol, in 
particular in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR. As established in the case of 
Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (ECtHR, Jdg. of 22 Dec. 2009), a 
constitutional requirement to identify with one of the three constituent peoples 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs) led to the exclusion 
 
making processes affecting their communities’ interests and concerns. It 
encourages them to take the necessary steps to effectively promote the 
recruitment of members of these communities into public administration, the 
judiciary and law-enforcement bodies.” Para. 78: “The AC calls on the 
authorities to promote direct representation of Roma interests and concerns in all 
decision-making affecting this community.” 
44 The Slovak Republic: Para. 80: “The AC encourages authorities to promote the 
adequate representation of national minorities in public life, including through 
measures that facilitate their engagement in broader political processes and 
mainstream political parties.” Para. 81: “The AC further calls on the authorities 
to review the position of the Plenipotentiary for National Minorities within the 
broader human rights structure, to ensure that high-level political attention is 
accorded to all issues pertaining to national minority protection, and that the 
views and concerns of all minorities are effectively considered in relevant 
decision-making processes. Para. 82: The AC further urges the authorities to 
promote the recruitment of persons belonging to national minorities, in particular 
Roma, into public service.” 
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of, for instance, persons belonging to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Roma and 
Jewish minorities. This was deemed a violation of the ECHR. Hence although 
the three so-called constituent peoples had every opportunity to effective 
participation on the basis of the guarantees in the constitutional structure of 
the State, such as with veto mechanisms concerning vital issues, every other 
minority group was actually prevented from participating in elections if they 
chose to not self-identify with one of the constituent peoples.45 
 
Similarly, in the case of Aziz v. Cyprus (ECtHR, Jdg. of 22 June 2004), the 
ECtHR found that the Turkish population living in the part of Cyprus 
controlled by the Government of Cyprus was deprived of the right to vote and 
stand in elections to the Cypriot legislature in contravention of Article 3 of the 
First Protocol. The Court observed (para. 26) “that the Cypriot Constitution 
came into force in August 1960. Article 63 thereof provided for two separate 
electoral lists, one for the Greek-Cypriot community and one for the Turkish-
Cypriot community. Nonetheless, the participation of the Turkish-Cypriot 
members of parliament was suspended as a result of the anomalous situation 
 
45 A similar situation emerged in the case of Zornic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(ECtHR, Jdg of 15 July 2014), where the applicant did not want to identified 
herself with any group in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, neither with any of the 
constituent peoples nor any minority group. The applicant maintained that despite 
being a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina she is denied by the Constitution any 
right to stand for election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency because she 
does not declare affiliation with one of the “constituent peoples” or any ethnic 
group. The Court made reference to Sejdić and Finci and said that elections to the 
House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina fall within the scope of Article 3 of 
the First Protocol. Accordingly, Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with 
Article 3 of the First Protocol was applicable in the Zornic case. In para. 31, the 
Government tried to argue that the applicant could at any time choose to affiliate 
with one of the “constituent people“, but the Court observed that the same could 
be said for members of minority groups, such as the applicants in Sejdić and 
Finci, or citizens without any ethnic affiliation. The Court noted that in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, “there are no objective criteria for oneʼs ethnic affiliation […]. 
It depends solely on oneʼs own self-classification. There may be different reasons 
for not declaring affiliation with any particular group, such as for example 
intermarriage or mixed parenthood or simply that the applicant wished to declare 
herself as a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While it is not clear what the 
present applicant’s reasons are, the Court considers them in any case irrelevant. 
The applicant should not be prevented from standing for elections for the House 
of Peoples on account of her personal self-classification. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that there has been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
Article 3 of the First Protocol and a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 
resulting from the applicantʼs continued ineligibility to stand for election to the 
House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the Presidency of that State. 
 
 
that began in 1963. From then on, the relevant Articles of the Constitution 
providing for the parliamentary representation of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community and the quotas to be adhered to by the two communities became 
impossible to implement in practice.” Because the applicant was completely 
deprived of any opportunity to express his opinion in the choice of the 
members of the House of Representatives in the country of which he is a 
national and where he has always lived, the Court found a violation of Article 
3 of the First Protocol. 
 
The AC’s direct praxis regarding elections within the framework of para. 7 
LR is relatively thin. In the first cycle, Bosnia and Herzegovina,46 Estonia47 
and Hungary48 were recommended measures in this respect, while in the 
second cycle, Albania,49 Croatia50 and the United Kingdom51 received 
 
46 The AC found that in the limited cases where there exists a possibility for national 
minorities to be represented in elected bodies through the category of “Others”, 
there have been cases of abuse. Therefore, the competent authorities should 
review the current representation of “Others” and adopt the necessary 
amendments in electoral laws to ensure that persons belonging to national 
minorities have a real chance to be elected. 
47 It was concluded that the right of persons belonging to national minorities to 
participate in public affairs is greatly advanced by the possibility of non-citizens 
(that is, Russians that formerly were citizens of the Soviet Union) to vote in local 
government council elections. It was also concluded that the Estonian language 
proficiency requirements for candidates in local and parliamentary elections are 
not compatible with Article 15 FCNM. It was recommended that Estonia pursues 
the abolition of these requirements as a matter of priority. 
48 It was concluded that the so-called “cuckoo-problem”, the situation where persons 
not belonging to a given minority, through the openness of the electoral system, 
nevertheless manage to get themselves elected as representatives of that minority, 
risks undermining the credibility of the system as a whole. It was recommended 
that Hungary actively pursues remedies for these difficulties. 
49 The AC recommended that the authorities should ensure that persons belonging to 
national minorities, in this case Roma, who have been excluded from the 
electoral process owing to the use of birth certificates as identification are fully 
included in the electoral process through the use of identity cards or any other 
system to be adopted. 
50 The AC held that Croatia should maintain its system guaranteeing the representation 
of persons belonging to national minorities in Parliament and in local and 
regional self-government, reviewing the schemes periodically in order to ensure 
that they adequately reflect the developments in the country and the needs of the 
national minorities concerned. Shortcomings in the election process should also 
be addressed in the run-up to the forthcoming elections. 
51 The AC urged the authorities to examine, in close cooperation with the persons 




recommendations to this effect. In the third cycle, only Croatia52 and 
Romania53 were issued election-related recommendations, and in the fourth 
cycle, so far Spain54 has been the only country to receive recommended 
measures in this area. It seems likely that when recommending election-
related measures for Romania, the AC is partly venturing into the same areas 
as the case of Grosaru v. Romania (see below). 
 
As concerns para. 8 LR on the regulation of the formation and activity of 
political parties under the freedom of association,55 the ECtHR has concluded 
in the case of Parti pour une société démocratique (DTP) et autres c. Turquie, 
(ECtHR, Jdg. of 12 Jan. 2016) that a legal order that prevents minority 
populations from organizing political parties and divests the elected members 
of such a party of their mandates in the parliament would run counter to 
Article 3 of the First Protocol for preventing participation. Similarly, 
concerning the prevention of political activities of a person belonging to a 
minority, the Court said in Zdanoka v. Latvia (ECtHR, Jdg. of 17 June 2004) 
that the ideas advocated by the applicant concerning the Russian-speaking 
minority in Latvia and the legislation on language matters discerned no 
evidence of anti-democratic leanings (former Communist party) or 
 
legislative bodies and identify further ways of encouraging greater participation 
of persons from minority ethnic backgrounds in electoral processes at all levels. 
52 The AC called on the Croatian authorities to devise a system to correct voter 
registration records in consultation with civil society and representatives of 
national minorities in order to ensure that the special voting rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities are duly implemented. 
53 The AC considered that the authorities should, when drafting the Law on National 
Minorities, create conditions for free and fair competition in the electoral process 
between different organisations representing national minorities. They should 
also ensure that the allocation of seats is done in a simplified and transparent 
way. 
54 Para. 98: “In addition to promoting the participation of Roma in appointed bodies, 
the AC again calls on the authorities actively to promote the effective 
participation of Roma in elected bodies at all levels, for example by promoting 
the reflection of the diversity of society in the lists of candidates of political 
parties.” 
55 In this context, it is clear on the basis of the cases of, inter alia, Sidiropoulos v. 
Greece (ECtHR, Jdg. of 10 July 1998), United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden 
v. Bulgaria (ECtHR, Jdg. of 2 Oct. 2001) and United Macedonian Organisation 
Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (ECtHR, Jdg. of  20 Oct. 2005) that 
groups of persons which want to promote minority issues, autonomy or 
secession, even if inconvenient for the State, have the right under the ECHR to 
have their organizations registered as legal persons and the right to carry out their 
activities without interference. 
 
 
incompatibility with the fundamental values of the Convention. Therefore, a 
permanent disqualification from standing for parliamentary elections was not 
proportionate to the aims that the Latvian law pursued, and also not necessary 
in a democratic society. As a consequence, a violation of the EHCR had taken 
place. In other words, attempts to promote the position of the Russian-
speakers in Latvia were not equal to activities of a forbidden political 
organization, but were instead entirely legitimate. 
 
However, an association created for minorities cannot expect to have the right 
to monopolize an electoral mechanism that the constitution of a state creates. 
In the case of Gorzelik and Others v. Poland (ECtHR, Jdg. of 17 February 
2004), the applicants tried to register a minority association for Poland’s 
Silesian minority called the “Union of People of Silesian Nationality” in the 
memorandum of association. The association aimed to conduct activities 
throughout the Polish territory and to possibly establish local branches. The 
aims of the association were perfectly legitimate, as were the means of 
achieving the aims. A number of internal issues established in the 
memorandum of association were contentious from the start, including the 
question of whether or not the Silesians constitute a minority at all. In the end, 
the organisation was denied registration. In essence, the issue from the point 
of view of the Polish authorities was that a group of persons whose minority 
character was in doubt would, by means of registering such a minority 
association, be able to secure easy access to the national parliament by 
circumventing the support threshold and thus misuse legal norms for purposes 
that they were not intended for.56 The ECtHR did not find a violation of 
Article 11 ECHR on the freedom of association, because it was “prompted by 
the need to protect the State electoral system against the applicants’ potential 
attempt to claim unwarranted privileges under electoral law”. 
  
The AC has so far not issued any recommendations under Article 15 FCNM 
that would deal with para. 8 LR, that is, with the formation and activity of 
political parties. However, there is AC praxis in this respect under Article 7 
FCNM from the first,57 the second58 and the third59 cycle of monitoring that 
 
56 It can be said against the background of Article 25(b) and (c) CCPR that the 
electoral consequences of setting up such an association could have compromised 
the equality of the vote and equal access to public service as well as the right to 
stand as candidate. See Suksi, ‘The Electoral Cycle’, pp. 17–21, 28–31. 
57 Bulgaria, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine. 
58 Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation. 
59 Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation. 
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makes it relevant for political affairs and political life of minorities. For 
instance, the AC considered that provisions in Article 11 paragraph 4 of the 
Constitution of Bulgaria concerning political parties on ethnic, racial, or 
religious lines and pertinent legislative provisions raise problematic issues in 
the light of the FCNM and thought that the authorities should re-examine the 
provisions in question in order to remedy the lack of legal certainty in these 
matters. In addition, Bulgaria was asked to secure adequate guarantees for the 
practical application of Article 7 of the Framework Convention, something 
that was repeated during the second and the third cycle, when also a reference 
was made by the AC to the case of United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden 
– PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, resolved by the ECtHR in 2005 (see above, 
fn. 51), where the dissolution of a political party of a minority was held to be 
a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR. Moldova and the Russian Federation 
appear to have similar issues with minority parties on a continuous basis. 
 
Para. 9 LR deals with the electoral system’s facilitation of minority 
representation and influence. The ECtHR would not, out of respect for the 
State’s sovereignty over matters of the electoral system, prescribe any 
particular electoral system for a State.60 However, when an electoral system 
has been put in place, such as particular electoral provisions for minorities, the 
Court will not refrain from determining whether the national electoral 
provisions are applied in a manner that is compatible with Article 3 of the 
First Protocol. As indicated by the case of Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey 
(ECtHR, Jdg. of 8 July 2008), Article 3 of the First Protocol does not seem to 
contain any requirement regarding a lower numerical threshold for minority 
representation in the legislature. The Court approved a voting threshold of 10 
% without any reserved seats, although in practice, minority groups would not 
normally be able to achieve representation in the Turkish parliament. The case 
of Riza et autres c. Bulgarie (ECtHR, Jdg of 13 Oct. 2015) deals with 
invalidation of out of country votes cast in polling stations in Turkey. The 
court was not convinced by the process of invalidation of votes cast by 
Bulgarian citizens who resided in Turkey. These actions were deemed as 
violations against the right to vote of such Bulgarian citizens who resided in 
Turkey. In addition, the actions violated the right to stand for election of three 
persons who, if the votes had been counted, would have received mandates in 
the Bulgarian parliament, where they would have represented the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria. Also, the Court considered that repeat elections for the 
affected out-of-country voters were impossible to arrange in this context. 
 
60 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, infra, section 5.3. 
 
 
Therefore, the Court held that violations of Article 3 of the First Protocol had 
taken place. 
 
Grosaru v. Romania (ECtHR, Jdg. of 2 March 2010) dealt with the allocation 
on the basis of the votes cast for the one mandate reserved to each national 
minority in Romania. The applicant was a member of the Association of 
Italians of Romania and stood as a candidate in the parliamentary elections of 
26 November 2000 for the Italian Community of Romania, one of the 
organisations representing the Italian minority in Romania. That organisation 
submitted a single-candidate list containing the applicant’s name in nineteen 
of the forty-two constituencies. Once the votes had been counted, the Central 
Electoral Office decided, on the basis of the 1992 law on elections to the 
Chamber of Deputies and to the Senate, to allocate the parliamentary seat 
belonging to the Italian minority to the Italian Community of Romania, which 
had secured 21,263 votes at the national level. Although the applicant had 
secured 5,624 votes out of a total of 21,263 at the national level, the Central 
Electoral Office allocated the parliamentary seat to another member of the 
Italian Community of Romania who had stood for election on another single-
candidate list and had secured only 2,943 votes, but winning a single 
constituency. The Court noted (para. 48) that Romania has chosen to ensure 
special representation for minorities in Parliament, and that this European 
country contains the largest number of minority parties or organisations 
represented in elections and in Parliament. The Court found that the 
applicable election rules did not specify whether the seat should be allocated 
to a candidate receiving the largest number of votes at the national level or 
constituency level, although such a detail may prove decisive when 
determining the winning candidate. In addition, the Court doubted the 
impartiality of the bodies involved in the decisions that allocated the mandate 
to a candidate with less votes, because representatives of political parties 
constituted one-half of the bodies and no judicial body had ever properly 
examined the matter. As a consequence (para. 57), the Court found a violation 
of the ECHR and considered that “the lack of clarity of the electoral law as 
regards national minorities and the lack of sufficient guarantees as to the 
impartiality of the bodies responsible for examining the applicant’s challenges 
impaired the very essence of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1”. 
 
The AC’s praxis around para. 9 LR is quite limited. Only two 
recommendations can be found, both located in the third cycle. For Albania, 
the AC encouraged the authorities to consider measures to improve the 
representation of national minorities in elected assemblies by removing all 
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undue obstacles, including those enshrined in law, particularly concerning the 
Roma and persons belonging to numerically-smaller minorities. The 
implication here appears to be, with a view to the assessment, that threshold 
requirements should be abolished for minority parties. As for Romania, the 
AC considered that the authorities should, when drafting the Law on National 
Minorities, create conditions for free and fair competition in the electoral 
process between different organisations representing national minorities. 
Here, there seems to be a link to the above case of Grosaru v. Romania, 
because the AC thought that the rules should also ensure that seats are 
allocated in a simple and transparent manner.  
 
It appears that the ECtHR has not resolved any cases that deal with 
geographical boundaries from a participation point of view concerning 
elections at the national level (para. 10 in the LR). The praxis of the AC 
concerning geographical boundaries is also very limited, with only one 
recommendation each in the first and the third cycle of monitoring. In relation 
to Ukraine, the AC concluded in the first cycle that it “finds that the specific 
rules aimed at protecting national minorities in the context of the drawing of 
constituency boundaries were not retained in the new Law on Elections, 
adopted in 2001. The Advisory Committee considers that the idea reflected in 
the previously applicable provisions should be kept in mind in the 
administrative practice and its re-introduction in the legislation should be 
considered.”61 In the case of Lithuania in the third cycle, the Advisory 
Committee encouraged “the authorities to continue a close dialogue with 
minority representatives regarding any changes to constituency boundaries to 
ensure that their opportunities to be effectively represented in the legislature 
are not negatively affected”.62 
 
5.3. Arrangements at the Regional and Local Levels 
 
The focus of Article 3 of the First Protocol is on elections to legislative 
assemblies, and because only around half of the European States have sub-
state arrangements with constitutionally defined legislative powers proper, the 
ECHR rarely applies to arrangements at the regional and local levels. In the 
case of Magnago and Südtiroler Volkspartei v. Italy (Eur.Comm.HR, Dec. of 
15 April 1996), the former European Commission of Human Rights found, in 
 
61 Opinion on Ukraine, adopted on 1 March 2002, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)010, para. 
109. 
62 Third Opinion on Lithuania, adopted on 28 November 2013, 
ACFC/OP/III(2013)005, para. 96. 
 
 
a case concerning the rights of the German-speaking minority in Northern 
Italy, that the Convention did “not compel the Contracting Parties to provide 
for positive discrimination in favour of minorities”.63 The Court noted, 
however, in the case of Partei die Friesen v. Germany (ECtHR Jdg. of 28 
January 2016) that “this decision was taken before the entry into force of the 
Framework Convention on 1 February 1998. The Court further observes that 
the Framework Convention, while acknowledging the margin of appreciation 
enjoyed by the State in electoral matters, puts an emphasis on the participation 
of national minorities in public affairs (…). However, the possibility of 
exemption from the minimum threshold is merely presented as one of many 
options in this context.” The Court went on to observe that “[t]he Advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention expressed the opinion that the 
potentially negative impact of minimum thresholds on the participation of 
national minorities in the electoral process needed to be duly taken into 
account. It considered that exemptions from threshold requirements had 
proved useful for enhancing national minority participation in elected bodies.” 
The opinions of the AC on the FCNM may thus influence the interpretations 
of the ECtHR.64 
  
The issue of special representation at the level of a constituent state of a 
federation as an exponent of para. 11 LR (corresponding to para. 6 at the level 
of the central government) was dealt with in the case of Partei die Friesen v. 
Germany (ECtHR Jdg. of 28 January 2016). The applicant party, which 
represented a national minority, claimed that the rights of the minority had 
been violated by the Land Niedersachsen because it had not introduced similar 
exemptions for minority parties in Lower Saxony as had been introduced for 
other national minorities in two other states of the federation (for the Danes in 
Schleswig-Holstein and for the Sorbs in Sachsen and Brandenburg).  The 
Court said (para. 41) that it has, by making reference to the case of Gorzelik 
and Others v. Poland, found “that the forming of an association in order to 
express and promote its identity may be instrumental in helping a minority to 
preserve and uphold its rights”. The Court agreed with a German court in that 
“no clear and binding obligation derives from the Framework Convention to 
exempt national minority parties from electoral thresholds. The States parties 
to the Framework Convention enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in how to 
approach the Framework Convention’s aim of promoting the effective 
 
63 As quoted in Partei die Friesen v. Germany, para. 42, infra. 
64 Opinions of the Advisory Committee on the FCNM are referenced also in the case 




participation of persons belonging to national minorities in public affairs as 
stipulated in Article 15. Consequently, the Court takes the view that, even 
interpreted in the light of the Framework Convention, the Convention does 
not call for a different treatment in favour of minority parties in this context.” 
Therefore, Germany was not in violation of Article 14 ECHR read in 
conjunction with Article 3 of the First Protocol when no exemption from the 
voting threshold had been created for minority parties in Lower Saxony. It 
was entirely within the legislative sovereignty of the state in the federation, in 
this case Lower Saxony, to determine whether or not such an exemption 
should apply in that state (Land). The exemptions held by other minority 
parties in other states on the basis of their respective state laws were not 
considered discriminatory in relation to the party in Lower Saxony. 
 
Para. 11 LR is a recurring theme amongst the AC’s recommendations. The 
largest number of recommendations was made during the first cycle of 
monitoring,65 while there have been less recommendations given during the 
second66 and the third67 cycles. Decentralisation was one technique favoured 
by the AC during the first cycle, reflected in the recommendations for Serbia 
and Montenegro. However, already during the first cycle of monitoring, the 
AC pinpointed a problem for Ukraine that today exists for the Russian 
Federation: “The Advisory Committee finds that, following the abolition of 
reserved seats in the legislature of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the 
presence of Crimean Tatars in the said body has been drastically reduced. The 
Advisory Committee considers that Ukraine should pursue its efforts to 
improve this situation.”68 During the second cycle, focus on general 
decentralization measures was dropped, while a very specific recommendation 
was made for Slovenia concerning the position of the Roma in the area of 
local self-government, in particular to ensure that a Roma councillor could be 
elected to the Grosuplje local council. The AC continued to place emphasis on 
Roma during Slovenia’s third cycle. A similar recommendation was made for 
Bulgaria. A recommendation for Germany in the fourth cycle also focused on 
the situation of the Roma and Sinti. However, in addition, Germany received 
recommendations concerning more effective participation of the Sorbian 
 
65 Altogether 10 States: Azerbaijan, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Russian Federation, Serbia, Ukraine. 
66 Altogether 6 States: Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Serbia, Slovenia, Switzerland, 
UK. 
67 Altogether 6 States: Armenia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, Slovenia, UK. 




minority in decision-making processes. 
 
A guarantee at the regional level for the rights of persons belonging to 
national minorities according to para. 11 LR (with reference to para.7) was 
handled in the case of Polacco and Garofalo (Eur.Comm.HR, Decision of 15 
September 1997, D&R 90-A). In this case, the European Commission on 
Human Rights concluded that “only those who had been living continuously 
in the Trentino-Alto Adige Region for at least four years could be registered 
to vote in elections for the Regional Council, which were held every five 
years”. The Commission took the view that this requirement was not 
disproportionate to the aim pursued given the region's particular social, 
political and economic situation and considered that “it could not be regarded 
as unreasonable to require voters to reside there for a lengthy period of time 
before they could take part in local elections, in order to acquire a thorough 
understanding of the regional context so that their vote could reflect the 
concern for the protection of linguistic minorities”. A somewhat similar 
situation was at hand in the case of Py v. France (ECtHR, Jdg. of 11 Jan. 
2005), which dealt with the French territory of New Caledonia in the Pacific 
Ocean (a part of France for the purposes of the ECHR), where the indigenous 
population, the Kanaks, was facing an influx of immigration from 
metropolitan France and also from other countries. The applicant, who was 
from metropolitan France, was subject to local legislation passed by the 
Congress of New Caledonia. But in order to be able to vote in the elections, 
the election legislation imposed a residence requirement of ten years, which 
amounted to two mandate periods of the legislature. Although the residence 
requirement might appear disproportionate to the aim pursued, the Court 
raised the issue of whether there are local requirements in New Caledonia 
within the meaning of Article 56 ECHR, such that the restriction in question 
on the right to vote may be deemed not to breach Article 3 of the First 
Protocol. The Court opined that local requirements, if they refer to the specific 
legal status of a territory, must be of a compelling nature if they are to justify 
the application of Article 56 ECHR. The Court felt (para. 64) that “the history 
and status of New Caledonia are such that they may be said to constitute 
‘local requirements’ warranting the restrictions imposed on the applicant's 
right to vote”. In those circumstances (para. 65), “the very essence of the 
applicant's right to vote, as guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, has not 
been impaired”. Consequently, there was no violation of the provision. 
 
In an interesting admissibility case of Federacion Nacionalista Canaria v. 
Spain (ECtHR, inadmissibilty decision of 7 June 2001), the Court was within 
the purview of para. 11 LR concerning regional and local levels with 
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reference to para. 7 on elections. With a  reference to the cases of Mathieu-
Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium (ECtHR, Jdg. of 2 March 1987) and Matthews 
v. the United Kingdom (ECtHR, Jdg. of 18 Feb. 1999), the Court reiterated 
(para. 1) that the word “legislature” does not necessarily mean the national 
parliament and opined that the word has to be interpreted in light of the 
constitutional structure of the State in question.  Regarding Spain, the Court 
notes that Article 66 of the Constitution confers the exercise of legislative 
power on Parliament (Cortes Generales), and because the Autonomous 
Communities have legislative assemblies that participate in the exercise of 
legislative power, they are therefore part of the “legislature” within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the First Protocol. The Court noted that the choice of 
electoral system by which the free expression of the opinion of the people in 
the choice of the legislature is ensured – whether it is based on proportional 
representation, the “first-past-the-post” system, or some other arrangement – 
is a matter in which the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation. The 
applicant asserted that due to the system of proportional representation in 
force in the Autonomous Community of the Canary Islands and the thresholds 
set in order to avoid the fragmentation of political representation, it had been 
denied the opportunity to represent, in the Autonomous Community’s 
legislative assembly, more than 28% of those who had voted on the island of 
Lanzarote. The system founded by the Statute of Autonomy for the Canary 
Islands established that the number of residents per seat in each of the 
constituencies had to lie within specified limits: either at least 30% of all valid 
votes must be obtained in an individual constituency, or at least 6% of all 
valid votes must be obtained in the Autonomous Community as a whole. The 
Court considered that this kind of system, instead of hindering election of 
candidates such as those put forward by the applicant federation, actually 
“affords smaller political groups a certain degree of protection. It emphasises 
that in the instant case the applicant federation did not satisfy either of the 
conditions prescribed by law.” The application was found to be manifestly ill-
founded and therefore inadmissible. 
 
Recommendations touching upon elections at the regional and local levels are 
not prominent within the praxis of the AC. The number of recommendations 
is relatively even in the three cycles, with three in the first cycle,69 five in the 
second one,70 and two in the third one.71 In each cycle, Bosnia and 
 
69 Altogether 3 States: Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Russian Federation, Slovenia. 
70 Altogether 5 States: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Latvia, Russian Federation, 
Spain. 
71 Altogether 2 States: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia. 
 
 
Herzegovina received recommendations targeted towards assuring the 
electoral rights of national minorities at the local level, from including the 
other minorities (outside of the constituent peoples) and improving the 
inclusiveness of local elections in the first cycle to ensuring that the positive 
measures in favour of national minorities are not exploited by persons or 
groups who do not represent persons belonging to national minorities in the 
second cycle. Also in the third cycle, there was somewhat of a shift in the 
focus of recommendations for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Still, the basic tenet is 
the same, supplemented with the wish to review the criteria for inclusion of 
national minority representatives on party lists so as to prevent abuse of the 
system by candidates who do not represent national minorities and by a wish 
to review the 3% threshold for guaranteed reserved seats, taking account of 
the results of the next census when they become available. Also, the AC was 
concerned about the drop in the number of minority representatives elected in 
the 2012 local elections and requested a review in order to remedy any 
problems identified in time for the next local elections in 2016. 
 
Neither the European Court of Human Rights (which has no competence in 
the area of non-legislative elections) nor the Advisory Committee on the 
FCNM has given any interpretations concerning the regional or local level 
with respect to paras. 8 and 9 LR. This makes it impossible to know what the 
concept of effective participation might contain in the areas of political parties 
and the electoral system as applied in regional and local elections. 
 
As concerns the reference in para. 11 LR to para. 10 on geographic boundaries 
at the regional level, an issue that is probably of great importance for 
minorities, the ECtHR has actually not resolved any cases related to this issue 
except for in the case of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium (ECtHR, 
Jdg. of 2 March 1987). In this case, the boundary issue is indirectly present for 
elections at the regional level. According to the Court (para. 57), “[o]ne of the 
consequences for the linguistic minorities is that they must vote for candidates 
willing and able to use the language of their region”. The Court conceded that 
a similar requirement is found in the organisation of elections in a relatively 
high number of States, and that such requirements do not necessarily threaten 
minority interests. “This is particularly true, in respect of a system which 
makes concessions to the territoriality principle, where the political and legal 
order provides safeguards against inopportune or arbitrary changes - by 
requiring, for example, special majorities (…). The French-speaking electors 
in the district of Halle-Vilvoorde enjoy the right to vote and the right to stand 
for election on the same legal footing as the Dutch-speaking electors. They are 
in no way deprived of these rights by the mere fact that they must vote either 
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for candidates who will take the parliamentary oath in French and will 
accordingly join the French-language group in the House of Representatives 
or the Senate and sit on the French Community Council, or else for candidates 
who will take the oath in Dutch and so belong to the Dutch-language group in 
the House of Representatives or the Senate and sit on the Flemish Council. 
This is not a disproportionate limitation such as would thwart ‘the free 
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’.”72 
Here, the geographical boundary between the linguistic groups was apparently 
considered neither opportune nor arbitrary. The resulting consequences for 
those elected concerning the required language for the oath of office were 
considered legitimate. The AC has not given any recommendations relevant 
for this dimension of effective participation. 
 
5.4. Advisory and Consultative Bodies 
 
Bodies with advisory and consultative tasks, mentioned in para. 12 (and 13) 
LR, fall outside the ambit of Article 3 of the First Protocol because they are 
not legislative bodies elected by means of general elections. Therefore, the 
ECtHR has no praxis concerning such bodies. In contrast, the Advisory 
Committee on the FCNM has a wide praxis within this area. In fact, the 
prevalence of recommendations dealing with advisory and consultative bodies 
almost reaches the level of general recommendations linking to para. 6 LR. 
Combined with the recommendations within para. 6 LR, the recommendations 
linking to para. 12 LR (and para. 13 LR) emphasize consultations with 
minorities as a main mode of engaging minorities in effective participation. 
Conversely, this probably means that recommendations leading to actual 
decision-making powers for minorities are fewer (see below). 
 
Recommendations concerning the creation or functioning of advisory and 
consultative bodies were plentiful in the first,73 second,74 and third75 cycles of 
 
72 The special majorities mentioned in the case as a protection against inopportune or 
arbitrary changes of boundaries are matched in the LR by language to the same 
effect in para. 22. 
73 Altogether 18 States: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Italy, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, 
Slovakia. 
74 Altogether 20 States: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, 
Italy, Kosovo, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine. 
 
 
monitoring. In addition, the number of recommendations issued by the AC 
increased during each monitoring cycle, bringing these types of 
recommendations to par with the more general recommendations linked to 
para. 6 LR. In such a setting, it is only natural that the same countries are 
often featured in all of the monitoring cycles, such as Armenia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Finland, Russian Federation, 
and Slovakia. Here, focus will be on recommendations issued to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria. 
 
In the first cycle, Bosnia and Herzegovina was issued a recommendation 
concerning the Council of National Minorities, which should have been 
established no later than 14 November 2003 as a special advisory body of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to gather representatives 
of national minorities, but had not been set up by the time of monitoring. The 
AC considered such a body instrumental to enhancing the participation of 
persons belonging to national minorities in view of the many obstacles 
hampering their direct access to a number of elected bodies. The AC 
recommended that similar councils be established in the Federation and in 
Republika Srpska. Such councils were deemed especially necessary to 
alleviate the situation of the non-constituent peoples, and it was recommended 
that the Advisory Board for Roma should include Roma representatives and 
be regularly consulted on relevant issues by the competent ministries on 
relevant issues. The AC returned to this topic in the second cycle and voiced a 
certain improvement of the situation, although there still were outstanding 
issues concerning advisory and consultative bodies, especially around the 
efficient functioning of the Council of National Minorities and an increase the 
financial and human resources at the Advisory Committee for Roma’s 
disposal. Also, the AC called for the rapid and transparent appointment of a 
Council of National Minorities of the Federation, as outlined in the 
Federation's Law on National Minorities. Finally, in the third cycle, the AC 
focused on the functioning of the advisory and consultative bodies in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina by making recommendations to improve their activities 
through de-politicizing their activities and ensuring that the members of the 
Council are genuinely representative of national minorities, particularly the 
Roma. It also urged the authorities to pay special attention to the proposals put 
forward by the Councils of National Minorities. It suggested that such 
 
75 Altogether 24 States: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Kosovo, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, UK. 
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proposals be followed up on, and that any decision not to address the 
proposals should be justified. 
 
For Bulgaria, the position and functioning of a particular advisory body has 
been in focus. In the first cycle, the recommendation was relatively general, 
focusing on additional efforts needed at the institutional level to enhance 
consultation of minorities on issues concerning them. The AC proposed 
strengthening of the Council for Ethnic and Demographic Questions. Further 
focus on functions and membership can be found in the recommendations 
from the second cycle, when the AC called on the Bulgarian authorities to 
ensure that the National Council for Co-operation on Ethnic and Demographic 
Issues can effectively play its role as a consultation mechanism and enable 
persons belonging to national minorities to participate effectively in decision-
making. The AC also called on the authorities to ensure that admission of 
NGOs representing national minorities to the National Council for Co-
operation on Ethnic and Demographic Issues follows a transparent and 
inclusive process and that the length of time for which they are admitted be 
extended to at least three years. Finally, in the third cycle, the AC makes 
recommendations to enhance the position of the advisory body through further 
clarification of powers and strengthening the role of the National Council for 
Cooperation on Ethnic and Integration Issues in order to ensure that it enables 
persons belonging to national minorities to participate effectively in decision-
making. 
 




Because Article 3 of the First Protocol deals with elections to the legislature, 
the ECHR does not have a direct bearing on the organizational structures or 
institutional solutions suggested by the LR in the second prong, such as 
territorial and non-territorial arrangements. In so far as a participatory 
structure for a minority involves a territorial arrangement with legislative 
powers, the ECHR has, as we have seen above, some relevance for self-
governance. In general, however, the ECHR does not require any particular 
administrative structure from a State, but allows a lot of discretion for the 
State concerning its internal organisational arrangements. 
 
The situation could be different with the FCNM, especially concerning the 
requirement on effective participation for minorities. Effective participation 
could be brought about by means of, for instance, non-territorial and territorial 
 
 
arrangements, where persons belonging to minorities assume the leading 
positions in the organizational structures, perhaps with relatively far reaching 
decision-making powers, and often even legislative powers. It is interesting 
however to note that the AC seldom touches upon non-territorial 
arrangements and rarely recommends anything concerning sub-state 
arrangements such as territorial autonomy. Perhaps the AC thinks that issues 
of this kind touch upon the core of the sovereignty of a State and is therefore 
cautious to comment on these issues. Another natural reason for the low level 
of recommendations in this area might be the fact that we are still early into 
the history of the FCNM. Therefore, it is reasonable to start with general 
recommendations (such as consultation processes and organs), and if the 
general recommendations fail to make an impact, the level of requirements 
that the FCNM establishes for States concerning effective participation of 
minorities could be increased. 
 
6.2. Non-Territorial Arrangements 
 
Different non-territorial arrangements for securing effective participation may 
provide tailor-made solutions for minority needs. As indicated above, the low 
number of recommendations given by the AC during the first,76 second,77 and 
third78 monitoring cycles that concern paras. 17 and 18 LR on non-territorial 
arrangements is striking. In addition, some of the recommendations are issued 
under Article 5 FCNM on the preservation of culture and identity instead of 
Article 15 FCNM. 
 
The recommendations of the AC are issued to States that already have non-
territorial arrangements in place (or, as concerns Romania and Serbia during 
the second cycle, with forthcoming legislation, which implies that the decision 
to introduce the arrangement had already been made by the State). This means 
that the AC has actually not issued any such recommendation to any State that 
would promote the introduction of non-territorial arrangements for a national 
minority. Instead, the AC has been interested in supporting the activities of 
existing institutional arrangements and in specifying procedures surrounding 
such arrangements, emphasizing in particular the consultation mechanisms in 
relation to such arrangements. There is less attention to such substance that 
might be important for national minorities mentioned in para. 18 LR, such as 
education, culture, use of minority language, and other matters crucial to the 
 
76 Altogether 4 States: Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Sweden. 
77 Altogether 6 States: Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Sweden. 
78 Altogether 5 States: Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Serbia, Sweden. 
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identities and lifestyles of national minorities. All of the AC’s 
recommendations deal with so-called cultural autonomy, but there is no single 
recommendation concerning other forms of non-territorial arrangements such 
as functional autonomy (although functional autonomy and financial 
autonomy is mentioned in one of the opinions concerning Hungary). 
 
In the first cycle, the AC raised in its recommendations the issue of non-
territorial arrangements only with Estonia, Finland, Hungary, and Sweden. In 
the case of Estonia, the AC concluded that it is “of the opinion that some of 
the initiatives to protect national minorities, such the National Minorities 
Cultural Autonomy Act, contain elements that are not suited for the present 
situation of minorities in Estonia and need to be revised or replaced in order 
for them to be effective. This pertains in particular to their personal scope of 
application.”79 The AC proposed to the Committee of Ministers concerning 
the opinion on Hungary that “the sphere of duties and jurisdictions of minority 
self-governments and the regulations pertaining to financial contributions by 
the state and by local governments need to be refined, as well as the 
regulations on the co-operation between local governments of settlements and 
local self-government bodies of minority groups. It recommends that 
appropriate action be taken.” In addition, the AC submitted the proposal to the 
Committee of Ministers to recommend that appropriate action be taken 
concerning “the form in which to establish minority self-governments on 
regional and county level, which is a missing link”.80 
 
In the second cycle, the AC took note of forthcoming legislation in Romania 
and Serbia and recommended some clarifications. For Romania, the AC 
recommended for legal clarity to be provided regarding cultural autonomy 
institutions and procedures envisaged by the draft law on the Status of 
National Minorities. Judging from the more specific recommendations for 
Serbia, it may be assumed that the Serbian draft legislation stood out to the 
AC as a particularly far-reaching non-territorial arrangement. The AC found it 
 
79 Opinion on Estonia, adopted on 14 September 2001 by the Advisory Committee on 
the Framework Convention, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)005, para. 68. In respect of 
Art. 5 FCNM, the AC held in its proposal to the Committee of Ministers that “the 
National Minorities Cultural Autonomy Act of 1993 has had no substantial 
impact on the practical situation in Estonia and recommends that initiatives to 
revise or replace this legislation should be pursued with a view to strengthening 
the applicable norms and to adapting them to the current minority situation of 
Estonia”. 
80 Opinion on Hungary, adopted on 22 September 2000 by the Advisory Committee on 
the Framework Convention, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)004, paras. 50, 51, and p. 16. 
 
 
possible to issue more specific recommendations for Serbia, such as to ensure 
that the forthcoming law on the national minority councils provides 
appropriate guarantees for the councils to take part in decision-making 
processes in matters affecting them, and to give the councils adequate support 
from the respective authorities in order to fulfil their tasks efficiently. The AC 
also referred to ensuring that the principle of free self-identification of persons 
belonging to national minorities is fully guaranteed during the registration 
process for persons belonging to national minorities in the special electoral 
roll. It thus appears that the AC had noticed the significant decision-making 
powers that would be accorded to the national councils of national minorities 
in Serbia. For Hungary, the recommendation of the AC was to “continue its 
efforts to strengthen the operational and financial autonomy of the minority 
self-governments in order to help them to acquire, run and manage public 
institutions relevant to minorities. In this context, the transition from a co-
decision mechanism to one in which the self-governments have full decision-
making powers should be supported. Clearer rules on state and local authority 
funding and support for the minority self-governments could help to improve 
relations between the local minority self-governments and local authorities.”81 
For Estonia, the recommendation was made, actually on the basis of Article 5 
FCNM, to “[a]ddress shortcomings in the National Minority Cultural 
Autonomy Act by drawing up, in consultation with those concerned, 
legislation that is more inclusive and takes better into account the present-day 
concerns of persons belonging to national minorities”.82 
 
During the third cycle of monitoring, the AC encouraged the Hungarian 
authorities to continue to facilitate the full and active participation of persons 
belonging to national minorities in decision-making processes at the national, 
regional, and local levels through minority self-governments, with a view to 
continue consultations between the self-government entities and authorities. 
The AC recommended for Serbia to refine the new system of national 
councils of minorities. The recommendation suggested to focus on removing 
conflicts with other laws, laying down clear criteria for the transfer of 
competences to national minority councils, ensuring that all cases potentially 
involving conflicts of interests between two or more councils are regulated on 
the basis of clear criteria, and strengthening the legal provisions governing 
elections to and the implementation of elections to national minority councils 
 
81 Second Opinion on Hungary, adopted on 9 December 2004, 
ACFC/INF/OP/II(2004)003, para. 119. 
82 Second Opinion on Estonia, adopted on adopted on 24 February 2005, 
ACFC/INF/OP/II(2005)001, para. 189. 
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so as to ensure full respect for the principle of free self-identification. Also, 
the authorities should abstain from intervening in internal functionings of 
national minority councils. 
 
6.3. Territorial Arrangements 
 
As indicated above, recommendations by the AC concerning territorial 
arrangements within the framework of paras. 19 through 21 in the LR are rare. 
In the first monitoring cycle, there were two recommendations (for Denmark 
and Moldova), while in the second and the third cycle, there was one 
recommendation each, one for Serbia and the other for Moldova. Again, the 
AC is mostly recommending the development of existing territorial 
arrangements rather than proposing the introduction of such arrangements in 
States that yet could implement such arrangements. 
 
In the first cycle of monitoring, the AC started with positive remarks 
concerning territorial autonomy in Denmark, underlining the importance of 
home rule for Greenland and the Faroe Islands to the effective participation of 
the individuals concerned in cultural, social, and economic life and in public 
affairs. Territorial autonomy can thus clearly be important in the context of 
effective participation of minorities, because autonomy of the kind established 
in the Faroe Islands and Greenland would certainly allow the minority at hand 
to be well positioned to participate effectively in public affairs. For Moldova, 
the recommendation was geared towards improving the existing arrangement, 
because the representatives of the autonomous territory of Gagauzia had 
voiced dissatisfaction with the scope and functioning of the autonomy they 
have been granted. In addition, there was an overall positive comment on the 
territorial autonomy of Vojvodina in the then Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
In the second cycle, the recommendation concerning Serbia dealt with a 
territorial arrangement that operates parallel to the non-territorial national 
councils mentioned above, namely Vojvodina, for which there was law-
drafting underway. The AC was of the opinion that the future statute should 
clearly define the respective competences of the central and provincial 
authorities, including areas of relevance for national minorities. Here, the 
focus is again on improving an existing arrangement. 
 
The recommendations on territorial arrangements from the third cycle dealt 
again with Moldova. The AC recommended the allocation of sufficient 
financial resources to the economic development of Gagauzia and encouraged 
the authorities to pursue the dialogue with a view to provide a clearer 
 
 
determination of the Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit’s competences and 
for a more effective functioning of the autonomy regime. Apparently, the AC 
had become aware of the dysfunctional nature of the territorial arrangement in 
Moldova and supported the improvent of this imperfect arrangement that was 
creating frustration amongst those for whom it was intended. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
Our review of the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Advisory Committee on the FCNM reveals an interesting profile and mutual 
complementarity when analysed against the background of the Lund 
Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in 
Public Life. 
 
The praxis of the ECtHR, consisting of around 20 cases, focuses on elections 
(para. 7 LR) and electoral rules (paras. 8, 9, 11 LR), as Article 3 of the First 
Protocol applies to elections. The provision, which is quite specific in 
comparison with Article 15 FCNM, does not focus on participation in general 
or on effective participation of minorities in particular, but the cases reviewed 
here are clearly relevant for both. The practice of the Court permits, within a 
broad margin of appreciation, different electoral systems that aim to enhance 
the position of minority populations through participation in electoral 
structures. For instance, at the same time as a threshold of up to 10 % is 
approved by the Court - with the consequence that parties representing 
minorities are potentially excluded from acquiring mandates in a parliament - 
the Court is of the opinion that reserved seats for minorities are possible and 
even a positive feature in a constitutional system. However, the Court clearly 
disapproves discriminatory arrangements and arbitrary applications of 
domestic election law relevant for minorities. Furthermore, it is not possible 
under the ECHR for the Court to propose any particular electoral system for 
the promotion of the position of a national minority, because decisions of that 
sort are within the purview of the sovereign State. In the praxis of the ECtHR, 
effective participation of national minorities is mainly a material rule 
concerning the right of minorities to free elections. From that perspective, the 
interpretations have travelled a long way since the first case in 1983 
concerning Norway. In addition, the ECtHR has established a broad range of 
freedom for political parties of minorities under Article 11 of the ECRH, but 
has not allowed political processes to be hijacked by attempts to organize 
opportune minority parties. 
 
The praxis of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, 
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consisting of around 160 - 170 recommendations concerning Article 15 on 
effective participation of minorities during the first three cycles of monitoring 
(with an additional 15 or so on Articles 5 and 7), is different in nature and is 
less focused on elections. In fact, in AC recommendations, there is relatively 
little on elections. However, it is possible to observe a certain parallelism in 
the judgments of the ECtHR and the recommendations of the AC regarding 
reserved seats, as well as a complementarity outside of the area of elections. 
The AC recommends measures of a general nature (para. 6 LR) as well as the 
creation and activities of advisory and consultative bodies (paras. 12, 13 LR), 
at least in part because Article 15 FCNM is very general and open-ended in 
comparison with Article 3 of the First Protocol and does not, it should be 
underlined, create any right to effective participation. In this respect, the AC 
has kept itself well within the boundaries of the Explanatory Note to Article 
15 FCNM. The main thrust of the AC recommendations appears to be 
consultations and consultation mechanisms with national minorities, not 
public powers granted to national minorities. This means that the praxis of the 
AC is more about the procedural issues of effective participation and less 
about material issues. This “consultative” orientation that emphasizes 
dialogue becomes very clear when considering recommendations of the AC 
that involve non-territorial and territorial arrangements of self-governance, 
(paras. 14, 15, 16 LR), which are very few. Hence arrangements and 
mechanisms that could lead to a strong enhancement in the effective 
participation of a minority are less favoured than arrangements that do not 
transfer power from “the State” to the minority group. Against this 
background, it is legitimate to ask in a somewhat critical tone whether 
consultations and dialogue really can lead to effective participation of national 
minorities. In light of the LR, the AC still has a lot of latitude left to step up 
the level of recommendations as concerns the effectiveness of minority 
participation along categories indicated by the LR. There is room to improve 
and to move further into specific recommendations dealing with particular 
public powers and, in particular, with particular institutional arrangements of 
a non-territorial or territorial nature. 
 
The AC’s focus on consultative features does not mean that its 
recommendations necessarily become unspecific (although the ECtHR has 
sustained the opinion of a German court that no clear and binding obligation 
derives from the FCNM to exempt national minority parties from electoral 
thresholds). In many cases, the recommendations pinpoint particular public 
bodies or organs and even geographical locations, not to speak of minority 
groups affected by the policies of a State (in particular, Roma, Sinti, and 
Travellers, but also other groups and, in addition, female members of national 
 
 
minorities). The AC is not resolving individual complaints of the same kind as 
the ECtHR, but the recommendations issued by the AC can nevertheless 
contain a level of detail not far off from the judgments of the Court (although 
the AC does not, after the first cycle of monitoring, make reference to the 
conduct of States as being incompatible with the FCNM, and it has never 
referenced anything as a violation). Of course, the Court has the specific task 
to resolve individual cases, so the judgments of the Court become very 
detailed accounts of the circumstances of the case and of how the facts 
resonate with Article 3 of the First Protocol. The AC will probably never be 
able to come close to that level of detail in its opinions, but this does not mean 
that the recommendations would be completely toothless; when considering 
the opinions of the AC in a longitudinal manner, it is evident that in many 
States, improvements have taken place, perhaps as a result of its 
recommendations. While the ECtHR may respond to issues involving 
effective participation of minorities when resolving election-related cases in a 
process of incremental evolution, where rather limited boundaries are set by 
the ECHR, the AC still has a lot of space to develop its full potential 
concerning the rather open-ended norms of the FCNM on effective minority 
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European integration and minority rights conditionalty 
policy 
 
European integration and minority issues 
In the 1990s, the revival of political mobilisation on ethnic basis 
raised great attention in the international community. Political 
transition to democracy in Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
states was coupled with emerging political cleavages along 
national or ethnic identity lines. The new democracies in CEE 
indeed not only faced the challenges of political transition from 
one-party rule to democracy, but also the problem of redefining 
or creating the identity of the state and its relation to the existing 
cultural and ethnic diversity that characterises many of these 
societies. Both national minority communities and majority 
nations started to redefine their nation-building endeavours in the 
new political framework, and this often led to to contrasting 
claims and inter-ethnic conflicts.  
Furthermore, democratic transition and European integration 
have become closely interrelated processes for most post-
communist countries.83 The membership/partnership policy of 
European international organisations also played an important 
role in the implementation and stability of the new democratic 
institutions. The rise of ethnic-based politics as a characteristic of 
political transition in CEE and the protection of minorities as a 
desirable panacea, especially as a basic principle of democratic 
political ideals, have also been raised as key issues in the 
European integration process. International organisations have 
had a powerful influence in the reinforcement of arguments on 
minority rights protection within these states and in the attempts 
to create an appropriate legal and political environment for inter-
ethnic stability through the improvement of minority rights 
protections.  
The increasing attention given to the situation and legal 
 
83 Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda (eds.) Democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe, 
Vol. 1-2. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
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protection of minorities at an international level also entailed that 
questions related to minorities were more strongly articulated 
within the broadening process of European integration in the 
1990s. The institutional expansion of the Western international 
organisational regime to CEE offered a new perspective for 
international co-operation. International organisations – like the 
Concil of Europe (CoE), the EU, and, to a lesser extent, even the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – were indifferent 
or weak in addressing the problems related to the 
accommodation of national and ethnic diversity within their 
member states before 1989, but turned out to be surprisingly 
active in taking minority issues to the floor in their relations with 
the new democracies in CEE. As a result, the propagation of 
minority rights protections as a ‘pan-European’ standard has 
become an integral element of their political profile, at least in 
their external relations. What could be seen as a novelty was not 
the extension of a consistent legal regime of minority rights, but 
the fact that the concept of the protection of minorities was 
increasingly articulated as a basic element of the ‘ideal’ of liberal 
democratic governance within the European framework of the 
institutional integration of CEE states. However, while within 
European organisations the lack of clarity regarding the basic 
standards in the treatment of minorities was not a crucial 
problem for Western European countries, it has become a 
difficult and intrinsic quandary for CEE states in their accession 
to the same international organisations.84 
 
In this context, different international organisations played 
disparate roles and applied rather different forms of political and 
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economic pressure and incentives to support not only democratic 
transition, but also positive developments in minority rights 
policies in CEE.   
One of the most significant political tools applied by Western 
European states in this endeavour was their strategy related to the 
timing and conditions for the formal institutional integration of 
CEE countries into ‘Western’ international organisations. 
Extending partnership first and offering membership later to 
CEE countries in the CoE, NATO, and the EU was widely 
believed to be an effective strategy for reinforcing democracy 
and political stability in the region. Therefore, the concern about 
strengthening the protection of minorities was notably present in 
the membership policy applied by these international 
organisations towards CEE states. 
The CoE, the EU and, in a less obvious but no less influential 
manner, NATO, have each applied a policy of conditional 
admission in supporting domestic political reforms and 
emphasising the importance of good neighbourly relations, 
regional stability, and the protection of minorities. In this regard, 
the prospect of membership in the CoE, NATO, and the EU has 
gained overwhelming importance and has proven to be a 
powerful motivation for policy change in CEE countries.85 
Since the 1990s, the EU has become the most dominant player in 
this integration process, especially due to its eastward 
enlargement. The EU’s power in international relations is not the 
result of its own foreign policy strategy, but rather its “club” 
power: the EU has become the most economically and politically 
attractive region and membership is strongly appealing to its 
close neighbors.86 
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Conditionality policy and international norms on minority rights 
Conditionality in general terms is usually defined as “a basic 
strategy through which international institutions promote 
compliance by national governments” and “a mutual 
arrangement by which a government takes, or promises to take, 
certain policy actions.”87   
The CoE and NATO formulated political conditionality within 
their membership policy. These political requirements, however, 
remained strictly consistent with their organizational goals: 
human rights protection, democratic stability, and security 
guarantees, respectively. If minority issues emerged on the either 
agenda, in both cases they were limited to the context of the 
specific interests of each organization. Furthermore, both NATO 
and CoE member states regarded enlargement as a geostrategic 
move rather than a transformative force. Thus, even in the case 
of the CoE, many human rights and minority rights conditions 
were formulated as ex-post conditionality. The future member 
states were often required to take only a formal commitment 
without specific legislative or policy measures.88 The 
membership criteria adopted by the EU Copenhagen summit in 
1993 included institutional, economic, and political elements. 
Candidate countries are requested to have stable institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
respect for and protection of minorities (emphasis added); a 
functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competition and market forces in the EU; and the ability to take 
 
in the commercial relations of CEE states, that gave a clear preference for 
membership. In a similar way the political ideal of „belonging to Europe“ was 
also closely associated with gaining EU membership.  
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on and effectively implement the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and 
monetary union.89 The Copenhagen criterion includes legal 
(implementation of EU law and policies, the “acquis”), political, 
and economic (competitive market economy) conditions. The 
European Union, including the minority protection condition, 
established a broader political conditionality reaching beyond its 
internal legal and political competences.90 In principle, political 
conditionality is less objectively measurable. In lack of clear 
normative or quantitative standards for compliance, the political 
requirements are more open to political contestation. This was 
even more the case with minority protection requirements. 
Debates about how can EU influence domestic policy changes 
with its conditionality policy reflect the arguments on “logic of 
consequences” and “logic of appropriatness”91 or the 
rationalist/constructivist divide in international relations theory. 
From a rationalist standpoint, enlargement takes place only if the 
benefits of extending organizational institutions exceed the 
subsidiary costs of the accession of new members, both for the 
member states and for the applicant states. The accession 
procedure in these terms is following the simple logic of human-
state behaviour: in order to maximize the benefits of integrating 
new states, national actors follow a consequentialist theory of 
action – member states define accession conditionality and 
provide incentives for candidate states in order to reduce the 
material and strategic risks of enlargement and accession states 
employ similarly rational calculations that drive their efforts and 
domestic policy towards fulfilling the conditions set up by the 
international organisation. In this perspective, accession 
conditionality may be perceived as an appropriate instrument to 
minimize the economic and political risks of enlarging and “to 
 
89 Council of the European Union. Copenhagen European Council Presidency 
Conclusions, 21-22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93 REV 1 
90 See also Eli Gateva: European Union Enlargement Conditionality. Palgrave-
Macmillan, London, 2015. 
91James G. March – Johan P. Olsen: Rediscovering Institutions – The Organizational 
Basis of Politics. New York et al., The Free Press, 1989. 
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bring about and stabilize political change.”92 
Minority issues can be understood as a security risk in this 
context: inter-ethnic conflicts may easily destabilize candidate 
states and promotion of minority rights protection can be seen as 
an appropriate tool to prevent such conflicts and to build political 
stability. The Union’s concern about minorities was largely 
conceived as a strategic policy to increase stability and security 
in the accession countries. In fact, it was often formulated that 
the accommodation of ethnic diversity and the promotion of 
democracy serve basic security interests in post-communist 
Europe.93  
The criticism of rationalist interpretations formulated by social 
constructivists is founded on the perception that enlargement is 
not driven by actor preferences, but is shaped by ideational, 
cultural factors. The most relevant of these factors is the degree 
to which actors inside and outside the organization share a 
common identity and a shared set of values and fundamental 
beliefs.94 “The more an external state identifies with the 
international community that the organization represents and the 
more it shares the values and norms that define the purpose and 
the policies of the organization, the stronger the institutional ties 
it seeks with the organization and the more the member states 
are willing to pursue horizontal institutionalisation with this 
state”.95 
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95 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier: ‘Theorising EU enlargement: 
research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research’. In: Journal of European 
Public Policy 9/4 2002 p. 513. 
 
 
On the basis of these assumptions, constructivists posit that the 
origins and the constitution as well as the goals and procedures 
of international organizations are more strongly determined by 
the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness of the 
international community to which they belong, than by the 
utilitarian demand for efficient problem-solving.96 In a 
constructivist argumentation, rules and norms are constitutive as 
an enabling framework for action and a precondition for making 
causal claims.97 In this perspective, the role of shared values, 
processes of persuasion, and socialization are important.98 
Human and minority rights norms are particularly important 
since they form an integral part of the liberal democracy ideal, 
promoted and seen as a pan-European model to follow by CEE 
states after the fall of communism. 
Schimmelfennig also made an attempt to bridge rationalist and 
constructivist paradigms, arguing that “rethorical action” is a 
mechanism when institutional political actors use normative 
arguments strategically in order to justify their self-interested 
preferences.99 In this sense, the security concerns of EU member 
states on minority issues could be advanced through the 
rhetorical actions about meeting minority rights standards. 
Indeed, it was not only the EU that made references to 
international standards; OSCE and CoE efforts to improve the 
situation of minorities were coupled with EU accession. EU 
membership conditionality was often a motivation behind 
changes to minority policies, but the CoE and OSCE, having a 
more normative basis, formulated the substance of policy 
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Norm diffusion – limits and potentials of international standards 
on minority rights 
 
In this context, the EU could not promote its own normative 
regime on minority protection in CEE states, but rather it acted 
as an agent in transferring international norms to domestic 
legislation and politics in CEE candidate states. International 
instruments on minority rights however do not offer solid, 
unquestionable legal standards that could be translated into 
domestic legislation. Most international instruments on minority 
rights emerged in Europe and have not become universally 
acknowledged norms and they remain largely contested even 
among European states. The EU, building on the established 
practices of the CoE and CSCE/OSCE, linked human rights and 
minority rights with democracy and with security concerns.101  
The foundations of international norms on minority rights 
developed in Europe in the 1990s were equally based on human 
rights and security concerns. The ‘new regime’ of international 
minority rights protection, features some basic characteristics. It 
builds on the existing post-WWII human rights regime and takes 
states’ security concerns about specific political claims of 
minority groups into consideration. 1.) In principle, the ‘new 
regime’ does not depart from the individualist approach of 
modern human rights protection; 2.) it builds on the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination; 3.) minorities are not 
acknowledged as political communities and the right to self-
determination is not assigned to them; 4.) the group character of 
minorities is not, or just  implicitly acknowledged; 5.) the rights 
of minorities are usually formulated in vague terms, offering an 
ample room for divergent governmental policies and 
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Looking at the specific international norms on minority rights, 
for a long period of time Art. 27 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights was the only direct reference to the 
rights of minorities under international law. This vaguely 
formulated provision recognized the right of persons belonging 
to minorities to preserve their identity, but it remained rather 
ambiguous about the specific duties and responsabilities of state 
parties in this regard.102 The international protection of 
minorities started to get more attention only in the 1990s, first 
when the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration on the 
rights of minorities,103 and then especially when in Europe the 
rights of minorities became a central issue in international 
relations. Outstanding achievements of this period include the 
adoption of the Copenhagen Document (1990), the establishment 
of the position of High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(Helsinki Document, 1992) within the OSCE, and the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992) and 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(1995 - FCNM) within the CoE. However, though these 
documents provided a stable normative framework for State 
parties regarding the treatment of minority claims, OSCE 
documents were only political declarations. The two relevant 
international treaties, the Language Charter and the FCNM, are 
considered to contain weak provisions: states often agreed to 
terms that would potentially limit their undertakings, and in fact, 
the Language Charter offers a flexible ‘á-la-carte’ mechanism 
that allows signing states to select from a list of optional 
 
102 Art. 27 reads as follows: „In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
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obligations proffered by the Charter. And the FCNM also 
contains flexible conditions for specific rights, like “if [persons 
belonging to minorities] so request.” Other international 
documents on minority rights abundantly attach certain 
conditions to state obligations, such as “if necessary,” “within 
the framework of their legal system,” “where appropriate,” et 
cetera, without providing a definition or a tacit general consensus 
on the precise meaning and applicability of these limitations. 
Moreover, the Language Charter and the FCNM contain “soft 
control mechanisms,” i.e. there are no legal sanctions or a 
judicial forum in place to render the implementation of these 
legal commitments effective. The monitoring procedure 
introduced by both treaties builds on the work of expert bodies 
and on the political recommendations adopted by government 
representatives in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe. 
The lack of a strong independent judicial or judicial-like 
institution to controll the implementation of these standards has 
left monitoring and evaluation procedures largely vulnerable to 
political considerations. Due to this, political concerns regarding 
the situation of minorities formulated within the framework of 
extending institutional relations between CEE states and the 
CoE, NATO, and the EU have gained greater prestige than the 
procedures established for the purpose of implementing 
international minority rights standards.104 Or in other words, the 
efficiency of these specific procedures and mechanisms often 
depends greatly on their reinforcement by the institutional 
policies of CoE, NATO, and the EU towards CEE states. The 
activities of international organisations in this regard however 
are not strictly norm-guided, but appear to be driven by looser 
policy-driven mechanisms.105 
The EU, however, applied a unique approach: its pre-accession 
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monitoring procedure on minority rights combined normative 
and political elements. Taking minority rights protection into 
account on the enlargement agenda in an institutionalised form 
within the EU was a very new development in its implementation 
of the membership process, on its consequences for candidate 
states, and for the EU integration process. When preparing its 
regular reports on candidate states’ progresses in the field of 
minority protections, the European Commission relied on the 
monitoring mechanisms established to supervise the 
implementation of the FCNM. The work of the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (hereinafter also HCNM) 
similarly received great attention. 
This ‘intermediary’ position necessarily entailed an interpretative 
involvement, i.e. articulating certain norms of minority rights 
protection while neglecting others, and constrained the EU to 
give particular meanings to norms in specific situations and in 
the context of its own institutional structures and preferences. 
Most studies on norm diffusion focus on the practices and 
procedures of how external norms are internalised in single 
states.106 But in this case, the question is not only how, but also 
which norms are taken into consideration. EU conditionality 
expressly highlights the relevance of norm resonance and 
domestic norm construction in processes of norm diffusion.107 
Besides the problem of identifying ‘which norms matter?’108 it is 
also a question of the interpretative framework in which actors’ 
understandings of accession norms are defined. 
 
Double standards and effective conditionality: non-
discrimination and minority specific rights 
When observing compliance either from a constructivist or a 
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rationalist approach, it becomes evident that the normative 
foundations are important in developing an effective and crebible 
conditionality policy.  Three elements seem to be important in 
this regard: conditionality has to be credible; conditions have to 
be concrete; and the external incentives must be more promising 
than domestic political costs.109 Could EU conditionality policy 
on minority rights meet these criteria?  
One of the major criticisms towards the EU approach to minority 
issues in its enlargement policy was that the EU applied double 
standards in this field and thus required candidate states to 
implement specific minority rights norms that have never been 
requested from member states. It is important here to distinguish 
between minority specific and non-minority-specific rights as 
two possible forms of minority protection.110 We may identify 
two fundamental pillars of minority rights protection in 
international law: the prohibition of discrimination and the 
recognition of minority specific rights. The very basis of the 
legal status of a minority is the principle of non-discrimination. 
In spite of the important distinction often made between the 
principle of non-discrimination and the specific rights of 
minorities, minority rights cannot be analysed without observing 
the anti-discrimination principle. 111 
Non-discrimination means that the law must not attach any 
negative consequences to the fact that an individual belongs to a 
minority. So, the prohibition of discrimination is the first step 
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and the indispensable basis for ‘real’ minority protection policy 
or legislation, but in itself cannot be a sufficient instrument.  
 
Minorities benefit from the principles of equality and non-
discrimination,112 but an important distinction has to be made 
between the anti-discrimination approach and minority rights. 113  
Specific minority rights as they are embedded in international 
documents usually cover three main areas that are particularly 
relevant for the preservation of minority culture and identity: a.) 
linguistic rights may comprise a wide set of private and public 
relation and areas where the use of minority languages is 
acknowledged;  b.) the second group of specific rights are related 
to education on minority language;  and c.) the third specific 
group of rights can be delimited as covering the right of 
minorities to effective participation in political, economic, and 
social life. 
 
It is true that EU member states have not acknowledged specific 
minority rights under EU law and that member states also largely 
differ in recognising international standards on minority rights. 
Some of them have even refused to ratify the FCNM.114 
Nevertheless, the European Commission’s regular reports and 
the European Parliament’s resolutions on candidate states’ 
progress made towards membership contain regular references to 
international minority rights standards. These references 
 
112 Thornberry: op. cit. Part III. 
113 The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
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measure of differential treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics which 
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[if] a minority wishes for assimilation and is debarred, the question is one of 
discrimination.“ U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/52, Section V. 
114 The position of France and Greece is well known in denying the existence of 
minorities on their territories and thus denying the relevance of any international 
minority protection norm in their domestic constitutional regime.  
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remained rather vague, and they cannot be seen as any form of 
legal monitoring of the implementation of international minority 
rights standards. But the normative elements considered by EU 
bodies as relevant are reflected in the recurring references to the 
existing pillars of international minority rights law, such as in the 
FCNM and the OSCE documents, especially the statements and 
recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM). The ratification of the Framework 
Convention has become a tacitly accepted precondition of 
accession.115 
Non-minority-specific rights are more tangible in EU law: the 
establishment of a legislative competence to combat 
discrimination (introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty) and the 
two anti-discrimination directives adopted in 2000 may be seen 
as having impact on the rights of minorities as well.116  
Before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, four areas 
could be seen as potentially relevant to the rights of minorities: 
combating discrimination (Art. 13 TEC), European citizenship 
(Arts. 17-22 TEC), right to diversity (Art. 151 TEC), and 
protection of fundamental rights (Art. 6 TEU & Charter of 
Fundamental Rights).117 These norms however were far from 
having any direct relevance to the effective legal treatment of 
minorities and minority specific rights. As a matter of fact, they 
have never been seen as offering guidelines on minority rights 
protection for EU member states. However, as Topidi states, 
“…the experience of enlargement as a conditionality process, 
combined with ‘internal’ legislative measures (including a 
 
115 The Commission explicitly urged among others Estonia for the ratification of the 
FCNM and as a matter of fact each candidate state signed and ratified it before 
accession. 
116 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (also known as 
Race Directive). OJ L 180, 19 July 2000, pp. 22-26. and Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation. OJ L 303, 2 December 2000, pp. 16-
22. 
117 Treaty establishing the European Community (Consolidated version 2002) OJ C 
325, 24.12.2002, p. 33–184.  
 
 
limited number of ECJ decisions), and an accompanying policy 
oriented post-2004, and 2007 towards the promotion of diversity 
and the elimination of discriminatory trends, demonstrate the 
gradual development of an EU policy on minority rights.”118 The 
normative framework in EU law has not changed significantly 
even after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The 
inclusion of the respect for “rights of persons belonging to 
minorities” among the fundamental values of the EU in Art. I-2 
TEU does not establish any legislative competence for the EU. 
The potential sanctioning mechanism of Art. 7. is far too 
theoretical, and thus it does not entail the translation of these 
values into normative commitments by Member States. 
In this aspect, it can be argued that in the application of minority 
protection condition, the principle of non-discrimination, as a 
legally embedded norm in the acquis, could provide a ‘hard’, i.e. 
legally defined requirement for candidate states. On the other 
hand, in the absence of relevant normative background in EU 
law, specific minority rights standards could be only formulated 
as ‘soft’ norms, opening a broader room for interpreting 
compliance with membership requirements.119 
 
European Union enlargement policy and specific minority rights 
During the first wave of eastward enlargement, after accession 
negotiations started with the first CEE candidate states in 1998, a 
series of criticisms were formulated regarding the EU’s 
performance on minority issues. During the accession process, 
the European Commission played a determining role since it was 
tasked with conducting the accession negotiations with candidate 
states and publishing the annual regular reports (progress reports) 
on candidate states’ progress towards membership.  
It is true that the EU’s missing “coherent vision on the legal 
 
118 Topidi: op. cit. p. 5. 
119 Cf.: Guido Schwellnus – Antje Wiener: Contested norms in the process of EU 




position of minorities”120 could not contribute to the 
consolidation of a general European minority rights standard.121 
But this could hardly be expected from EU, since the geopolitical 
logic of enlargement and the missing minority rights standards in 
the acquis did not help EU bodies to substantiate strict normative 
barriers regarding the situation of minorities. Still, the hidden 
concept of minority rights (better understood as non-minority-
specific rights) within the acquis and the occasional references to 
international minority rights norms could induce political or 
legislative changes in candidate states. “Effective conditionality 
does not necessarily imply convergence among candidate states, 
especially when – as is the case with minority rights – no specific 
EU models are offered and conditions are either ill-defined or a 
diverse set of specific demands not deduced from a coherent set 
of principles.”122 In the field of minority specific rights,  
conditionality may have divergent outcomes in different 
candidate states and we cannot expect any coherent standard. But 
in the field of non-discrimination where specific EU rules are in 
place, legislative and policy changes in candidate states may be 
more convergent. The uneven effects of conditionality render 
difficult the overall evaluation of its effectiveness. But 
conditionality should not necessarily be understood as a “clear-
cut variable in a causal mechanism that explains policy or 
institutional change.”123 Hughes et al. argue that conditionality is 
continuously developing in its content and is being shaped by 
various actors both within the EU institutions and by political 
actors in candidate states who may also instrumentalize 
conditionality for their domestic political goals.124 From this 
 
120 Kyriaki Topidi: ‚The Limits of EU Conditionality: Minority Rights in Slovakia‘ in: 
JEMIE 2003(1), p. 31.  
121 Guido Schwellnus: Looking Back at Ten Years of EU Minority Conditionality vis-
á-vis Central and Eastern European Candidate States in: European Yearbook of 
Minority Issues, Vol. 4. 2004/5 pp.321-340. 
122 Ibid. p. 324.  
123 Gwendolyn Sasse: EU conditionality… p. 19. 
124 James Hughes – Claire Gordon – Gwendolyn Sasse: Europeanization and 
Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. 
Houndmills, Palgrave, 2005. 
 
 
approach, the changing content of political conditionality is part 
of the game. The arguments and preferences formulated by the 
Commission towards candidate states reflect the changing 
political context in which they were formulated. 
During the first Eastern enlargement process between 1997-
2007, an overview of the European Commission’s comments on 
the situation of minorities in the regular reports125 reveals: i) the 
Commission arbitrarily selected among problematic minority 
issues; ii) on various occasions, the comments published in the 
reports were inconsistent with the reports published in previous 
years; iii) actual political considerations oftentimes 
overshadowed the coherent interpretation of conditionality.126 
A reading of the regular reports published in this period clearly 
shows that the Commission did not pay equal attention to all 
minority communities. The situation of the Russian speaking 
population in the Baltic States, the Roma living in the Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, and to a 
lesser extent, issues related to the situation of Turks in Bulgaria 
and Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania was highlighted. This 
selection may lead to the conclusion that the Commission 
established a political hierarchy between the different minority-
related problems. From a security perspective, the situation of 
Russian minorities in the Baltic States was strategically 
important to the EU in light of its political-economic relations 
with Russia. The social integration of Roma –with its significant 
population and living in very similar socially marginalised 
position in almost all candidate states – was also important not 
only for social stability in candidate states but also for increasing 
fears about their migration to the EU.127 Apparently the 
 
125 All are accessible on the EU Enlargement website: 
<http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm> 
126 See also James Hughes – Gwendolyn Sasse: Monitoring the Monitors: EU 
Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs, Journal on 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 2003, No. 1. 1–38. 
127 Peter Vermeersch: Minority policy in Central Europe: Exploring the impact of the 




European Commission confronted difficulties in assessing 
“progress” made by candidate states in the field of minority 
rights protection. In this aspect, mostly statistical data and formal 
measures, regarding for example legislative changes and the 
adoption of policy programs,  was used as a basis for evaluation. 
The ratification of the FCNM and the adoption or modifications 
of specific laws (related to minority rights or cititenship) were 
evaluated as positive steps towards compliance. The general 
evaluations within their regular reports use vague and rather 
positive expressions in describing candidate states’ commitments 
in this field. The overall evaluation of the candidate states’ 
successes in fulfilling the political criteria of accession is almost 
always positive.128 The wordings used in the regular reports are 
very similar: “a number of positive developments took place in 
this area”;129  “…authorities made significant progress in this 
area”;130 “considerable progress was made”;131 “the country has 
made considerable progress in further consolidating and 
deepening the stability of its institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights  and  respect  for 
minorities.”132 The returning references to “international” or 
“European standards” in the reports remain blurred. It would be 
difficult to deduce specific norms considered by the Commission 
as essential and unquestionable in the context of EU 
enlargement.133 The only stable, visible, and significant request 
 
128 The only exception was Slovakia, which did not meet the political criteria in 1997 
and 1998 under the Meciar government. 
1292001 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress towards Accession, Brussels, 
13.11.2001 SEC(2001) 1753. p. 29. 
1301999 Regular Report on Slovakia’s Progress towards Accession, Brussels, 
13.10.1999. p. 16. 
131 2000 Regular Report on Estonia’s Progress towards Accession, Brussels, 
8.11.2000. p. 20. 
1322001 Regular Report on Estonia’s Progress towards Accession, Brussels, 
13.11.2001. p. 23.  
133 The Regular Reports recurrently make references tot he documents, 
recommendations adopted within the OSCE or the Council of Europe. The 
requirements formulated by these organisations were also reinforced in the 
Association Agreements (Europe Agreements) stipulated with Estonia and 




formulated in the regular reports was the ratification of the 
FCNM by candidate states. Accession to the FCNM was seen as 
giving teeth to commintments on minority protection by 
accepting an international monitoring procedure to regularly 
evaluate the situation of minorities.134 However, in the case of 
Poland, the delay in ratifying the Framework Convention did not 
change the positive assessment of Poland’s performance on 
minority rights protection. Even when the Commission 
“urged”135 Latvia to ratify FCNM, accession got the green light 
even while this requirement was still missing. 
In principle, the European Commission has sought to escape the 
conceptual debates regarding the situation of minorities. The 
regular reports are silent on the lack of a consistent definition of 
minorities, the denial of the existence of minorities (Bulgaria), or 
the constitutional reinforcement of the dominance of national 
majority over minorities (Slovakia, Romania). The Commission 
attempted to focus on practical issues instead of questioning the 
constitutional structure of candidate states. The situation of 
minorities in Bulgaria was an outstanding example in this regard. 
The Bulgarian Constitution does not recognize the existence of 
minorities as it would contradict to the definition of Bulgaria as a 
unified national state. In this way, the only legislative measures 
relevant for minorities are based entirely on the general non-
discrimination principle. The Commission usually overlooks the 
lack of specific minority rights and the overall situation of 
Turkish minority. The regular reports only recurringly state that 
Turkish minority “is integrated into political life through elected 
representation at national and local levels and through increasing 
representation in public administration,”136 ignoring the fact that 
 
regarding the improvement of human and minority rights. Official Journal L 68, 
9 March 1998, 3. és Official Journal L 26, 2 February 1998, 3–4. 
134 Author’s interviews with European Commission Enlargement DG officials, 
November 2013. 
135 2002 Regular Report on Latvia’s Progress towards Accession, Brussels, 9.10.2002. 
p. 30. 
136 2003 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession, Brussels, 
5.11.2003. p. 25. 
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this is not a result of specific legal guarantees but rather of a 
delicate political modus vivendi.137  
In regard to Romania, the Commission welcomed the elaboration 
of a draft law on the rights of minorities that included a special 
form of cultural autonomy. The Romanian government started to 
work on the draft law in 2004-2005 and presented it to the 
Parliament in 2005.138 The draft law offered a relatively coherent 
structure for minority rights, which partly responded to the 
claims of Hungarian minority representatives to autonomy. The 
accession treaty was signed with Bulgaria and Romania in 2005 
under the condition that the Commission continues the 
monitoring of compliance with accession criteria (Co-operation 
and Verification Mechanism) for a transitory period until 2007. 
In this period, both the Commission and the European Parliament 
were concerned about the adoption of the law on minority rights. 
The Parliament expressed its “disappointment over the continued 
delay in the adoption of the law on minorities; […]” and its wish 
“to see the law on minorities approved as soon as possible, 
respecting the political criteria.”139 In its 2006 report, the 
Commission stated that the parliamentary debate on the law  
“needs to be followed closely.”140 This law was seen as an 
important element in meeting the political criteria of accession, 
but in its final evaluation, the Commission did not expressly 
mention this141 and Romania gained membership without 
 
137 Martin Brusis: ‚The European Union and Interethnic Power-sharing Arrangements 
in Accession Countries‘ in: JEMIE 2003/5. p. 7. 
138 Cf.: D. Cristopher Decker – Aidan McGarry: Enhancing Minority Governance in 
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139  European Parliament resolution on the extent of Romania's readiness for accession 
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140 European Commission Monitoring Report, May 2005. p. 12. see at 
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adopting the final law. The law still has yet to be adopted. Here 
again it seemed to be evident that the Commission, facing 
political resistance from candidate states, prefers to drop specific 
requirements and as long as the general principle of non-
discrimination is respected, it does not regard specific minority 
rights as an issue of great concern. 
 
European Union minority protection conditionality to South-
Eastern European states 
Following the 2004 “big-bang” enlargement and the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty, EU member states and the European 
Commission adopted a more progressive enlargement strategy 
vis-á-vis the potenatial South-East-European (SEE) candidate 
states. As early as 1997, the European Council opted for a 
“graduated approach” and underlined that in the EU’s relations 
with SEE states, “to the extent possible, conditions are broken 
down into operational, verifiable elements (Annex). The Council 
will monitor and evaluate the progress made in meeting 
conditionality requirements, using all mechanisms at its disposal 
and taking into account reporting from international 
organisations/bodies in the region such as UN, OSCE and Office 
of High Representative (OHR). Progressive implementation of 
conditions will lead to progressive improvement of relations 
subject to a continuous and comprehensive political and 
economic assessment in which each country will be judged on its 
own merits.” This “graduated approach” was translated into 
different levels of conditionality: the first level, offering 
preferential commercial relations, does not refer to minority 
protection. The second step, the accession to the PHARE 
financial aid programs, was conditioned by “compliance with 
obligations under the peace agreements, including those relating 
to cooperation with the International Tribunal in bringing war 
criminals to justice. (…) It would also require respect for human 
and minority rights and the offer of real opportunities to 
displaced persons (including so called ‘internal migrants’) and 
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refugees to return to their place of origin.”142  At the third level 
of the graduated approach, conditionality is explicitly described 
as an ”evolutionary process.”  The start of negotiations is only 
possible if the country at stake fulfills 10 general conditions.  
These conditions include the “[c]redible offer to and a visible  
implementation of real opportunities for displaced persons 
(including so called ‘internal migrants’) and refugees to return  to  
their places of origin, and absence of harassment initiated or 
tolerated by public authorities,” the “[a]bsence of generally 
discriminatory treatment and harassment of minorities by public 
authorities,” and the “[a]bsence of discriminatory treatment and 
harassment of independent media.” The concession to start 
accession negotiations requires “a lower level of compliance than 
the conclusion of the agreements. At each stage, including after 
the conclusion of agreements, the situation should be monitored 
and, in accordance with the relevant articles of the agreement, its 
application could be suspended in case of serious non-
compliance.” An Annex to this kind of Conditionality-Decalogue   
provides   the   European   Union with “[e]lements for the 
examination of compliance” with the different criteria.  With  
respect  to  the  protection  of minorities, three elements are 
mentioned explicitly: the “[r]ight   to   establish   and maintain   
... own   educational,   cultural   and   religious   institutions,   
organisations   or associations,”  “[a]dequate opportunities for ...  
minorities to  use  their  own  language  before courts and public 
authorities,” and “[a]dequate protection of refugees and 
displaced persons returning to areas where they represent an 
ethnic minority.”143  
This new and ‘fine-tuned’ approach to enlargement was also 
 
142 2003rd Council meeting General Affairs Luxembourg, 29/30 April 1997, Press 
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seen as a second generation of conditionality.144 Toggenburg 
argues that this renewed enlargement strategy was more 
outspoken about the situation of minorities and minority 
protection requirements and that more attention was paid to heal 
the consequences of wars: co-operation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
appropriate treatment of internally displaced persons.  
The most visible change was the addition of a new chapter (23) 
“on judiciary and fundamental rights” to the list of accession 
negotiation chapters. The first time this separate chapter was 
introduced was when the negotiations started with Croatia. Here, 
fundamental rights (covering also the protection of minorities) 
were not regarded anymore as a prerequisite of starting accession 
negotiations – as Art. 49(1) TEU would suggest – but they can 
be considered as an integral part of the acquis and thus as a legal 
commitment of candidate states in their legislative harmonization 
with EU law.  
These changes demonstrate that the European Commission went 
through a policy learning process and has made efforts to put 
political conditionality on a more objective, normative basis. On 
the other hand, it also reveals that despite the improved 
monitoring mechanism, substantial political dilemmas related to 
the implementation of conditionality could hardly change.145  
Measuring the impact of EU enlargement 
This chapter focuses on the EU’s influence on the development 
of specific minority rights in candidate states. Nevertheless, it 
should be acknowledged that the EU seemed to be successful in 
changing anti-discrimination legislation. Based on the legal 
requirement to implement EU law in candidate states, the 
transposition of the Racial Equality Directive in national 
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legislations was a strict condition of accession. In his analysis of 
the legislative changes in this field during the “big-bang” 
accession, Schwellnus concluded that “the formal adoption of 
anti-discrimination legislation as a result of EU pressure can be 
considered a success, the results regarding the implementation of 
legal rules are so far mixed.”146 
There is not an evident positive outcome in the field of specific 
minority rights. Even if a more detailed and gradual approach 
was adopted towards SEE states, it does not mean that the 
Commission’s normative arguments have become more 
consistent in regard to minority rights. It was an important 
procedural step when the European Commission confirmed that 
Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) – relevant also to 
the evaluation of minority rights protection - , and Chapter 24 
(Justice, freedom and security), have to be opened early and 
closed late. The European Commission also reaffirmed that 
political criteria and human and minority rights issues in 
particular are very important parts of accession conditionality.147 
But this political conditionality has not been better translated into 
consistent normative requirements, except for in anti-
discrimination legislation.  
In the context of political criteria of accession, the EU defines 
the goals, not the instruments and means to achive them. For 
example, the 2006 European Partnership for Croatia prescribes 
implementation of the Law on Minority Rights both as a short- 
and medium-term priority through “improvement of minority 
rights, in particular ensuring that equitable representation of 
minorities in local and regional self-government units is achieved 
as well as in the state administration and judicial bodies and in 
the bodies of public administration.”148 For Macedonia, the 2006 
Partnership requires “equitable representation of minorities as a 
 
146 Guido Schwellnus: Anti-discrimination legislation in: Bernd Rechel (ed.): Minority 
Rights in Central and Eastern Europe. London, Routledge, 2009. p. 42. 
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Regarding the normative requirements formulated towards 
candidate states, the regular reports follow the Commission’s 
strategy developed over the years: special focus is on the 
situation of Roma, on the implementation of non-discrimination 
laws, and on the use of minority languages in education. 
However, in some cases the Commission highlights the 
importance of participatory rights of minorities. For example, in 
the case of Montenegro, the regular reports recurrently evaluated 
the cooperation between the government and minority 
councils150 and criticized the inadequate representation of Roma 
in public life.151 But on the other hand, the Commission refrained 
from evaluating the restrictions introduced by the Serbian 
Constitutional Court’s decision, substantially degrading the 
competencies of National Minority Councils.152 This means that 
the Commission prefers to refrain from declaring or requiring a 
specific level of minority rights protection, but focuses only on 
existing politically less delicate issues (representation of Roma in 
Montenegro) and on the implementation of existing legislation 
(both in the case of Montenegro and in the case of Serbia 




As it was pointed out, it is rather difficult to assess the effects of 
EU enlargement on domestic policy changes.153 Both candidate 
 
149Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2006 Progress Report, Brussels, 
08.11.2006 SEC (2006)1387 p. 19. 
150 Commission Opinion on Montenegro's application for membership of the European 
Union Brussels, 9.11. 2010 COM(2010) p. 670; Montenegro 2011 Progress 
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151 Montenegro 2013 Progress Report, Brussels, 16.10.2013 SWD(2013) 411 final. p. 
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152 Serbia 2015 Report Brussels, 10.11.2015 SWD(2015) 211 final. pp. 57-58. 
153 Bernd Rechel: Introduction in: Bernd Rechel (ed.): Minority Rights in Central and 
Eastern Europe. London-New York, Routledge, 2009. 3-7. 
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state governments and EU officials inclined to overstate the 
impact of EU influence. Moreover, on many occasions it is also 
difficult to separate the impact of different international 
organisations, the EU, the CoE, or the OSCE on formulating the 
same or very similar demands for policy change. The picture 
becomes even more complicated when we take into account the 
role of domestic actors and their interplay with international 
actors. Minorities, opposition political parties, and NGOs may all 
have an impact on domestic minority politics. Politics and policy 
preferences may also change if a minority party is strong enough 
to influence government coalition agreements or if kinstates 
lobby for their kin-minorities.  
We may conclude that EU membership conditionality was 
effective in those cases when it changed (or contributed to a 
change in) domestic policies and induced legislative measures 
affecting minorities, which was the case in the adoption of anti-
discrimination laws.154 But the EU leverage was much less 
visible in stabilising or reinforcing specific minority rights. 
Moreover, experience shows that long-term stability and 
appropriate implementation of these laws after accession remains 
fragile.155 The effect of conditionality policy has been 
unbalanced: in the field of combating discrimination, the ability 
of EU bodies to rely on the acquis communautaire has led to the 
adoption of rather consistent laws and policy strategies. 
Nevertheless, the adopted anti-discrimination measures are often 
not implemented in a “minority conscious” way and the 
European Commission could not and did not want to push 
candidate states in that direction. 
As a final conclusion, we may also see that the EU’s regular 
monitoring of minority rights in CEE and SEE has not brought a 
coherent approach to international minority rights standards and 
could not even strengthen existing CoE principles.  
 
154 Guido Schwellnus: Anti-discrimination legislation in: Bernd Rechel (ed.): Minority 
Rights in Central and Eastern Europe. London-New York, Routlegde, 2009. pp. 
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in: Treatises and Documents Journal of Ethnic Studies 73/2014 p. 5-27. 
 
 
Galbreath and McEvoy point out that in an overall European 
context, three international organisations — the OSCE, the CoE, 
and the EU — formulated minority rights protection during the 
enlargement process as a “means to securing regional security, 
democratization and the future of European integration.”  They 
make strong arguments that the whole European minority rights 
regime “1) is not asking how can it improve the role of 
minorities in Europe, but instead how it can reduce the likelihood 
of regional instability; 2) tries to ‘satisfice’ rather than maximize 
the role of minorities in European political communities; and 3) 
pushes protection over empowerment as a solution to the 
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National minority rights issues have always been of major concern in Croatia 
due to the regional context surrounding the country. It is rather well known 
that Croatia was recognized only recently as an independent state, after the 
end of an ethnic conflict that, led to the collapse of the Federal People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY). 
As it is widely known, the war of the 1990s was due in part to the failure of 
the experiment to keepdifferent national groupstogether in the same territory. 
Indeed, as a multicultural region, where a number of peoples, nations, and 
minorities have always lived together, since the fourteenth to the end of the 
twentieth century, the Yugoslav peninsula was governed by multinational 
states–the Ottoman Empire157, the Austro-Hungarian Empire158, and the 
FPRY.159 However, all of these forms of constitutional organizationlackeda 
 
157In fact, the Ottoman Empire was a multinational decentralized State based on the 
millet system. On its history and organisation, see L. Missir de Lusignan, La 
multinationalité ottomane (éléments de réflexion), in O. Audéod, J.-D. Mounton, 
S. Pierré-Caps (edts.), L’Etat multinational et l’Europe, Presses Universitaires de 
Nancy, 1997, pp. 117-122 ; N. Beldiceanu, L’organisation de l’Empire ottoman 
(XIVe-XVe siècles), in R. Mantran (edt.), Histoire de l’Empire ottoman, Libraire 
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strong and unitary national identity and proved to be particularly weak. 
Therefore, soon after the death of Josip Broz Tito – and the end of his 
authoritarian and charismatic leadership – a dramatic ethnic conflict broke 
out. 
Soon after the war, two parallel yet opposite processes beganin Croatia, as 
well as in almost all of the countries of former Yugoslavia. On the one hand, a 
new independent state was established. In this context, nation-building played 
a fundamental role. In contrast with the (failed) tradition of multinational 
states, it followed the model of a unitary national state. On the other hand, the 
country was engaged in the process of European integration. This process was 
in sharp contrast with the ideology of nationalism, requiring this new state to 
renounce part of its recently conquered sovereignty with the aim of being 
admitted to this ‘prestigious’ club, including not only the European Union 
(EU), but also the Council of Europe (CoE). 
Independence and European integration were deeplyinterconnected. Indeed, 
the process of Croatian independence was deeply influenced by the CoE. In 
fact, the declaration of independence itself was adopted under the auspices of 
the CoE Parliamentary Assembly that on 21 September 1991 recognized the 
right of dissociation of the former Yugoslav Republics. Soon after  
international recognition, on 4 May 1992 Croatia obtained the status of a 
“special guest” with the Council of Europe. On 11 September 1992, Croatia 
submitted an application to the CoE and was admitted on 6 November 
1996.160 
In the early 2000s, soon after the death of the authoritarian leader 
FranjoTuđman, Croatia was engaged in the process of democratic 
transition,161as well as in the negotiation process to join the European Union. 
Indeed, Croatia officially applied to the EU on21 February 2003 and was 
recognized as an applicant country in June 2004. The negotiations, which 
opened in the European Council on 16-17 December 2004, had been 
postponed in order to wait for a more effective cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. They re-opened on 
3 October 2005. The negotiations were closed on 30 June 2011, and after the 
referendum held on 22 January 2012, Croatia became the 28th member of the 
 
Composition of Yugoslavia); M. Paunović, Nationalities and Minorities in the 
Yugoslav Federation and in Serbia, in J. Packer, K. Myntti (edt.), The protection 
of Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities in Europe, Institute for Human Rights, Åbo 
Akademi University, 1993, pp. 145-165. 
160 For a chronology of Croatia’s admission to the Council of Europe, see the website 
of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs: 
http://www.mvep.hr/en/foreign-politics/multilateral-relationsold/council-of-
europe-(ce)/relations-between-croatia-and-the-council-of-europe-/#1. 
161 On this issue, see S. P. Ramet, D. Matic (edts.), Democratic Transition in Croatia. 




EU on 1 July 2013.162 
Considering the historical and social background of Croatia, at the time of 
application to the CoE as well as theEU, the institutions of both organisations 
decided to exercise a strict scrutiny in respect to democratic standards, with a 
particular focus on the rights of national minorities. As a result, the Croatian 
processes of independence and democratization were deeply conditioned by a 
“wide” European conditionality, involving not only the EU but also the CoE 
and the Venice Commissionin particular.163 
The Eastern enlargement of both the CoE and the EU required the 
introduction of standards that were – and still are – considered to be binding 
in order to fulfill the admittision requirementsof these organisations. The 
standards for the admission to the CoE have been formalised on the basis of 
the expansive interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 of the CoE Statute.164 As a 
result, new members can be admitted to the Council of Europe provided that 
theyfulfilla geographical standard (the country must belong to Europe165) and 
a set of political standards: the commitment to democracy, the rule of law, the 
separation of powers, and human and minority rights.166 
As to the standards for the admission to the EU, at the European Council held 
in Copenhagen in 1993 it was declared that the associated countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe can become members of the EU provided that they 
respect a set of conditions.As it was stated, they include the “stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
 
162For a chronology of Croatia’s admission to the European Union, see the website of 
the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs: 
http://www.mvep.hr/en/croatia-and-the-european-union/. 
163 I explored the effects of the “wide” European conditionality on the democratic 
transitions of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in M. Dicosola, 
Transizioni costituzionali e condizionalità politica europea, in Le trasformazioni 
costituzionali del secondo millennio: scenari e prospettive dall’Europa 
all’Africa, Maggioli, Rimini, 2016, pp. 57-80. 
164Indeed, according to art. 3, the fundamental principles of the Council of Europe are 
the rule of law and the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms, while, 
according to art. 4, «Any European state which is deemed to be able and willing 
to fulfil the provisions of Article 3 may be invited to become a member of the 
Council of Europe by the Committee of Ministers». 
165 The concept of Europe is considered much wider than the European continent, as 
demonstrated by the admission of Russia. See the report of 16 June 1992, On the 
Enlargement of the Council of Europe (doc. n. 6629). 
166J.-F. Flauss, Les conditions d’admission des pays d’Europe central et orientale au 




forces within the Union.”167 The Copenhagen criteria now have a normative 
value due to their formalization of Article 49 of the Treaty on the European 
Union, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty.168 
Since the 1990s, the development of national minority rights legislation in 
Croatia has been strongly supported by the impact of European conditionality. 
However, this process, though it fostered the adoption of extensive legislation, 
was not able to reduce the clash between “law in the books” and “law in 
action,”or the adverse effects of minority right legislation adopted with the 
formal aim to comply with European standards. 
In this paper it is argued that, notwithstanding the limits of European 
conditionality, the current issue of minority rights in Croatia should no longer 
be considered one of major concern. This is due in particular to the 
progressive case law of the Constitutional Court, which, going beyond the 
limits of European conditionality, is driving Croatia towards democratic 
consolidation.169 
 
2. Nationalism vs. European conditionality 
Croatian nationalism has origins long before the wars of the nineties. Indeed, 
amongthe nationalistic movements that emerged between the First and the 
Second World Wars, a conflict opposing the Croatian and Serbian peoples, 
both claiming the right to establish their own independent national State, 
emerged.170 
These aspirations were stifled during the World Wars and later the rule of 
ethnic federalism in the FPRY and dramatically re-emerged after the death of 
Tito, when Yugoslavia proved to be a fragile mosaic. In fact, in 1986 in 
Serbia, Slobodan Milošević was elected as leader of the League of 
Communists, with a political program aiming, first of all, to build ‘Greater 
Serbia.’ In an effortto achieve this, he supported the the Serbian Academy of 
Science’s publication of a memorandum stating that Serbian national identity 
was born during the 1389 battle in Kosovo. In order to foster Serbian 
 
167European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, 
SN 180/1/93 REV 1, in particular par. 7.A.iii.  
168 For a general overview on European “internal” conditionality, see for example: 
K.E. Smith, The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality, in 
M. Cremona (edt.), The enlargement of the European Union, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 105-139; P. Nicolaides, Enlargement of the EU and 
Effective Implementation of Community Rules: An Integration-Based Approach. 
Maastricht, EIPA Working Paper, 3 December 1999 (http://www.eipanl). 
169Indeed, according to the 2016 Freedom House Report, Croatia is currently a “free 
country”, with a score of 87/100. 
170J. Krulic, La perception de l’Etat-nation par les Croates, les « Musulmans » 
bosniaques et les Serbes, in S. Cordellier (edt.), Nations et nationalismes, La 
Découverte, Paris, 1995, pp. 108-113. 
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nationalism, he denied most of the rights of non-Serbian peoples and 
suspended the autonomies of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In 1990 in 
Croatia,Franjo Tuđman was elected as President of the Republic. His political 
program intended to affirm the identity and sovereignty of Croats and to 
reduce Serbs’ superiority in Yugoslavia. In this context, together with 
Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia seceded from FPRY. 
The conflicting nationalisms emphasized the cultural, political, and economic 
differences among the republics, differences thaterupted in a dramatic 
escalation of violence.171 
The 1991 Constitution of Croatia was adopted in this context and its preamble 
– which is, with slight amendments, still in force – explicitly defines Croatia 
as a national state, referring to “the millenary identity of the Croatian nation 
and the continuity of its statehood, confirmed by the course of its entire 
historical experience within different forms of states and by the preservation 
and growth of the idea of a national state, founded on the historical right of 
the Croatian nation to full sovereignty.”172 History, therefore, is considered as 
the main identification factor of the Croatian nation.The preamble of the 
Constitution, in fact, is called Izvorišneosove (historical foundations). 
Furthermore, the same text summarizes the main historical facts supporting, in 
the seventh century, the determination of the people to establish Croatia “as a 
sovereign and democratic state in which equality, freedoms and human rights 
are guaranteed and ensured, and their economic and cultural progress and 
social welfare promoted.”173 On these bases, Croatia is defined as the 
“national state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of its 
national minorities.”174 It follows the list of recognised national minorities 
including “Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, 
Austrians, Ukrainians, Rusyns, Bosniaks, Slovenians, Montenegrins, 
Macedonians, Russians, Bulgarians, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Turks, Vlachs, 
Albanians and others who are its citizens and who are guaranteed equality 
with citizens of Croatian nationality and the exercise of their national rights in 
compliance with the democratic norms of the United Nations and the 
 
171On the escalation of nationalism and the grounds for the conflict of the nineties, see 
F. Roth, Les raciness historiques de la crise yugoslave, in O. Audéod, J.-D. Mounton, 
S. Pierré-Caps (edts.), L’Etat multinational et l’Europe, Presses Universitaires de 
Nancy, 1997, pp. 55-62. In the same book, see also: M. Gjidara, Radioscope d’un 
échec: la Yugoslavie (Bilan d’un désastre annoncé), pp. 75-81; S. Milacic, L’ex-
Yugoslavie: radioscopie d’un échec analytique (L’épistémologie des auteurs dans le 
rétroviseur), pp. 83-93; and in particular on Milošević politics P. Garde, L’ambigüité 
de l’état yougoslave, pp. 63-66. 
172 Preamble, 1st sentence. 
173 Preamble, 3rd paragraph. 
174 Preamble, 2nd paragraph. 
 
 
countries of the free world.” 
Despite referenc to minorities in the preamble of the Constitution, only 
citizens are considered members of the nation, as confirmed by Article 1 of 
the Constitution, which states,“power in the Republic of Croatia derives from 
the people and belongs to the people as a community of free and equal 
citizens.”175 
Ethnic nationalism seems to be the ideology inspiring the whole text of the 
preamble of the Croatian Constitution.176 Therefore, as anticipated, it comes 
as no surprise that during the negotiations for the admission to European 
organisations, a strong emphasis was devoted to the rights of national 
minorities with the aim to restrain this nationalistic attitude.177In particular, 
both the EU and the CoE required: 
a) To restore the suspended 1991 Constitutional National Minority Rights Act 
(CNMRA) – that, adopted in 1991, was nevertheless suspended in 1995 
during the war – and to amend it with the aim of including non-citizens 
amongst the subjects who might benefit from its application 
b) To amend the preamble of the Constitution. 
With reference to the constitutional law, in 1999, the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe requested, by a resolution, to amend the 1991 
suspended law.178 Following the resolution, in 2000 the law was amended and 
 
175 Art. 1 par. 2. 
176 It has been argued that while the theory of civic nation has been implemented in the 
countries of Western Europe, the theory of ethnic nation has been welcomed in 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia. See in this 
sense the pivotal study of H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. A study on its 
origins and Background, New York, MacMillian, 1994. Accordingly, it is 
possible to distinguish between a “Western model” and an “Eastern model” of 
protection of minority rights in Europe, as pointed out by C.A. MacCartney, 
National States and National Minorities, Russel & Russel, New York, 1968.  
This distinction, however, has been subject to critics. See: T. Kuzio, The Mith of 
Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s Framework for Understanding 
Nationalism, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2002, vol. 25, n. 1, pp. 20 ff. 
177See for example the opinion on the application of Croatia to the EU: Croatia’s 
Application for Membership of the European Union, COM (2004) final, released 
on 14 April 2003, where a particular emphasis is put on the rights of national 
minorities.  On the effects of EU conditionality on minority rights in Croatia, see 
A. Petričušić, Croatia, in E. Lantscher, J. Marko, A. Petričušić (edts.), European 
Integration and its Effects on Minority Protection in Europe, Nomos, Baden-
Baden, 2008, pp. 167-187. See also S. Tatalović, Exercise of National Minority 
Rights in Croatia and European Integration, in Prospects of Multiculturality in 
Western Balkan States, Ethnicity Research Center, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
2004, pp. 111-135. 
178 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, resolution n. 1185 (1999), 
Honouring of obligations and commitments by Croatia. 
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in 2002 the new CNMRA was adopted.179 Finally, new amendments were 
introduced in 2010, a few years before the final admission of Croatia to the 
EU. 
As to the preamble of the Constitution, the Venice Commission recommended 
that Croatia deleteits list of national minorities in order to reduce cases of 
discrimination.180The preamble was amended only in 2010. However, the list 
of national minorities, instead of being deleted, was only expanded upon. 
During the negotiations for the admission to both the EU and the CoE, all 
Croatian legislation on national minorities was constantly supervised by 
European institutions, including not only “official” supervising and advisory 
bodies, such as the European Commission (through progress reports) and the 
Venice Commission,181but also additional bodies exercising a soft pressure on 
the candidate countries, such as the Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention on Minority Rights. 
Therefore, the Croatian legislative framework on national minority rights that 
isin force today is extremely detailed. This is the direct result ofEuropean 
organisations conditionality policies. However, this does not exclude cases of 
discrimination that derive from lack of implementation of legal provisions and 
adverse effects, as it will be pointed out in the following paragraphs. 
 
3. National Minority Rights. Basic principles 
The Croatian Constitution does not provide for a catalogue of minority 
rights.182 However, the protection of the rights of people belonging to 
minorities has always been guaranteed dueto the interpretation of some 
fundamental constitutional principles. 
First of all, as already anticipated, the nationalistic attitude within the 
 
179 Const. Law n. 155, 19 December 2002. For a comment, see A. Petričušić, 
Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities in the Republic of 
Croatia, in European Yearbook of Minority Issues, 2002/3, vol. 2, p. 607-629. 
180 Venice Commission, Draft Opinion on the Amendments of 9 November 2000 and 
28 March 2001 to the Constitution of Croatia, CDL (2001) 6. 
181 Indeed, the Venice Commission, established with final aim of elaborating a set of 
European common values, through the dissemination of human rights as well as 
the principles of democracy and rule of law, proved to be a major subject of the 
CoE conditionality. See in this sense G. Malinverni, The Contribution of the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), in L.-
A. Sicilanos (edt.), The Prevention of Human Rights Violation, Ant. N. Sakkoulas 
Publishers, Athense Martinus Nijoff Publisher, The Hague – New York – 
London, 2001, pp. 123-137; Id., La reconciliation à travers l’assistence 
constitutionnelle aux paix de l’Est: le role de la Commission de Venise, in Les 
Cahiers de la paix, n. 10, 2004; J. Jowell, The Venice Commission: 
Disseminating Democracy through Law, in Public Law, 2003, pp. 675-683. 
182 On the contrary, a catalogue of minority rights is provided, within the countries of 
former Yugoslavia, by the Serbian and Montenegrin Constitutions. 
 
 
preamble of the Constitution is moderated by the statement according to 
which “Croatia is hereby established as the nation state of the Croatian nation 
and the state of the members of its national minorities.”183 It follows the list of 
the recognised national minorities that was expanded upon (but not deleted)in 
the 2010 amendment, as required by most of the supranational bodies 
supervising Croatian performance in the field of minority rights. 
The rights of national minorities are based on the principle of non-
discrimination.184According to Article 15 of the Constitution, members of all 
national minorities have equal rights that shall be regulated by constitutional 
law. Article 15 points out that the law shall recognise general electoral rights, 
as well as the special right of the members of national minorities to elect their 
representatives into the Croatian Parliament. Moreover, the same article 
recognises the right of national minorities to express their nationality, the 
freedom to use their languages and scripts, and cultural autonomy. 
Article 15 was implemented by the previously mentioned 1991 Constitutional 
National Minorities Rights Act and was replaced by the 2002 constitutional 
law, which was last amended in 2010. An issue of major is that the 
constitutional law refers only to Croatian citizens as the subjects of the rights 
provided thereof. As a consequence, since national minority groups living 
permanently in Croatia but lacking citizenship are excluded by the application 
of the law, the denial of citizenship has often been used to discriminate 
against the Serbian minority.185 Despite the recommendations made by several 
supranational bodies, the reference to citizenship has never been deleted.  
 
4. Linguistic and cultural rights 
According to the Constitution, the official language of the Republic of Croatia 
is Croatian with Latin scripts. However, another language and the Cyrillic or 
some other scriptmay be introduced in individual local units under conditions 
specified by law.186On the basis of this principle, the constitutional National 
Minority Rights Act guarantees the use of minority languages through several 
provisions. 
In particular, the right to use first and family names in the minority language 
as well as the right to have the names officially recognised through entry in 
registers or other official documents is recognised. Accordingly, identity card 
 
183 Preamble, 2nd paragraph. 
184 Provided by art. 14 Const.: «Everyone in the Republic of Croatia shall enjoy rights 
and freedoms, regardless of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or 
other belief, national or social origin, property, birth, education, social status or 
other characteristics. All shall be equal before the law». 
185 See in this sense J. Yacoub, Les minorities. Quelle protection?, Desclée de 
Brouwer, Paris, 1995, pp. 147-155. 
186 Art. 12 Const. 
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forms can be printed and completed in the minority language and script.187 
Moreover, the right to use minority languages and scripts both privately and 
in public and ondisplay signs, inscriptions, and other information is 
recognised.188 
The constitutional law also recognises the right to education in minority 
languages.189 To this aim, special programs are provided in public schools190 
and the right toestablish preschools, primary and secondary schools, and 
higher educational institutions are recognised for the purposes of minority 
education.191 
The right to use minority languages is also guaranteed at the local level, in 
local self-government units in places wheremembers of a national minority 
compose a minimum of one third of the population. In this case, the use of 
minority languages is regulated according to the charters of local or regional 
self-government units.192 
As to cultural rights, the right to use insignia and symbols of national 
minorities,193 the right to establish associations with the aim of preserving, 
developing, promoting, and expressing minority culture and national 
identity,194and the right to maintain contact with people sharing the same 
national affiliation and who live in the‘homeland’ are recognised.195 Finally, 
local and national radio and television stations have to produce and/or 
broadcast programmes with the aim of preserving minority cultures.196 
 
5. Political rights 
The protection of political rights of national minorities, both at the national 
and local levels, is particularly detailed dueto the CNMRA and the 
implementing electoral law.197 
 
187 Art. 9 CNMRA. 
188 Art. 10 CNMRA. 
189 Art. 11 CNMRA. On this right, with particular reference to the Italian minority, see 
E. Ferioli, Sistema educativo pubblico e tutela della minoranza italiana in 
Croazia e Slovenia, in V. Piergigli (edt.), L’autoctonia divisa. La tutela giuridica 
della minoranza italiana in Istria, Fiume e Dalmazia, Cedam, Padova,2005, pp. 
365-374. 
190 Art. 11 (2-7) CNMRA  
191 Art. 11 (8) CNMRA. 
192 Art. 12 CNMRA. 
193 Art. 14 CNMRA. 
194 Art. 43 Const. and law on the associations, Off. Gazz. n. 70/1997, 88/2001. 
195 Art. 16 CNMRA. 
196 Art. 18 CNMRA. 
197 According to an Italian scholar, the constitutional law on national minorities can be 
considered as a framework law on political rights of national minorities: C. 
Casonato, La rappresentanza della comunità italiana in Italia e Croazia, in  V. 
Piergigli (edt.), L’autoctonia divisa, supra at note 32, pp. 313-338. 
 
 
The right to representation is provided first through the mechanism of 
reserved seats in legislative bodies. Indeed, at the national level, “a minimum 
of three seats in the Croatian Parliament shall be reserved for representatives 
of those national minorities which … account for more than 1.5 percent of the 
population.”198 At the local level, national minorities are provided with the 
right to be represented in the representative bodies of local and regional self-
government units, which is regulated in detail by Article 20 CNMRA. 
Moreover, specific rules can be provided with reference to those national 
minorities not representing the majority of the population by the local 
charters.199 
In addition to the right of representation in legislative assemblies, minority 
representation is guaranteed in the executive bodies of local self-government 
units.200Additionally, the right to be represented in public administration and 
the courts according to special legislation as well as employment policy 
papers of those bodies is recognised.201 
The right to national minority representation is also guaranteed by collective 
bodies thatmainly perform advisory functions, as well asthe right to legislative 
initiative,“in the interest of advancement, preservation and protection of the 
status of national minorities in society.”202 In particular, constitutional law 
provides Councils of National Minorities, which are non-profit legal 
persons203 elected by the members of a national minority representing, in self-
government units, more than 1.5 per cent of the population, in local self-
government units, more than 200 persons, and in regional self-government 
units, more than 500 persons.204 According to Article 31(1) CNMRA, 
“National minority councils in self-government units shall be entitled to: 
– propose to the bodies of self-government units measures to improve the 
position of the respective national minority nationally or in a specific area, 
including proposals for general ordinances to regulate issues relevant to that 
national minority; 
 
198 Art. 19 CNMRA. 
199 Art. 21 CNMRA. 
200 Art. 22(1) CNMRA. 
201 Art. 22(2) CNMRA. 
202 Art. 23 CNMRA. 
203 Art. 25(1) CNMRA. 
204 In particular, according to art. 24 CNMRA, municipal national minority councils 
shall be composed by 10 members, city national minority councils by 10 
members, and county national minority councils by 25 members. The candidates 
for membership in those bodies are nominated by national minority associations 
or groups of citizens who are members of national minorities being not less than 
20 in the territory of a municipality, 30 in a city and 50 in a county. The members 
of national minority councils shall be elected by direct secret ballot for a four-
year term, according to the procedure for the election of the representative bodies 
of local self-government units.  
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– nominate candidates for posts in the civil service and the bodies of self-
government units; 
–be kept apprised of any issue to be discussed by the committees of the 
representative bodies of a self-government unit that are relevant to the status 
of that national minority; 
– provide opinions and submit proposals pertaining to local and regional radio 
and television broadcasts intended for national minorities or addressing 
minority concerns.” 
. The Councils have a right to be consulted during the process for the adoption 
of local exectuve orders. Indeed, when drafting orders concerning rights and 
freedoms of national minorities, the executive authorities of self-government 
units shall consider their opinion.205 The Councils also have special ex post 
functions, including in particular the right to notify the ministry in charge of 
general administrative affairs on all executive orders deemed to be in contrast 
with the provisions of the Constitution or of the constitutional Law on 
National Minority Rights.206 
Special bodies are in charge ofcoordinating national minority councils. Since 
the 2010 constitutional reform, they have been recognized legal personality.207 
At the national level, Article 15 CNMRA provides for the National Minorities 
Advisory Board, appointed by the national government for a fouryear 
term,208to be in charge with considering and proposing “modes for the 
regulation and resolution of matters pertaining to the exercise and protection 
of minority rights and freedoms.”209 To this end, the Advisory Board 
cooperates with councils of national minorities, as well as with other bodies 
performing functions related to minority rights. 
 
6. European conditionality and minority rights in Croatia. From (lack of) 
implementation to compliance? 
Despite the detailed legal framework introduced dueto the pressure of 
European conditionality, the implementation of legal normsin Croatia is often 
far from satisfactory.210 Indeed, the recommendations requiring Croatia to 
delete the list of national minorities in the Preamble of the Constitution as 
well as the reference to citizens only in the CNMRA have never been 
considered. 
 
205 Art. 32(1) CNMRA. 
206 Art. 32(2) CNMRA. 
207 Art. 4 Constitutional Law 18 June 2010. 
208 Art. 36 CNMRA. 
209 Art. 15 CNMRA. 
210 The gap between law in the books and law in action in the field of minority rights is 
a general shortcoming of European conditionality, not only in Croatia. See in this 
sense: L. M. Letschert, The Impact of Minority Rights Mechanism, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, in part. pp. 6 ff. 
 
 
Moreover, as recently pointed out by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe,211even withthe positive developments in the protection of 
minority rights since the adoption of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, cases of discrimination and ethnically-
motivated incidents against persons belonging to the Serbian and Roma 
minorities are still frequent. In addition, a number of elderly returnees 
belonging to national minorities – including Serbians, Bosniaks, and the 
Roma – are still facing difficulties to be recognized with citizenship status. As 
a result, the constitutional provisions on the rights of national minorities 
remain inapplicable for these groups. Also, the functioning of the Councils of 
National Minorities is unsatisfactory in many respects. Indeed, the 
cooperation between the councils and local authorities is still weak, their 
democratic legitimization is undermined by the low turnout, and the funding 
remains inadequate. Finally, the right to political representation of national 
minorities would need, according to the Committee, further implementation. 
Lack of implementation is not the only concern when dealing with minority 
rights in Croatia. Indeed, as observed with reference to the effects of political 
conditionality, it is possible that, after the accession toEuropean organizations, 
without the “steak and carrot” instrument, the standards for the protection of 
human rights are dramatically lowered.212 There was a case of “regressive 
conditionality” in Croatia, with reference to Article 12 CNMRA, which 
provides the right to use national minority languages at the local level in local 
self-government units where national minorities represent at least one third of 
the population. 
Indeed, the implementation of this right proved to be particularly problematic 
in those local units where the memory of the ethnic war of the 1990s is still 
vivid. This was the case in Vukovar, a Croatian city whose population, 
according to the 2011 census, was more than one third Serbian. The Serbian 
minority was thereforeentitled, according to Article 12 of the Constitutional 
law, to display signs and symbols in Serbian with Cyrillic scripts. However, 
the decision to implement this right in late 2013 fuelled violent protests, led 
by the group HQs for defence of Croatian Vukovar, arguing that, due to the 
events of the Vukovar Battle,213 the city had to be exempted by the application 
 
211 Resolution CM/Res CMN(2011)12 on the implementation of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Croatia (Adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 6 July 2011 at the 1118th meeting of the Ministers’ 
Deputies). 
212 Indeed, the serious constitutional crisis that are taking place in Hungary and Polonia 
are examples of a serious “regressive conditionality”. In this sense, some scholars 
talked about the failure of EU to disseminate its values: see D. Kochenov, The 
Issue of Values, University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper Series, 
n. 19, 2013. 
213During the war of the 1990s, the Croatian city of Vukovar was occupied for 87 days 




of the provision.214 
The protests also acquired a legal dimension. With the support of the groups 
protesting against the application of the law, on 13 December 2013, a 
referendum question was submitted to the Parliament with an aim to amend 
Article 12 CNMRA. Indeed, the referendum question was formulated as 
follows: 
“Do you support that Article 12.1 of the Constitutional Act on the Rights of 
National Minorities (Official Gazette nos. 155/02, 47/10, 80/10 and 93/11) be 
amended to read: “Equal official use of the language and script used by 
members of a national minority shall be realised in the area of a unit of local 
self-government, state administration and the judiciary, when members of an 
individual national minority comprise at least half the population of such 
unit”?” 
In a nutshell, the aim of the referendum was to introduce, in the wake of the 
protests, stricter conditions for the exercise of minority language rights in all 
local units in Croatia. The aim, therefore, was not only to introduce an 
exception considering a special local case, but to introduce a higher threshold 
for the exercise of linguistic rights of any minority group in Croatia. It is more 
than evident that the referendum, if successful, would have resulted in an 
unjustified infringement of the rights of all national minorities and in 
particular the rights of Serbians, thus jeopardising the most basic principles of 
the Croatian Constitution. 
Besides cases on the lack of implementation and post-accession regressive 
conditionality, there is also the possibility of adverse effects of legislation 
adopted to implement European standards. This was the case with the 
Croatian Constitutional Reform Act of 2010, which, with the formal aim of 
improving the standards for the protection of national minority rights, 
introduceda new political right for national minorities. In particular, according 
to Article 1 of the reform act, a new clause had to be added to Article 19 of 
the CNMRA, stating that “national minorities which account for less than 
1.5% of the population of the Republic of Croatia shall, in addition to their 
right to exercise universal suffrage, be entitled to the special right to vote 
enabling them to elect five deputies belonging to such national minorities 
from within their own special constituencies.” In other words, the law 
intended to add to the system of reserved seats in favor of national minorities 
 
forces. Indeed, before the war Vukovar was a multiethnic city with a mixed 
Croatian-Serbian population. The Vukovar battle proved to be one of the worst 
episodes in the Balkan war or the 1990s. The city was destroyed and its non-
Serbian population ethnically cleansed by the army led by S. Milošević.  
214 The international press extensively reported the protests. See for example Croatians 
tear down Serbian signs, BBC News, 2 September 2013,retrieved 6February 
2016; Croatia plans Cyrillic signs for Serbs in Vukovar, BBC News, 3 January 
2013, retrieved 6February 2016. 
 
 
a right to double vote in order to recognizethe smallest minority groups. 
The introduction of the above mentioned provision represented, at least 
formally, the implementation of the recommendations of the European 
institutions in the context of conditionality.215The Office for National 
Minorities of the Croatian Government, in presenting the reform to the OSCE, 
pointed out its relevance in order to of reinforce the rights of the smallest 
national minorities, particularly for Roma people.216Accordingly, in the 2010 
report, the European Commission positively evaluated the new measures.217 
However, when looking not only at the law in the books but also in action, the 
possible adverse effects of this legal norm are clear. Indeed, the double voting 
system is a special mechanism of representation of national minorities that, 
due to its potential problematic effects, is not particularly common in 
comparative law.218 As pointed out by the Venice Commission, double voting 
is an exceptional measure, to be adopted only when mechanisms that are 
betterin compliance with the principle of equality, such as electoral systems 
based on proportional representation or providing for reserved seats, are not 
effective. Therefore, double voting systems can be introduced, provided that 
the principle of proportionality is strictly respected.219 
All of these shortcomings emerged clearly in the Croatian case, where the 
implementation of the right to double vote jeopardized the principle of 
equality amongst minorities. In fact, the only minority representing more than 
1.5 per cent of the population in Croatia is the Serbian minority. In theory, 
this would not be a problem. However, when considering the cases of 
violence against the Croatian and the Serbian communities, it was evident that 
the concrete implementation of this law could add ‘legal’ cases of 
discrimination to the already existent cases of ‘factual’ discrimination. 
Each of the mentioned cases confirm the opinion according to which the 
adoption of a legislative framework under the pressure of European 
conditionality can be a first step in the process ofhuman and minority rights 
improvement, but with the need for a constant process of monitoring and 
adaptation. However, this lesson seems to have been learned by Croatian 
 
215In particular, the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on Minority 
Rights had frequently required reinforcing the political rights of national 
minorities in its Reports on Croatia. 
216 See the statement of Mr Branko Sočanak, Head of the Office for National 
Minorities, Government of Croatia, at the OSCE Review Conference on Human 
Dimension, Session 7, Warsaw, 6 October 2010. 
217 Commission Staff Working Document, Croatia 2010 Progress Report, Brussels, 9 
November 2010, SEC(2010) 1326, in particular p. 6. 
218 An important case of implementation of this mechanism is Slovenia, where a right 
to double voting is recognized to the Hungarian and Italian minorities. 
219 Venice Commission, Draft Report on Dual Voting for Persons Belonging to 




institutions and in particular by the Constitutional Court in its progressive 
case law concerning both linguistic and political rights of national minorities. 
With reference to the right to use minority languages in local-self government 
units, on 12 August 2014the Constitutional Court declared therequest for 
referendum on Article 12 CANMR unconstitutional.220 In particular, 
according to the Court, the Constitution – though it does not provide any 
explicit prohibition to raise the threshold for the exercise of minority linguistic 
rights –establishes some fundamental values, such as the rule of law and the 
protection of human rights. Therefore, the threshold might be raised, provided 
that it is “justified exclusively by reasons which may be said to stem from a 
democratic society founded on the rule of law and the protection of human 
rights.”221In the opinion of the Court, any change in the threshold could be 
admitted provided that it has a “clear and rational basis and objective 
justification.” In other words, in order to be in compliance with the 
Constitution, raising the threshold has to be justified in terms of 
proportionality. In the words of the Court, “raising the threshold must have a 
clearly expressed legitimate aim in the public/general interest, and it must be 
necessary in a democratic society, which is strictly proportionate to the 
legitimate aim it is seeking to achieve.  In other words, there must be an 
urgent social need to raise the existing threshold.”222 
On these bases, the Constitutional Courtconsidered thatincreasing the 
threshold in this case did not meet the above-mentioned conditions, and it thus 
declared the proposed referendum unconstitutional. 
The Constitutional Court was even more progressive in the case concerning 
national minorities’ right to double vote. The Constitutional Reform Act 
introducing this right in favour of the smallest minorities was challenged 
before the Constitutional Court by a number of claimants including, besides 
several Serbian political parties and associations, the non-governmental 
organization GONG as well as the Croatian Helsinki Committee. The Court 
delivered its opinion on 29 July 2001,223 declaring the constitutional reform 
act to be inconsistent with the principle of equality of national 
minorities224and the right to equal suffrage.225 
The opinion of the Court is of particular relevance with reference to the limits 
of European conditionality and the possibilities for solutions through legal 
means. The Court recognizes that the duty to protect national minorities is 
founded not only in the Croatian Constitution and legislation, but that it is also 
 
220 Constitutional Court of Croatia, decision n. U-VIIR-4640/2014. 
221Constitutional Court of Croatia, decision n. U-VIIR-4640/2014, para. 13.2. 
222 Constitutional Court of Croatia, decision n. U-VIIR-4640/2014, para. 14. 
223 Constitutional Court of Croatia, nos. U-I-3597/2010, U-I-3847/2010, U-I-692/2011, 
U-I-898/2011, U-I-994/2011, 29 July 2011. 
224 Art. 15 Const. 
225 Art. 45 Const. 
 
 
imposed by the EU and the CoE. As a result, the Court “controls the 
realisation of constitutional, but also of European legal values.”226 In the case 
at stake, the Court, considered to be competent to evaluate the compatibility 
of the reform act not only with the Constitution but also with European 
values, declared the law to bein contrast with the principle of proportionally as 
provided by the Venice Commission. According to the Court, the law lacked 
any explanation about reasons for the introduction of the measure, and 
considering that the law already provided for a system of reserved seats, the 
double voting system “excessively infringes on the equality of suffrage in a 
democratic society.”227 
In a nutshell, according to the Court, the standards of European conditionality 
shall not be considered as a ‘mantra’ to be respected without any exception. 
On the contrary, they should be subject to discussion, evaluation, and in the 
case of a declaration of unconstitutionality, subject to consideration of the 
possible adverse effects of their concrete implementation. The aim of the 
Constitutional Court in its progressive case law, therefore, is not an a-critical 
implementation of external rules, but the substantial compliance of the 
internal legal system with European values. 
 
7. Final Remarks 
The case of minority rights in Croatia demonstrates how deeplyEuropean 
conditionality can influence national legal drafting processes. Since the 1990s, 
the constitutional and legal framework on national minority rights is 
particularly wide and complete.  
With reference to the theoretical framework supporting these reforms, it is 
possible to state that the civic concept of nation seems to replace the ethnic 
one.  Nevertheless, when looking not only at the ‘law in the books’ but also at 
the ‘law in action,’ it becomes evident thatthe legislative framework often 
does not correspond to the reality. As it has been described in the previous 
paragraphs, national minorities are often still discriminated against, and in 
several cases, their rights are denied in favor the idea that the national state is 
founded upon the ethnic nation. This is due not only to the lack of 
implementation of legal texts, but also to cases of ‘regressive conditionality’ 
after accession and‘adverse effects’ of legislation formally in compliance with 
European standards. 
In Croatia – a country whose national identity has been denied for centuries – 
finding a balance between nation-building and the protection of the rights of 
minority groups is a very complex task. However, as it has been pointed out in 
this paper, national institutions, and in particular the Constitutional Court, are 
in a special position to reconcile these two extremes.  
 
226 Constitutional Court of Croatia, 29 July 2011, point 28.1. 
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In the early 1990s, the Republic of Macedonia entered a process of social 
transition and as a newly independent state faced a denial of its identity from 
the outside as well as amended identity definitions from within.228 Despite 
being the only former Yugoslav republic to make a peaceful transition to 
statehood, Macedonia encountered challenges that questioned its stability. 
One major test was the development of a framework to accommodate the 
needs and rights of its minorities. The 1991 constitutional preamble asserted 
that Macedonia is  
 “established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full 
equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian 
people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romas and other 
nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia.”229  
The Constitution included few provisions guarantying basic minority 
rights.230 Rather than using the term ‘minority,’ the distinct groups were 
identified as ‘nationalities.’ Macedonia’s mixed population structure (see 
Table 1) comprises ethnic Macedonians as a dominant group and ethnic 
Albanians as another large group, alongside a few smaller ethnic 
communities. Following the country’s independence, tensions between ethnic 
Macedonians and ethnic Albanians manifested in different forms. The 
 
228 Dodovski, “Pride and Perplexities: Identity Politics in Macedonia and Its Theatrical 
Refractions”, 92.  
229 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, “Preamble” (Official Gazette n. 52 of 
22.11.1992). 
230 Art. 7: use of nationalities’ language in the units of local self-government; Art. 8: 
free expression of national identity as one of the fundamental values of the 
constitutional order; Art. 48: free expressing of nationalities’ identity and 
attributes and right to instruction in nationalities’ language in primary and 
secondary education; Art. 56: protection, promotion and enhancement of 
nationalities’ historical and artistic heritage; Art. 78: Council for inter-ethnic 
relations (within the parliament).  
 
 
Albanian parties called for autonomy and pressed demands for greater 
political participation and representation rights.231 The frictions went along 
with the political processes of democratization and state building, but 
culminated in violence in 2001. The conflict was put to an end with the 
signing a peace accord dubbed the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). The 
accord resulted in a new constitutional setting designed to advance minority 
representation. The constitutional amendments deriving from the OFA 
introduced changes to the terminology by replacing ‘nationalities’ with 
‘peoples’ and ‘ethnic communities.’  The country was essentially re-defined as 
a state shared by ethnic Macedonians and other constituent peoples (ethnic 
groups) who benefit from the various instruments of representation and 
protection of their rights at the national and local levels. 
 
Table 1: Population structure according to declared ethnic affiliation, by 
censuses.232 
 1991 1994 2002 
TOTAL 2 033 964 1 945 932 2 022 547 
 
Macedonians 1 328 187 65.30% 1 295 964 66.60% 1 297 981 64,18 % 
Albanians 447 987 22.03% 441 104 22.67% 509 083 25,17 % 
Turks 77 080 3.79% 78 019 4.01% 77 959 3, 85% 
Serbs 42 775 2.10% 40 228 2.07% 35 939 1,78 % 
Roma 52 103 2.56% 43 707 2.25% 53 879 2,66 % 
Boshniaks - - 6 829 0.35% 17 018 0.84% 
Vlachs 7 764 0.38% 8 601 0.44% 9 695 0,48% 
 
This chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of minority representation 
in Macedonia since its independenc and focuses on all constitutionally 
recognized minorities on its territory. First, the legal framework and the 
institutional setting are explicated. A twofold approach depicts the 
participation of ethnic Albanians and then discusses the struggles of smaller 
ethnic communities for greater involvement in the decision-making processes. 
Minority representation is assessed from several perspectives: 1) 
representation and participation in the parliament; 2) representation in the 
government; and 3) representation in the units of local self-government. The 
chapter offers insights into the performances of minority political parties and 
 
231 See more in Andeva, “Challenging National Cultural Autonomy in the Republic of 
Macedonia.”, 215-216. 
232 Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic 
of Macedonia, 56. Last population census is performed in 2002. 
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the extent to which they succeeded in ensuring an effective representation of 
their communities. In particular, the chapter considers the coalition dynamics 
and main challenges encountered by small-in-size minorities in their 
endevours for an effective voice. 
 
2. Minority representation in complex power-sharing arrangements 
 
Peaceful minority-majority relations can be achieved if minorities feel that the 
state in which they reside is also ‘their’ state—that it ‘belongs to them’—and 
if they are prepared to integrate fully into that state and its structures. 
Effective participation is another conditio sine qua non.233 Each group within 
the state is essentially important to the existence of peaceful relations and 
structures of governance are based on the necessary division and sharing of 
power between the groups.234 Two different forms of power-sharing are 
distinguished: consociationalism (consociational democracy)235 and 
‘integrative’236 power-sharing. The former can be partially or entirely based 
on a territorial principle (segmental autonomy), and it can include grand 
coalitions, proportional representation, and veto rights. Another important 
aspect of a power-sharing arrangement is the functionality of the system - be it 
equivalent or proportional.237 The former treats equally all constitutive groups 
within the composition of the state organs and the decision-making process, 
whereas the latter is based on minority representation following their numeric 
consistency.  
Where does Macedonia stand on this matter? Bieber and Keil238 argue that 
the entire Western Balkan region has been a laboratory of power-sharing 
instruments with rather mixed results. In Macedonia, power-sharing was a 
consequence of peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts; however, it also 
had some negative side effects. According to Bieber and Keil, despite many 
 
233 Hofmann, “The Future of Minority Issue in the Council of Europe and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”, 171. 
234 See more on self-governance and contemporary power-sharing arragements and 
questions in divided societies in Weller, M., & Wolff, S., Autonomy, Self-
governance and Conflict Resolution. Innovative approaches to institutional 
design in divided societies, 1-43; McEvoy, J., & O'Leary, B. (Eds.). Power 
sharing in deeply divided places, 231-364.  
235 Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory 
and Practice, 23-42. 
236 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 563-681. 
237 Palermo and Woelk, Diritto Costituzionale Comparato dei Gruppi e delle 
Minoranze, 127-161. 




similarities, Macedonia cannot be categorized as a fully-fledged 
consociational democracy. They refer to Wolff’s typology of the political 
systems with ‘complex power-sharing’ arrangements.239 They argue that 
Macedonia relies on informal power-sharing based on a partially territorial 
principle, as “[t]here are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues”; this is a 
system of proportional representation with electoral districts designed to 
ensure minority participation in the state legislature and minority veto rights 
according to the Badinter principle (as explained below).240 The element 
missing for a complete Lijphart consociational democracy is the grand 
coalition. There is no mandatory constitutional requirement for an executive 
grand coalition,241 and de jure, there have not been ‘grand’ coalitions in 
Macedonia, because not all significant parties of all significant ethnic 
communities have been regularly represented.242  Macedonia, de facto, has 
been governed by changing coalitions between mostly Macedonian and 
Albanian parties.  
The Macedonian power-sharing arrangements include several instruments 
for minority representation: 1) Badinter double-majority voting; 2) equitable 
representation; 3) proportional electoral model; and 4) special representation 
bodies at the state and local levels (Committee for Interethnic Relations and 
Commissions for Inter-Community Relations, respectively). 
Ethnic communities in Macedonia do not enjoy full veto rights; however, 
after 2001, they have a right to double voting on laws that concern their 
identity interests. Parliamentary adoption of laws relating directly to 
minorities must follow the Badinter principle, which requires a majority vote 
of deputies representing ethnic minorities. The aim of this principle is to 
protect ethnic minorities in parliamentary decision-making, meaning that laws 
with a significant impact on minority ethnic communities may not be adopted 
by a simple majority but require a ‘double’ majority, including a majority 
among political representatives of the communities. The Badinter majority 
 
239 Wolff, “Complex Power-Sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-governance 
in Contemporary Conflict Settlements”, 29. 
240 The principle is named after the French constitutional scholar and former Minister 
of Justice Robert Badinter, who served as a consultant during the Ohrid 
negotiations in 2001. 
241 Spirovski, “Separation of Powers and Consociational Power Sharing in Republic of 
Macedonia: Developments and Perspectives”, 1-17. 
242 ‘Grand coalition government’ is the one in which several political parties cooperate, 
reducing the dominance of any one party within the coalition. The only grand 
coalition in Macedonia, which also included opposition parties, was created 




principle is also used for adopting legislative acts in the units of local self-
government, although such arrangements do not derive from the OFA.243 
 The principle of equitable representation is determined by the 
Constitution as a fundamental value244: “equitable representation of persons 
belonging to all communities in public bodies at all levels and in other areas 
of public life” derives from the OFA (Section 4.2). The OFA does not call for 
strict ethnic quotas in public administration. Nevertheless, the obligation to 
implement equitable representation has been one of the most important state 
priorities. It is included in numerous laws and by-laws that regulate different 
areas of social life. The principle applies to the relations between ethnic 
communities in the country and their representation in the public 
administration workforce. In particular, it refers to employing civil and public 
servants at state and local level and staff in state institutions. One of the main 
goals is to gradually reach a percentage of employed members of the ethnic 
communities in accordance with the results of the country’s last population 
census.245 Table 2 illustrates a comparative overview of the application of this 
principle by presenting the sum of percentages of the total number of 
employees in all public and state institutions.246 
 
Table 2: Comparative overview of the implementation of the equitable 
representation for the period 2007-2014, expressed in percentages of the total 
employed staff.247 
 
 Macedonians Albanians Turks Roma Serbs Vlachs Boshiaks 
2014 74,8 18,6 1,9 1,4 1,6 0,7 0,4 
2013 75,3 18,1 1,8 1,3 1,5 0,7 0,4 
2012 75,2 17,8 1,8 1,3 1,6 0,7 0,5 
 
243 The Badinter principle is accepted and specifically regulated in the statues of the 
municipalities. However, there are examples when the principle has been ignored 
or used for political manipulation. For instance, the names of four primary 
schools in the municipality of Chair in the city of Skopje  have been changed 
without taking into account the votes and opinions of the representatives of 
ethnic Macedonians, who are in numeric minority in this particular municipality. 
244 Added with Amendment VI as addition to line 2 of the Constitutional Article 8.  
245 Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Strategy for equitable representation of 
communities that are not majority in the Republic of Macedonia, 12. 
246 According to its constitutionally established authority, the Ombudsman monitors 
annually the implementation of the principle of equitable representation by 
collecting data from the authorities, though several annual reports note that some 
institutions have refused to give data.  
247 Ombudsman Office 2015, Report on the Realization of the Principles of Equitable 
Representation for 2014, 2. 
 
 
2011 76,3 17,2 1,7 1,3 1,6 0,7 0,4 
2010 77,23 16,92 1,62 0,7 1,59 0,69 0,31 
2009 79,92 14,05 1,29 0,8 1,88 0,76 0,37 
2008 81,49 12,76 1,22 0,78 1,87 0,66 0,3 
2007 83,72 10,78 1,09 0,78 1,76 0,68 0,34 
 
The data presented in Table 2, particularly the percentages from 2013 and 
2014, indicate that the representation of all communities is approximately the 
same as in previous years, with a slight increase in the percentage of ethnic 
Albanians, and that there is still an insufficient representation of smaller 
communities.248 
 
2.1 Minorities representation in the legislative and executive bodies 
 
In multi-ethnic democracies, minorities can be included in the election and 
decision-making processes through their ethnic parties. They can be also 
included in mainstream parties (non-ethnically defined parties). The latter 
option seems less favorable to minorities. Bigger parties dominate the 
competition and their leadership has all the power to decide on the level of 
inclusion of ethnic community members in the electoral lists. This form of 
inclusion was used for smaller ethnic communities in Macedonia.  
Furthermore, minority representation is highly dependent on the electoral 
system employed. The ethnic structure of electoral districts, the electoral 
rules, and the intensity of electoral competition are also particularly relevant. 
The majoritarian system was strongly supported in the parliamentary elections 
in 1994. However, the principle of ‘one person, one vote’ was considered 
unfavorable for the Albanian political party PDPA/NDP.249 Some scholars 
argue that the majoritarian system is insensitive to minorities. Such arguments 
are in favor of the changes brought by the OFA in 2001.250 The mixed 
 
248 The percentages differ in separate ministries, public bodies and agencies. For 
example, the representation in the government (General Secretariat, Secretariat 
for Legislation, Secretariat for European Affairs, Secretariat for the 
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement) in 2014 included 56, 4% of 
ethnic Albanians, 9,0% of Turks, 6,0% of Roma, 1,6% of Serbs, 0,8% of Vlachs 
and 1,4% of Boshniaks. By contrast, in the Commission for Protection against 
Discrimination, the Albanian community is represented with 38,4%, the Turkish, 
Roma and Vlach communities with 9,1% for each community and there are no 
employees from the Serbian and Boshniak ethnic communities. 
249 Maleska, “Multiethnic Democracy in Macedonia: Political Analysis and Emerging 
Scenarios”, 1-27. 
250 Maleski, “The Causes of a War: Ethnic Conflict in Macedonia in 2001”.  
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(majoritarian/proportional) model (used since the second parliamentary 
elections) was changed to a purely proportional one before the 2002 elections 
as a consequence of the principle of proportionality as defined in the OFA. 
The pure proportional system significantly increased the number of competing 
parties,251 as well as the number of MPs belonging to the Albanian, Turk, 
Roma, and other ethnic communities. 
Nevertheless, there are visible differences when comparing the 
representation of the Albanian ethnic community on the one hand, and smaller 
ethnic communities (Roma, Turks, Serbs and Boshniaks) on the other. In 
parliamentary elections, political parties have two options: to join pre-
electoral coalitions or to stand alone before the electorate. The political 
participation of smaller communities in the Macedonian parliament was 
continuously secured through pre-electoral coalitions. Faced with the inability 
to command a majority of support, these communities were regularly forced 
to seek executive power through entering different forms of coalition.252 To 
illustrate the representation of ethnic communities in the parliament, Table 3 
presents the number of MPs representing an ethnic political party.  
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Source: Published mandates available on the official web site of the 
Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia at http://sobranie.mk/, retrieved 
October 2015. 
Note: From 1991 to 1994, NDP shared five seats with PDPM (Party for 
Democratic Prosperity in Macedonia). During the 2011-2014 term, NDP was 
renamed to National Democratic Revival. Though PEI was founded as a 
multi-ethnic party, its elected MP declared himself as ‘Torbesh.’ 
 
It is important to note that there are no guaranteed mandates for ethnic 
communities in the parliament. Attempts to introduce such mandates date 
back to 2005.253 The Democratic Party of the Turks presented a proposal to 
ammend the Law on Election of MPs by which eight to twelve seats would be 
reserved for the smaller ethnic communities and distributed proportionally 
depending on the number of votes at parliamentary elections. In the following 
year, smaller ethnic communities again insisted on guaranteed quotas in the 
parliament, as well as a Ministry for minority issues and a Constitutional law 
on the rights of ethnic communities.254 There were discussions on whether the 
distribution of guaranteed seats should be done proportionally or if each 
community should be entitled to one seat, while the rest of the seats is 
distributed to those who win the majority of votes at elections. .255 Eventually, 
there was another proposal to limit the guaranteed seats to five.256 In 2010, the 
issue resurfaced with a proposal by the Social Democratic Union of 
Macedonia (SDUM) to amend the electoral code and introduce ten guaranteed 
seats. Initially, the Albanian party DUI was against the proposal, arguing that 
it would jeopardize the Badinter principle; however, the party later declared 
 
253 Selmani, “Izborni matematiki so etnichkite malcinstva“. 
254 Utrinski vesnik, „Malite etnichki zaednici so ultimatum do Gruevski“; Utrinski 
vesnik, “Pomalite etnikumi baraat garantirani mesta vo parlamentot“. 
255 Selmani, “Sobranie so 133 pratenici“. 
256 Cangova, “Garantiranite mandati ne se reshenie za izlez od kjorsokakot“. 
 
 
its support, but only if the proposed ammnedments do not affect this 
principle.257 
Minority participation in the decision-making process is also guaranteed 
through specific parliamentary bodies. The 1991 Constitution introduced a 
Council for inter-ethnic relations within the parliament. It was composed of 
the president of the parliament and the following representatives: two 
Macedonians, two Albanians, two Turks, two Vlach, two Roma and two 
members of other ethnic communities in Macedonia. With the 2001 
constitutional amendments, the Committee for inter-ethnic relations was 
recomposed to include 19 members—seven Macedonians, seven Albanians, 
and one member from each of the communities of Turks, Vlachs, Roma, Serbs 
and Boshniaks, elected by the parliament. Its work was further specified in the 
Law on the Committee for Interethnic Relations, adoped in 2007. The main 
task of the Committee is to monitor, discuss, and give suggestions to the 
parliament on the manners of advancement of interethnic relations. In 
addition, the Committee is entitled to make decisions on the manner of voting 
in the event of questioning if a proposed legislation should be voted accoring 
to the Badinter principle. Moreover, the work of the Committee includes 
scrutinizing drafted and existing legislation, reviewing of information 
prepared by the government and the ministries upon Committee's request, and 
overseeing the implementation of laws and other legal provisions. This body 
seemed to be the highlight of the development of inter-ethnic relations in 
Macedonia and potentially a crucial agent for the promotion of minority 
rights. In reality, however, it had little, if any, effect on the advancement of 
interethnic relations.258 
A distinctive mark of Macedonian politics is the recognition that the 
inclusion of minorities is crucial to state stability. All governments elected by 
the Macedonian parliament since 1991 were coalition governments in which 
one of the parties of the Albanian community acted as a coalition partner and 
held several ministerial positions (see Table 4). Other ethnic communities did 
not participate in such arrangements, although they too managed to secure 
their places in over-size government coalitions, usually through negotiations 
with bigger political parties forming ‘voluntary’ executive power-sharing.259 
 
 
257 Neskova, “Ustavot ne dava Badenter da se deli“; Radio Slobodna Evropa, “Sredbata 
na Ahmeti so pomalite etnichki partii“.  
258 Petkovski, “The Effects of the Work of Committee and Commissions on Interethnic 
Relations in Republic of Macedonia.”, 140-156. 
259 Spirovski, “Separation of Powers and Consociational Power Sharing in Republic of 
Macedonia: Developments and Perspectives”, 4. 
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Table 4: Number of ministerial posts per ethnic community in Macedonian 
governments (1991-2016) 
 
 Albanian Roma Turks 
I - 1991 (23 posts) 3 - - 
II - 1992-1994 (22 posts) 5 - - 
III - 1994-1998 (20 posts) 4/5/4 - - 
IV - 1998-2002 (17 to 17 posts) 5/5/4/6 - - 
V - 2002-2004 (18 posts) 5 - - 
VI - 2004 (18 posts) 5 - - 
VII - 2004-2006 (19 posts) 6 - - 
VIII - 2006-2008 (21 posts) 5 - 1 
IX - 2008-2011 (22 posts) 6 1 1 
X - 2011-2014 (23 posts) 7 1 1 
XI - 2014-2016 (26 posts) 8 1 - 
 
The main Albanian party, Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), 
participated in all Macedonian governments from 1991 to 1998. It held three 
ministerial posts (deputy prime minister, labour, and minister without 
portfolio) in the interim government of 1991 whose main goal was to 
constitute the Republic of Macedonia as an independent state. The 
government that formed in 1992 was the first ever to be formed by a ruling 
majority and to have an opposition. Within this government, PDP held several 
ministerial positions: deputy prime minister, finances, labor and social policy, 
science, and minister without portfolio. In 1994, a coalition government was 
formed by SDUM and PDP in which, initially, four ministerial posts were 
taken by PDP.260 In the 1998-2002 government led by the political party 
VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization -  
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity), the number of ministerial 
posts allocated to the Albanian coalition partner - the Democratic Party of 
Albanians (DPA) - varied from four to six.261 In the period between 2002 and 
 
260 This government had two reconstructions: in 1996, with five ministerial posts for 
PDP; and in 1997, with four ministerial posts for PDP. 
261 In 1998 DPA held five ministerial positions: labor and social policy, science, 
information, local self-government, and minister without portfolio. In 1999, DPA 
again held five positions, swaping the minister of science for a minister of justice. 
In 2000, there were two reconstructions of the government; in the first one DPA 
held four ministerial positions: justice, labor and social policies, local self-
government, and one without portfolio. In the 2001 reconstruction, DPA held two 




2006, there were six coalition governments between one Albanian and two 
Macedonian political parties (Democratic Union for Integration, DUI, SDUM, 
and Liberal Democratic Party, LDP). In the 2006-2008 government, the 
coalition led by VMRO-DPMNE formed a government with DPA, giving the 
latter four ministerial portfolios (health, education, culture, and 
environment).262 During this period, the Albanian opposition party DUI had 
more parliamentary seats than DPA and practically requested to be in the 
government since it was the true representative of the will of the majority of 
Albanians in Macedonia. In 2007, VMRO-DPMNE began negotiations with 
DUI and reached the so-called “May Agreement,” which resulted in 
dissolution of the parliament, the first premature elections in 2008, and a new 
government coalition between VMRO-DPMNE and DUI.263 This was also the 
first government since the country’s independence with a ministry position 
assigned to one of the smaller ethnic communities.264 Two subsequent 
governments were based on coalitions between VMRO-DPMNE and DUI, but 
ministerial positions were also assigned to representatives of the Roma and 
Turkish ethnic communities. The representation of minorities in the 2014-
2018 government comprises eight ministerial posts assigned to DUI and one 
position (minister without portfolio) to the Union of Roma.265 
 
2.2 Participation and representation at local level 
 
In its Basic Principles, the OFA declared: “The development of local self-
government is essential for encouraging the participation of citizens in 
democratic life, and for promoting respect for the identity of communities.”266 
Decentralisation sought to offer limited autonomy to Macedonia’s ethnic 
Albanians, compatible with the principles of consociationalism, whilst shying 
away from granting them full or formal autonomy.267 Declaring that “there are 
 
262 In this specific case, the executive coalition was not formed on the basis of ethnic 
proportional representation because the winning party (VMRO-DPMNE) formed 
a government with an Albanian party (DPA) that did not win the largest number 
of votes. 
263 The ministerial portfolios held by DUI were economy, labor, health, local self-
government, enivironment and one deputy prime minister responsible for the 
implementation of the OFA. 
264 The position of a minister without portfolio was given to a member of the Party for 
the Movement of Turks in Macedonia.  
265 Andeva, “Minorities in Coalition-Building: the Case of the Republic of 
Macedonia”, 19. 
266 “Ohrid Framework Agreement“, point 1.5.   
267 Lyon, “Municipal Decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonia: Preserving a 
Multi-Ethnic State?”, 31-41.  
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no territorial solutions to ethnic issues,” the OFA introduced the concept of 
decentralization as a fundamental element: roughly two-thirds of the seventy 
laws that have been adopted or revised as a result of the OFA (in the first 
couple of years after the agreement) relate specifically to it. Ripiloski and 
Pendarovski argue that by addressing the longstanding demand for a greater 
administrative autonomy at the local government level, the Macedonian side 
reasoned it would obviate a future Albanian push for a formal 
federalization.268 In fact, when drawing municipal borders in December 2003, 
some parts of the country were defined accoring to political and ethnic 
interests rather than economic and socio-geographical ones. Within a total of 
85 municipalities, ethnic Albanians constitute a majority in 16, while 79.3% 
of all members of the Albanian ethnic community reside in Albanian-majority 
municipalities.269 
Even though the OFA does not explicitly foresee most of the mechanisms 
for minority protection and representation at the state level to be also 
applicable at the local level, the practice proves to the contrary. For example, 
both equitable representation of municipal employees and the Badinter 
principle of voting in municipal councils are applied at the level of local self-
government units. Moreover, there is a specific representation form at the 
local level; the 2002 Law on Local Self-Government forsees the formation of 
commissions for inter-community relations in municipalities where at least 
20% of the total population are members of an ethnic community.270 The role 
of the commissions271 is to enable institutional dialogue among the ethnic 
communities at the local level, and to act as an instrument for enabling direct 
citizen participation within the municipal decision-making processes. 
According to this law, the commissions review issues referring to the relations 
among local ethnic communities and provide opinions and proposed 
 
268Ripiloski and Pendarovski, “Macedonia and the Ohrid Framework Agreement: 
Framed Past, Elusive Future”, 135-161. 
269 Kreci and Ymeri, “The Impact of Territorial Re-Organisational Policy Interventions 
in the Republic of Macedonia”, 279; cited in Ripiloski, Sasho & Pendarovski, 
Stevo. “Macedonia and the Ohrid Framework Agreement: Framed Past, Elusive 
Future”, 135-161. 
270 Art. 55, para. 1. Following the condition prescribed by law such commissions are 
foreseen to be established in 20 municipalities in the Republic of Macedonia 
including the City of Skopje. In all these municipalities, at least one ethnic 
community comprises 20% (or more) of the total population within the 
municipality. 
271 A distinction should be made between the Parliamentary Committee for Inter-
Ethnic Relations and the commissions (often called committees) for inter-
community relations at local level. 
 
 
resolution to problems that may arise among them.272 However, there seem to 
be different interpretations of the commission’s role and of its work in various 
municipalities.273 This is mainly due to ambiguities in the law that cause 
difficulties in its implementation. The commissions’ role is considered to be 
crucial for resolving the issues pertinent to non-majority communities. In 
particular, this applies to issues requiring the adoption of special voting 
procedures, given that municipal councils are obliged to consider and make 
decisions based on the commissions’ opinions.  
Commissions for inter-community relations can be also established in 
municipalities where the representation of ethnic communities is less than 
20%. There are ethnic communities that do not have a representative in the 
municipal council who could present their stands and opinions. This is 
because the members of the local council are elected at local elections 
according to the election results.274 Still, the law stipulates that regardless of 
their individual numbers in the municipality, ethnic communities should be 
equally represented in the commissions. Consequently, if smaller 
communities do not manage to elect their representative in the municipal 
council (either from a party-affiliated or independent list), their stands and 
opinions are nonetheless conveyed before the municipal council through their 
representative in the commission.275 
 
3. Effective representation: dynamics and outcomes 
 
Badinter majority voting has brought very few positive results, whereas 
disputes and debates around its misuse have multiplied. The lack of a ‘double 
majority,’ i.e. a majority of representatives of the minorities as well as an 
overall parliamentary majority, affects the implementation of the OFA as well 
as the government’s ability to enact its legislative program.276 Ethnic 
Albanians have continuously pushed for ever greater legislative areas to be 
covered by double majority voting, including the appointing of the National 
 
272 Art. 55 of the Law on Local Self-government.  
273 Koceski, Se shto sakam da znam za komisiite za odnosi megju zaednicite: iskustva i 
preporaki, 11. 
274 Koceski, Se shto sakam da znam za komisiite za odnosi megju zaednicite: iskustva i 
preporaki, 10-12. 
275 For example, there is no councilor representing the Turkish ethnic community in 
the Council of the municipality of Tetovo. Still, in the municipal Commission for 
inter-community relations there is a representative who can convey the stands 
and opinions of the Turkish community. 
276 European Commission, “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2010 
Progress Report.”, 7. 
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Bank governor, the adoption of the national budget, and the internal decision-
making procedures of the Constitutional Court. On the other hand, ethnic 
Macedonians have generally been unwilling to discuss these new demands. 
Given the respective numbers and the level of parliamentary representation of 
ethnic Albanians, the Badinter majority gives undue sway to ethnic Albanians 
at the expense of others. While the provision on double majority voting 
applies to all ethnic communities, achieving a majority among the 
representatives of non-Macedonians is solely dependent on the votes of ethnic 
Albanian MPs. This is due to the paucity of seats held by smaller communities 
- a situation that effectively sidelines the political voice of non-Macedonians 
and non-Albanians and that further embeds bi-nationalism.277  
 Equitable representation has been one of the most contested issues as 
well as one of the most sensitive elements stemming from the OFA. It has 
been benefitial mostly for the members of the Albanian community, leaving 
smaller ethnic communities underrepresented. In particular, the number of 
Turks and Roma in civil service remains low.278 Moreover, there are a large 
number of employees who receive salaries, but do not hold actual posts, thus 
burdening the payroll.279 The European Commission reported on the 
continuous trend of recruiting employees on a quantitative basis without 
regard to the real needs of the institutions; also, the procedure remains 
vulnerable to undue political influence.280 The last progress report issued by 
the European Commission highlights the need for reforms to ensure full 
implementation of the merit principle.281 An opinion prevails that the 
employment in the state administration has been an unsuccessful project 
because the equitable representation principle has been misused to authorize 
employment without adequate qualifications as a means of securing support 
 
277 Ripiloski and Pendarovski, “Macedonia and the Ohrid Framework Agreement: 
Framed Past, Elusive Future”, 135-161 
278 European Commission. “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2009 
Progress Report.”, 21; European Commission, “The Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia 2010 Progress Report.”, 22; European Commission. “The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2015 Progress Report.”, 10. 
279 The State Secretary in the Ministry of Information Society and Administration has 
announced recently that there are around 1600 employees on a payroll who 
nonetheless have no work placements. Telma, “ Sedat doma, a zemaat plata 1600 
“ramkovni” administrativci“. 
280 European Commission. “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2011 
Progress Report.”, 10. 
281 European Commission. “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2015 
Progress Report.”, 10. 
 
 
for the ruling parties.282 Members of ethnic communities are being employed 
because of their political party affiliation. Hence, the enforcing of equal 
representation usually means lack of meritocracy.283 Recent studies note the 
prevailing perception that the objectives of the OFA, have not been met, 
particularly around equitable representation. At the institutional level, the 
implementation of this principle was to be monitored through annual plans for 
equitable representation. Due to a lack of legal mechanisms for control, such 
plans are either not prepared regularly or not by all institutions. Unlike in the 
first years of its implementation, equitable representation came to be 
perceived as an element of coalition agreements whereby coalition partners 
compete to employ staff from their ethnic communities. The main coalition 
parties of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians dominate this ‘game,’ 
while smaller communities remain largly overlooked.284 
One can also question the work of the commissions for inter-community 
relations at local level. Some twenty multi-ethnic municipalities that were 
legally oblidged to establish commissions have done so, while according to 
data collated by the Association of the units of local self-government (ZELS) 
at the end of 2010, more than fourteen other municipalities have formed 
commissions on a voluntarily basis.285 Nevertheless, citizens remain generally 
uninformed of their existence,286 whereas assesments suggest that these 
commissions “convene for the sake of demonstrating that they have done so, 
and they rarely provide advisory, preventive or reactive recommendations.”287 
Although most of the municipalities comply with the rule of having an equal 
number of representatives from the communities, there are still municipal 
commissions that do not fullfil this criterion. 
  
4. Reviewing the achievements and failures 
 
282 Velickovska, Implementation of the Principle of Adequate and Equitable 
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state administration: Working Paper”.  
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the project Bona Mente, implemented by the Center for Intercultural Dialogue 
and the Association of the units of local self-government, available at 
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Some see the OFA and the subsequent modification it brought to Macedonia’s 
minority framework as a completed process. Others, however, suggest that 
there is room for improvement and that the OFA has not been fully 
implemented. There have been diverse calls for revision of the OFA and even 
demands for a completely new agreement. In 2009, DPA suggested that the 
OFA should be succeeded by an agreement for federalization of Macedonia in 
which a vice presidential office will be assigned to a member of the Albanian 
community.288  
 To this date, there has been no comprehensive academic study that 
objectively assesses whether minorities have been successfully accomodated 
in multi-ethnic Macedonia. Analyses carried out by scholars and non-
governmental organizations focus on limitted aspects of the implementation of 
the OFA. In principal, extant assessments immensely depend on the political 
situation and the assessor’s political inclination. Also, the need to officially 
evaluate the implementation process has been always followed by political 
bargaining. 
The Macedonian government launched a review of the OFA in 2011.289 It 
was followed by a report on the implementation of the OFA in 2012 that 
focused only on quantitative data, presenting mainly de facto undertaken 
activities and lacking an analysis of the quality of operation in the established 
institutions and of the quality of application of the adopted laws.290  
Another review of the OFA was launched in the second half of 2015. It 
focused on social cohesion and the government considered it as a tool that will 
“help to see what has been achieved in the past and to create policies that will 
improve inter-ethnic relations as a prerequisite for the country to move closer 
to the European Union.”291 For this review, the Macedonian government 
signed a memorandum of understanding292 with the European Institute of 
 
288 Ripiloski and Pendarovski, Macedonia and the Ohrid Framework Agreement, 141. 
289 In August 2011, Musa Xhaferi, the Deputy Prime Minister in the Government and 
head of Secretariat for Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
(SIOFA), and the British Ambassador to Macedonia Christopher Yvon have 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding  to carry out this two-year project with 
British aid. 
290 SIOFA, “Izvestaj po odnos na sostojbata za implementacija na site politiki sto 
proizleguvaat od Ohridskiot ramkoven dogovor ”. 
291 SIOFA, “Xhaferri: analiza na Ramkovniot dogovor zaradi kreiranje podobri 
politiki”.  
292 SIOFA, “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the review of implementation 
of the Ohrid Framework Agreement”. 
 
 
Peace (EIP), represented by Pieter C. Feith.293 The results and 
recommendations were supposed to be delived before the end of 2015. 
However, the fact that this review was launched amidst the political crisis 
after the ‘Przino Agreement’294 and before the parliamentary elections 
scheduled for April 2016 calls into question the delivery of an impartial and 
relevant qualitative analysis of the subject.  
In fact, represenatives of the ethnic Albanian community have used the 
negotiations over the Przino Agreement to inflate their old demands and to 
announce new ones. The latter included an amendment to the Constitution in 
regards to the official use of the Albanian language and consensual decisions 
on the issues of: budget allocation, government election, state symbols and 
names, as well as rotation of one of the three state functions—prime minister, 
president of the state, and president of the parliament—with a guaranteed 
position for the ethnic Albanians.295 These demands engendered media 
spinning and reculcitrant speculations over ‘federalization’ of the country.296 
Furthermore, aledged draft recommendations stemming from the second 
review of the OFA leaked to the media caused additional expecations and 
concerns on the part of ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians, 
respectively. Leaked information discussed the introduction of a constitutional 
preamble with a civic rather than ethnic connotation, making of the Albanian 
language a second official language of the state, imposing of the Albanian 
language in schools, stipulating the knowledge of minority languages as a 
standard for employment in public administration, and expanding the 





Koinova argued that Macedonia advanced minimally in the area of respect for 
human and minority rights despite high EU involvement in the country after 
2001.298 Nonetheless, power-sharing arrangements of 2001 and subsequent 
developments in the political life succeeded in preserving peace and stable 
 
293 Feith was one of the mediators in the 2001 Ohrid negotiations. 
294 European Commission, “2 June 2015 Agreement”.  
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inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia. Despite many rises and falls, the country 
has managed to keep a balance in the distribution of political power 
established by the OFA.  
The implementation of the OFA, however, has been a sensitive and 
challenging process. The development of Macedonia’s minority protection 
model has mainly depended on the dialogue between the Macedonian and 
Albanian ethnic communities, whereas smaller ethnic communities have 
received less attention. The representation of the latter remains dependent on 
the political will of the largest and most influencial political parties. The 
partial use of the instruments ensuring communities’ representation and 
participation, specifically Badinter voting at the local level and the work of 
the commissions for inter-community relations, supports the conclusion that 
not all ethnic communities are being accommodated equally.299 Informal 
sharing of power through negotiations and bargaining among the leaderships 
of the main Macedonian and Albanian political parties sometimes replaces the 
constitutionally defined forms of the political process. Power-sharing 
arrangments at the local level involve similar difficulties. 
Fifteen years after the establishment of the OFA, debates on the status of 
its implementation evolve around an image of Macedonia as a state that gives 
substantial rights to the Albanian community while often neglecting smaller 
communities.300 Some undescore that the OFA has changed the context and 
the concept of the state by creating a multi-ethnic Macedonia where 
communities, primarily the Albanian community, play a key role in its 
survival.301 The last developments concerning the calls for revision of the 
OFA indicate once more that the shape of the Macedonian minority’s 
protection model depends entirely on the demands of the Albanian political 
parties and the outcomes of the negotiations with their Macedonian 
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Minority Representation in Montenegro: Defying Balkan Standards  
 
Throughout the last quarter century, political development of Montenegro has 
been extremely turbulent and, considering the multi-ethnic character of its 
society, particularly challenging it terms of maintenance of internal political 
stability. In a region caught in the fire of the post-Yugoslav wars, in a state 
federation dominated by Serbia’s Slobodan Milošević, and in a country 
pressed by a long-unresolved statehood issue, it was seemingly impossible to 
preserve peace and reconcile political interests of Montenegrins, Serbs, 
Bosniaks, Muslims, Albanians, Croats and other national groups. Against all 
odds, Montenegro turned out to be the only Balkan state constitutionally 
defined as “civic,” which did not see an armed conflict on its soil, in which 
not a single strong nationalist party has emerged to date, and whose 
ethnic/national minorities predominantly endorsed civic political 
organizations and the idea of state independence. In an aim to contribute to a 
better understanding of this political phenomenon, this chapter analyzes the 
status of ethnic/national minorities in Montenegro prior to and after the 2006 
referendum on independence.  
 
8. Why no constitutional nationalism in Montenegro?  
The end of the 1980s brought about the culmination of a decade-long political 
crisis in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička 
Federativna Republika Jugoslavija – SFRJ). Clearly visible in most of its six 
republics, the dominance of nationalist ideas  fueling the worsening of 
political relations within the federation were particularly striking in the 
biggest republics of Serbia and Croatia. This was reflected not only in the 
results of the elections that took place around this time but also in the 
constitutional changes put into effect by the new political elites. As noted by 
Hayden, “various nationalist governments [in Yugoslavia] had based their 
election campaigns largely on chauvinism… each promised to deal firmly 
with the local minorities and to institute programs that would affirm each of 
their several republics as the nation-state of its dominant, ethnically defined 
nation (narod)” (1992: 655).  
 
In March 1989, the Serbian Parliament passed amendments to the Republic’s 
Constitution abolishing the political autonomy of its provinces, Vojvodina and 
Kosovo, which had been granted by the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. This 
was in line with the promise of a ‘unified Serbian state’ on which Slobodan 
Milošević rose to power two years earlier. Most importantly, it significantly 
degraded the political status of the Kosovo Albanians, the biggest ethnic 
 
 
minority in Serbia and a vast majority in the population of its southern 
province.302 Serbia’s transformation into a unitary state was formalized with 
the adoption of the new Constitution in September 1990.303 By removing 
constitutional mechanisms for the minorities’ self-rule, the Constitution 
“afforded scope for the establishment of a nationalist regime” (Ibid: 660). 
Three months later, Milošević and his Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička 
partija Srbije – SPS) won landslide victories in the first multiparty general 
elections.304  
Similarly, the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica – HDZ) easily secured a majority of seats in the April/May 1990 
parliamentary election in Croatia.305 At the core of its political success was 
another promise  – to create an independent Croatian state made the party 
leader, Franjo Tuđman. In December 1990, the new Croatian Constitution was 
promulgated, defining Croatia as “the national state of the Croatian people 
and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens.”306 
Serbs, the largest national minority in Croatia,307 thus lost their constitutive 
nation status. Their status was further aggravated by a series of constitutional 
provisions such as the one stating that “the official language and script of 
Croatia are ‘the Croatian language and Latin script’ (Article 12), [and] thus 
excluding the Serbian dialects and the Cyrillic alphabet customarily used to 
write them” (Ibid: 657). In April 1992, nearly a year after Croatia proclaimed 
independence and the war in this country broke out, Tuđman and the HDZ 
won the general elections by a large margin.308  
On the other hand, the Parliament of Montenegro passed a new Constitution 
in October 1992, after the collapse of the socialist Yugoslavia.309 Like in 
Serbia and Croatia, the constitution-making process was controlled by the 
 
302 According to the 1981 Yugoslav population census, Kosovo had 1.58 million 
inhabitants, more than 77% of which were ethnic Albanians.  
303 The document is available at: 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN019071.p
df.  
304 Milošević became the President of Serbia, winning an impressive 65.3% of the 
vote. His party won 46.1% of the vote and, because of a majority election system, 
thus secured 194/250 seats.  
305 The HDZ won 41.9% of the vote and, due to an electoral formula, as many as 55 
out of 80 Parliament seats.   
306 The text of the Constitution is available at: 
http://www.constitution.org/cons/croatia.htm.  
307 The last population census in Yugoslavia, conducted in 1991, showed that Serbs 
participated in the total population of Croatia with 12.2%. 
308 Tuđman won 57.8% of the vote in the presidential election whereas the HDZ won 
44.7% of the vote (85/138 seats) in the parliamentary election. 




ruling party, the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija 
socijalista – DPS), which succeeded the League of Communists of 
Montenegro (Savez komunista Crne Gore – SKCG). After winning the 
December 1990 parliamentary elections by a landslide, the party also held an 
absolute majority of seats in the Parliament.310 Yet, contrary to the 
“constitutional nationalism” of the Serbian and Croatian political elites, 
“based on the [idea of] sovereignty of an ethnic group rather than on that of 
the equal citizens of the state” (Ibid: 656), the Montenegrin incumbents opted 
for a “civic state” concept. The preamble of the new Constitution did stress 
the “historical right of the Montenegrin people to have its own state, which 
was acquired through centuries-long struggle for freedom.” However, the 
Constitution vested sovereignty in “all of the citizens of the Republic of 
Montenegro” (Article 2). At that time, Montenegrans represented nearly 62 
per cent of the overall population.311 Nonetheless, they were made to be equal 
with members of any other ethnic/national group in Montenegro. In the 
December 1992 general elections, the DPS once again won the parliamentary 
election by securing 42.7% of the vote (46/85 seats), while its leader 
Bulatović won another presidential term.  
Furthermore, the character of the system of government established by the 
Montenegrin Constitution – a parliamentary system with “president” (Shugart, 
1993) – was conducive to promoting the political interests of the 
national/ethnic minorities. Although he was directly elected, the president was 
not provided with significant constitutional powers, which is why Goati 
(2001) characterizes this type of government as “classical parliamentary 
system.” While systems with strong presidents tend to polarize ethnically 
heterogeneous societies even deeper by favoring zero-sum games and 
weakening incentives for the formation of coalitions and agreements to solve 
social problems (Rüb, 1994), parliamentary systems offer more possibilities 
for ethnic/national minorities to exert political influence and avoid becoming 
political minorities, too.  
On the contrary, in Serbia and Croatia, the constitutions established president-
parliamentary systems (Shugart, 1993) by placing much of the executive 
power in the hands of their presidents.312 According to Milošević, a strong 
 
310 Running under the SKCG name, the party won 52.6% of the vote and 83/125 
parliament seats. In the concomitantly organized presidential election, its 
candidate, Momir Bulatović became the first democratically elected President of 
Montenegro. 
311 The largest minorities in Montenegro, according to the 1991 census, were: Muslims 
(14.5%), Serbs (9.3%), Albanians (6.5%), Yugoslavs (4.2%), and Croats (1%). 
For an analysis of the impact of the population censuses on the political dynamics 
of Montenegro, see: Vuković (2016).  
312 According to the Serbian Constitution, the President was to be elected directly 
(Article 86); his acts did not have to be ratified in the Parliament, could not be 




presidential office – which he was expected to be soon voted into – was 
necessary “to confirm the political changes that prioritized national interest 
and unified Serbia” and “to preclude political instability which characterized 
classical parliamentary systems” (quoted in Thomas, 1999: 71). In effect, the 
main purpose of the Serbian constitution was “to provide the basis for his one-
man rule” (Hayden, 1992: 660). Similarly, after his party’s decisive victory in 
the 1990 election, Tuđman was in a position to tailor-make the new 
Constitution to his own political ambitions. In his mind, “it was he himself 
who, as the [future] Father of his country, could best be trusted to know what 
should be done and what was in Croatia’s interest” (Ramet, 2010: 259). And, 
indeed, endowed with vast constitutional powers and triumphant in the 1991-
1995 War on Croatian Independence, Tuđman represented throughout the 
decade a sort of “republican monarch“ (Kasapović, 2001).  
In comparison to the experiences of other republics of the then collapsing 
Yugoslav federation, the outcome of the process of the early 1990s 
constitutional engineering in Montenegro was substantially different. The 
reasons behind such divergence relate primarily to the political ambitions of 
the elites that were in charge of these processes. As indicated above, the 
introduction of multiparty competition in Serbia and Croatia was preceded by 
a period of an intense ethno-nationalist mobilization. Spurred by their 
intellectual elites and religious circles, the sense of discontent among Serbs 
and Croats concerning their economic and political status in Yugoslavia 
mounted steadily throughout these years. By the end of the 1980s, in Serbia 
and Croatia alike, “the stage was set for the emergence of a political figure 
that would channel the energy accumulated in the populace towards 
fulfillment of given national goals” (Vuković, 2014: 219). By pledging to 
“return the sense of national dignity” to their compatriots, Milošević and 
Tuđman thus managed to ascend to and soon monopolize power. From that 
moment on, all of their political endeavors came at the expense of the political 
rights of ethnic/national minorities.  
The reaction of the Montenegrin communist elite to the worsening political 
situation in the socialist federation was quite different. Both politically and 
 
not have to be counter-signed by the Government (quoted in Jovičić, 1992: 37). 
Moreover, he was given wide powers to introduce the state of emergency in 
which his decisions would have legal force (Article 83). Contrary to most post-
communist European countries in which the cases where the president could 
exercise this power were strictly defined, the Serbian had a great freedom to 
decide for himself the reasons for such a decision (Kutlešić, 1994: 358). 
Similarly, the Constitution of Croatia granted directly elected President the 
authority to appoint and relieve of duty the Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Croatia, deputy prime ministers and government members; to dissolve the 
Parliament; to pass decrees with the force of law and take emergency measures in 
the event of a state of war […] or when government bodies are prevented from 
regularly performing their constitutional duties (Article 101).    
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economically, Montenegro traditionally represented the most favored 
Yugoslav republic.313 Accordingly, at the moment when throughout the 
country “the political rhetoric of national interests and nationalism 
increasingly framed public debate and participation” (Woodward, 1995: 89), 
the highest representatives of the League of Communists of Montenegro stood 
up against all sorts of nationalism and in favor of the political status quo.314 
“Hoping for the continuation of a system that they rightly believed had 
worked greatly to their advantage” (Roberts, 2007: 426), they were ousted in 
January 1989 by a group of younger generation party officials dissatisfied 
with political and socio-economic results of their long governance. However, 
most party policies, including the negative stance on the rising nationalism in 
Yugoslavia, would actually not change. The maintenance of the federation 
built on the idea of unity of various ethnic/national, religious, and linguistic 
identities was still at the top of the SKCG political agenda.  
In the course of the constitution-making procedure, such attitudes of the 
Montenegrin ruling party’s elite gave birth to an ethnically/nationally 
inclusive concept of civic state. Largely due to that fact that throughout the 
following period, “the co-existence of minorities and the majority society in 
Montenegro has been considerably better than in most parts of former 
Yugoslavia” (Šistek and Dimitrova, 2003: 177).315 The maintenance of good 
inter-ethnic relations in Montenegro was particularly challenging not only 
 
313 On the account of a major role they played in the 1941-1945 National Liberation 
War, which led to the formation of the socialist Yugoslavia, Montenegrins 
managed to “colonize the federal bureaucracy” and, using strong clientelistic 
networks, for decades remain overly represented in the Yugoslav political 
institutions (Lampe, 1996: 303). The amount of power of Montenegro’s political 
representatives at the federal state level was most clearly reflected in a 
disproportionate share of funds allocated from the Yugoslav budget to the 
smallest republic to support its socio-economic development (Vuković, 2014: 
97). All taken into account, it is fair to say that the years in Yugoslavia were “the 
best in Montenegro’s entire history” (Roberts, 2007: 393).            
314 Back in 1974, in view of the growing nationalist tendencies across Yugoslavia, the 
SKCG Sixth Congress thus condemned “all sorts of nationalism, regardless of the 
form and dimension, [as] equally dangerous“. As stated in the final document of 
the Congress, this primarily related to “the Greater Serbian nationalism which, 
often from centralistic positions, denies Montenegrin nation and culture, [and] 
challenges Montenegro’s political, economic, and cultural equality”, but also to 
“the Separatist [Montenegrin] nationalism which aims at creating boundaries 
between the Republics, economic and cultural closing as well as stirring up 
disbelief and mistrust among our peoples” (quoted in Vrbica , 1974: 179-180).     
315 By the ”majority society” the authors mean the Christian Orthodox segment of 
Montenegro’s population including Montenegrins and Serbs. The debate on the 
identity difference between the two national groups, then considered almost 
indistinguishable, would later play a major role in the country’s political 
development and the 2006 renewal of its state independence.   
 
 
because of the wars raging in the neighborhood but also due to the fact that, 
unlike other “Yugoslav” peoples opting for state independence, Montenegrins 
voted in the March 1992 plebiscite to form a state federation with Serbia, 
where Milošević’s nationalist agenda was well underway.316  
Interestingly, this was the time of the hybrid (semi-authoritarian) regime in 
Montenegro. Behind the democratic façade created with the introduction of 
political pluralism, the SKCG/DPS continued using the mechanisms of power 
inherited from the communist period. With an absolute control of state 
institutions, financial resources, and media, it skewed the playing field to the 
extent that the opposition was, in effect, rendered politically uncompetitive. 
Just like those in Serbia and Croatia, the ruling party in Montenegro did not 
act as one of many equal participants in the multiparty contest but as a hyper-
privileged “state party” (Darmanović, 2003). However, when it comes to 
policies on the ethnic/national minorities and the level of their members' 
support for the ruling parties in the three former Yugoslav republics, the 
SKCG/DPS’s political record could not differ more from those of the SPS and 
HDZ.  
When asked why, in this regard, the Montenegrin political system was more 
inclusive compared to those in the neighboring countries, Momir Bulatović, 
former President of Montenegro (1990-1997) and former head of the DPS, 
claimed that the party’s leadership sought to politically integrate ethnic-
national minorities "out of democratic principles and with the aim to preserve 
peace” (Interview, July 2014). Yet Živko Andrijašević, former advisor to the 
Prime Minister (2012-2014) and History Professor at the University of 
Montenegro, asserted that such strategy was a result of “pure political cost-
benefit calculus and not beliefs" (Interview, July 2014). In his words:  
Unlike, for example, Serbia and Croatia, a strong nationalism was not 
necessary for maintaining power in Montenegro. It was much more 
politically opportunistic [for the ruling party] to profile itself as a 
moderate force between two poles. The formula for staying in the 
office was therefore the following one: occupy the center and, by 
frightening voters with the right and left extremes, remain attractive in 
the eyes of those belonging to ethnic-national minorities. (Ibid).  
Whatever the guiding principle was, such policies of the Democratic Party of 
Socialists ensured political stability, and to a great extent, contributed to the 
fact that Montenegro was the only ex-Yugoslav republic that did not see a war 
on its soil following the collapse of the socialist federation.  
 
9. Minority political representation in Montenegro (1990–2006)  
Ten articles of the 1992 Constitution of Montenegro defined “Special Rights 
 
316 The two-member state federation was named the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Savezna Republika Jugoslavija – SRJ).  
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of National and Ethnic Groups,” including: protection of identity (Article 67); 
the right to use their mother tongue and alphabet as well as the right to 
education and information in their mother tongue (Article 68); the right to 
establish educational, cultural, and religious associations with the material 
assistance of the state (Article 69); the right to a proportional representation in 
public services, state authorities and in local self-government (Article 73); et 
cetera. The establishment of the Republican Council for Protection of Rights 
of National and Ethnic Groups “for purpose of preservation and protection of 
the[ir] national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity,” to be headed 
by the President of the Republic, was also envisaged by the Constitution 
(Article 76). And while these provisions represent more or less standard 
normative mechanisms for minority rights protections, the practice of political 
representation of Albanians, Bosniaks/Muslims,317 Croats, and other 
ethnic/national minorities in Montenegro turned out to be rather peculiar, 
especially when juxtaposed against the political experiences of neighboring 
countries. In brief, as demonstrated in the remainder of this section, most 
members of these minorities would support civic rather than national political 
parties in each of the subsequently organized elections.  
In August 1990, the Montenegrin parliament passed the constitutional 
amendments (no. 64 to 82) which abolished the existing delegate model of 
political representation and paved the way towards direct multiparty elections. 
A few weeks earlier, the new Bill on Political Association (Zakon o 
udruživanju građana) was adopted, which “legalized” political organizations 
 
317 In the former Yugoslavia, Serbo-Croatian-speaking adherents of Islam were 
recognized as Muslims (Muslimani, with capital “M”). Concentrated mainly in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, their separate ethnic identity was acknowledged by the 
1969 constitutional reform and, for the first time, appeared in the 1971 Yugoslav 
population census. Following the collapse of the socialist federation, a group of 
Bosnian Muslim intellectuals put forward the term Bosniak (Bošnjak) which they 
considered more appropriate. As noted by Šistek and Dimitrova, “a designation 
based purely on the traditional religion was not seen as fitting in modern society 
since many members of the Muslim nation could, at the same time, be atheist or 
religiously indifferent; [and] the relationship between the term ‘Bosniak’ and the 
land of Bosnia as the ‘mother country’ (matična država) of all Bosniaks was also 
evident” (2003: 168). In Montenegro, as shown by the last population census 
conducted in 2011, there were 8.6% of Bosniaks and 3.3% of Muslims. The 
fundamental difference between the two identities relates to what Bosniaks and 
Muslims in Montenegro understand as their “mother country”. For the former 
camp, it is Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this regard, those who self-identify as 
Bosniaks claim to belong to a broader Bosniak ethnic body that, adjacent to 
Bosnian Muslims, comprises Islamic population of Montenegro and Serbia. In 
contrast, Montenegrin Muslims consider themselves an indigenous people of 
Montenegro which, accordingly, they regard as their mother country. For more 
on the Muslim/Bosniak identity issue, see: Bringa (1995) and Larise (2015).     
 
 
created in the course of 1989.318 In addition to those, two dozen parties were 
established prior to the December general elections. As the nationalist 
tensions grew across Yugoslavia, newly founded parties throughout the 
federation widely used national denomination in order to emphasize the 
‘national’ character of their organizations. In Montenegro, most 
Bosniaks/Muslims and Albanians – the two biggest ethnic minorities – resided 
in a small number of its 20 municipalities. In some, like Ulcinj, Plav, and 
Rožaje, they represented a majority population. With that in mind, one might 
have expected that the adoption of a proportional electoral system with 20 
districts (municipalities) and 4% threshold would generate similar political 
trends in Montenegro. Instead, a number of multi-ethnic (civic) political 
parties/coalitions, such as the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalni savez 
Crne Gore – LSCG) and the Democratic Coalition (Demokratska koalicija) 
formed and were strongly endorsed by the minorities (Goati, 2015: 52). As a 
result, the only national party that secured seats in the first convocation of the 
multiparty Montenegrin Parliament was the Serb nationalist People’s Party 
(Narodna stranka - NS).319  
As mentioned above, the next general elections were held in December 1992. 
Previously, the electoral law was amended and, this time, the entire territory 
of Montenegro represented a single electoral district (Pavićević, 2007). Once 
again, members of the ethnic/national minorities voted predominantly for the 
civic parties, the Democratic Party of Socialists, the Liberal Alliance of 
Montenegro, and the Social Democratic Party of Reformists (soon to be 
renamed the Social Democratic Party – Socijaldemokratska partija, SDP).320 
The Democratic Alliance in Montenegro (Demokratski savez u Crnoj Gori – 
DSCG), the single national Albanian party running in the election, failed to 
surpass the electoral threshold.321 Winning 20 per cent of the vote in total, the 
People’s Party and the extremely nationalist Serbian Radical Party (Srpska 
radikalna stranka – SRS) were the only national parties to find a way into the 
Montenegrin parliament.  
Another electoral law reform took place prior to the November 1996 
parliamentary election, dividing Montenegro into 14 voting districts. The 
ruling party’s gerrymandering turned out to be profitable for the national 
parties as well.322 Although none of them reached 4 per cent of the vote, two 
 
318 These were: the Democratic Alternative, the Democratic Party, the Association for 
Yugoslav Democratic Alternative, and the Association for Improvement for 
Democratic Processes.  
319 The NS won nearly 13% of the vote and gained 17 out of 125 seats. 
320 The Liberals won 13 and the Social Democrats garnered another four seats. 
321 The result of the DSCG was 3.85% of the vote.  
322 The DPS triumphed again, this time winning an absolute majority (51.2%) of the 
vote. On the other hand, albeit winning more than 4% of the vote in total, the 
Social Democratic Party (5.5%) and the Serbian Radical Party (4.3%) failed to 
enter the Parliament.    
bla3 
 
Albanian parties representing the Muslim minority – the Democratic Alliance 
in Montenegro and the Democratic Union of Albanians (Demokratska unija 
Albanaca – DUA) and the Party of Democratic Action of Montenegro 
(Stranka demokratske akcije Crne Gore – SDA CG) – were voted into 
Parliament.323 In an attempt to put an end to the DPS’s non-democratic rule, 
the LSCG and the NS, the two biggest – and ideologically completely 
different – parties formed a highly unlikely coalition.324 However, winning 
merely 19 out of 71 seats, their People’s Accord (Narodna sloga) failed to 
even threaten the ruling party’s political dominance.325  
However, just a few months after its electoral triumph, two political camps – 
led by Bulatović, and his vice-president and the Prime Minister, Milo 
Đukanović – started emerging within the ruling party’s structures. The leading 
political figures in Montenegro came to openly disagree over the issue of 
political relations with Slobodan Milošević. While Bulatović was determined 
to maintain political partnership with the Serbian strongman despite extremely 
negative consequences of his governance, Đukanović decided to turn back on 
him and take a new, pro-Western political course. The latter’s party faction 
prevailed. Subsequently, Bulatović and a significant number of his followers 
left the DPS, which consequently lost a great deal of political influence in 
Montenegro and, most importantly, its hyper-privileged position over its 
political rivals. The hybrid regime which the two had built together was 
collapsing and a genuine democratic transition involving truly competitive 
elections was about to begin in Montenegro (Vuković, 2014: 218).326  
In September 1997, at the peak of the conflict in the ruling party, the 
Montenegrin Parliament adopted a special document called “The Agreement 
on the Minimum Principles for the Establishment of a Democratic 
Infrastructure in Montenegro” (Sporazum o minimum demokratskih principa 
 
323 Their results were as follows: the SDA CG (3.5% of the vote / three seats), DSCG 
(1.8% / two seats), and DUA (1.3% / two seats).  
324 The civic Liberal Alliance of Montenegro was the first party to openly advocate the 
idea of Montenegro’s independence. Quite the contrary, the nationalist People’s 
Party stood at the position of transformation of the Serb-Montenegrin federation 
into a unitary state.    
325 To a great extent, this was a result of the character of the election which could 
hardly be called competitive. Thus for instance, using the uncompromised 
monopoly of power, the ruling party conducted an extremely lavish campaign, 
“this time beating the opposition in terms of money spent by a margin of 10:1” 
(Bieber, 2003: 28).     
326 This was obvious from the results of the October 1997 presidential election. In the 
first round, Bulatović prevailed over Đukanović with 0.7% of the vote margin, 
but failed to win the necessary 50%. In the second, Đukanović triumphed by less 
than 5,500 out of 344,000 votes cast. For the first time since the 1990 
introduction of political pluralism, one could not foresee an outcome of an 
electoral process in Montenegro.            
 
 
za razvoj demokratske structure u Crnoj Gori) that was supposed to lay the 
groundwork for the organization of free and fair elections and which, in one 
section, touched upon the status of minorities. It envisaged the use of a new 
designation of “minority nations” (manjinski narodi) for Albanians, Bosniaks, 
Croats, and Muslims in Montenegro, with the aim “to emphasize that the three 
groups have been autochthonous in parts of its territory, and to thus 
distinguish them from ethnic minorities which have resulted from migration 
(Roma and small groups such as Macedonians, Hungarians and Slovenes)” 
(Šistek and Dimitrova, 2003: 160). Based on this document, the Ministry for 
Protection of the Rights of National and Ethnic Groups was established within 
the next government of Montenegro, with the aim “to protect and preserve 
rights of persons belonging to national and ethnic groups according to the 
Constitution and international documents that relate to the same issues, and in 
accordance with the democratic goals to which Montenegro strives” (CERD 
Report, 2008: 7).327  
Furthermore, prior to the May 1998 parliamentary election – the first 
democratic balloting since the introduction of political pluralism 
(OSCE/ODIHR Report, 1998) – another reform of the electoral law took 
place. It lowered the threshold to three per cent and inaugurated a separate 
electoral district from the areas predominantly populated by the Albanian 
minority (the town of Ulcinj and parts of the cities Podgorica and Bar), in 
which five out of 78 MPs were to be elected.328 New possibilities for the 
promotion of minority political interests and, arguably, for strengthening of 
the national political parties were created as a result.  
However, it turned out that the democratic changes taking place in 
Montenegro and the 1998 modification of the electoral system actually 
increased the level of minority nations’ political support for the DPS and other 
civic political organizations. The ruling party’s program, based on the notions 
of multi-ethnicity, tolerance, economic reform, and greater political autonomy 
from Belgrade, “appealed to the Bosniaks-Muslims, who overwhelmingly 
voted for Đukanović and the DPS-led coalition in the 1997/1998 presidential 
and parliamentary elections as well as in several subsequent elections” (Šistek 
and Dimitrova, 2003: 165). Therefore, neither the SDA nor any other 
Bosniak-Muslim party won a single seat in the 1998, 2001, and the 2006 
parliamentary elections. At the same time, Albanian national parties benefited 
 
327 In 2006, it was renamed the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights Protection 
(Ministarstvo za ljudska i manjinska prava). The report is available at: 
http://www.uniset.ca/microstates/me_minorities_16.pdf.  
328 The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission criticized this solution as 
“artificial”. Accordingly, its main recommendation was “not to repeat the 
arrangement for voters of the Albanian minority, as it was implemented for these 




to a certain extent from the special electoral treatment “which ensured the 
participation of Albanian deputies in the Montenegrin parliament” (Ibid: 170). 
In each of the future elections, at least one of them managed to secure 
parliamentary status. However, albeit showing “more preference for minority 
parties than Bosniaks-Muslims,” the Albanians also kept “favoring multi-
ethnic parties over ethnic ones” (Ibid: 171). Thus, even in the special electoral 
district, Albanian parties could not win a majority of seats until the 2006 
election. In 1998 and 2001, the Democratic Alliance in Montenegro and the 
Democratic Union of Albanians won one mandate each; the DPS-led coalition 
won the remaining three. In the 2002 parliamentary election, the two Albanian 
parties and the DPS’s political alliance split four seats. 
 
10. Minorities in the post-referendum Montenegro 
The next few years of Montenegro’s political development were dominated by 
an all-encompassing debate on the issue of its statehood. The 1997-1998 pro-
/anti-Milošević political schism served as the basis for the creation of pro-
independence and pro-union political blocs. The referendum on Montenegro’s 
state independence took place on 21 May 2006. By the will of 55.5 per cent of 
those who voted, the country restored full sovereignty.329  
Given the results of the 2003 population census, which showed that 
Montenegrins, relative to Serbs, were only a relative majority (43.2% vs. 
32%) in Montenegro, it was clear that “the appeal to minorities would be 
crucial in the quest for Montenegrin independence” (Džankić, 2012: 41). And 
indeed, a vast majority of Bosniaks, Albanians, and Muslims sided with the 
pro-independence camp in view of the previously elaborated political 
transformation of the Democratic Party of Socialists, its main political force. 
In the project of the pro-Western, multi-cultural and civic state of 
Montenegro, they saw their political future. Accordingly, the political 
platform of the independence movement served as “the setting stone in 
establishing the constitutional and legal frameworks for minority protection in 
Montenegro after the country became independent in 2006” (Ibid).  
A month before the referendum on independence, Montenegrin Parliament 
passed The Law on Rights and Freedoms of Minorities (Zakon o manjinskim 
pravima i slobodama). As stated in the European Commission Progress 
Report on Montenegro, the new law “provided for a general framework for 
the protection of minorities and affirmed the multi-ethnic character of 
Montenegro and Montenegrin society” (2006: 15).330 It guaranteed the 
 
329 Internationally recognized as an independent state in the 1878 Berlin Congress, 
Montenegro ceased to exist in 1918 as a result of Serbian military occupation 
which preceded the creation of the first “Yugoslav” state, the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes.   
330 As noted in the Report, this included “nondiscrimination of ethnic and other 




protection of rights for “any group of citizens of the Republic of Montenegro 
which is numerically less represented than majority population, which has 
common ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics and firm historical 
bonds with Montenegro, and is incited by a desire to express and maintain 
national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity.”331 Compared to the 
previous legal practice, this represented a novelty in a sense that the term 
‘minority’ (manjina) “no longer included only the non-Christian Orthodox 
population or autochthonous minorities, but also Serbs, Roma, and other 
people not covered by earlier definitions of ‘minority’” (Ibid: 42). In terms of 
their political representation, the law envisaged a priori allocation of seats by 
which members of those minorities that, according to the latest population 
census, constituted one to five per cent of total population in Montenegro 
would have one seat in the Parliament, whereas those who constituted more 
than five per cent would be guaranteed three seats. Nonetheless, following a 
motion launched before the Constitutional Court, these provisions of the new 
law were annulled (Ibid).  
As one could have easily predicted in light of the referendum result, the DPS-
led coalition won the September 2006 parliamentary election by a large 
margin (48.6% of the vote; 41/81 seats). In the special-Albanian electoral 
district, the coalition secured two seats, while the remaining three were won 
by Albanian national parties. Founded in February 2006, the Bosniak Party 
(Bošnjačka stranka – BS) entered the Parliament by winning three seats in a 
coalition with the Liberals. Under the name “Serb List,” an alliance of six 
Serb national parties won 12 seats. Pursuant to the pre-referendum joint 
political endeavor guided by the idea of renewal of Montenegro’s 
independence, the DPS welcomed the national parties of minorities (except 
the Serb) in the government as a way to solidify the multi-ethnic foundation of 
the new state. The same situation repeated after the parliamentary elections in 
2009 and 2012, both won by DPS-led coalitions.  
A crucial step forward in the process of state-building and the minority rights 
protection in Montenegro was made in October 2007 when the Parliament 
adopted a new Constitution.  It created “legal guarantees for the establishment 
of a multiethnic environment” (Džankić, 2012: 45). In this regard, the 
preamble emphasizes that “the commitment of the citizens of Montenegro to 
live in a state in which the basic values are freedom, peace, tolerance, respect 
for human rights and liberties, multiculturalism, democracy and the rule of 
 
public and social life [... and] the establishment of minority National Councils, as 
well as a Republican Fund for Minorities“ (Ibid). In particular, the law 
guaranteed “proportionate representation of members of minorities in public 
services, public authorities and local government“ (Youth Initiative for Human 
Rights Report, 2007: 11).  




law,” and that “the determination that we, as free and equal citizens, members 
of peoples and national minorities who live in Montenegro: Montenegrins, 
Serbs, Bosniaks, Albanians, Muslims, Croats and the others, are committed to 
democratic and civic Montenegro.”332 The first Article of the Constitution 
defines Montenegro as “civic, democratic, ecological, and the state of social 
justice, based on the rule of law.” Article 2 states that the “bearer of 
sovereignty is the citizen with Montenegrin citizenship.” Such a civic 
understanding of the nation, also visible in Article 13 (“Language and 
Alphabet”) of the Constitution, which adjacent to “the official language” 
(Montenegrin) lists Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian, and Albanian as languages “in 
the official use,” reflects a social reality “rather unique in the Balkans” 
(Bieber/Winterhagen 2009).  
Furthermore, the Fifth Paragraph (Articles 79 and 80) of the Constitution 
defines special rights of the members of minority groups in Montenegro. It 
guarantees the protection of their identities (“Persons belonging to minority 
nations and other minority national communities shall be guaranteed the rights 
and liberties, which they case exercise individually or collectively with 
others”), and the prohibition of their assimilation (“Forceful assimilation of 
the persons belonging to minority nations and other minority national 
communities shall be prohibited; The state shall protect the persons belonging 
to minority nations and other minority national communities from all forms of 
forceful assimilation”). And while most of these provisions are in line with 
the international norms of minority rights protection, those regulating 
mechanisms of political representation of the Montenegrin minorities were 
adjusted to the domestic political context.  
Namely, the Constitution envisaged the right to “authentic representation” of 
minorities in the Parliament of Montenegro and in the assemblies of the local 
self-government units in which they represent a significant share in the 
population (Article 79/9), and the right to “proportionate representation” in 
public services, state authorities, and local self-government bodies (Article 
79/10). This led to a big debate in Montenegro over how to define and 
implement “authentic representation” in practice. According to Džankić, 
integration into the country’s legal system of such a vague notion was 
politically motivated as “the legislator deliberately refrained from relating it to 
proportional representation because of the respective share of different 
minorities, particularly Serbs, within the overall population” (2012: 45-46). 
The question of “whether or not ‘authentic representation’ meant 
representation by parties representing national identities, or whether it implied 
that minorities could ‘authentically’ be represented through non-ethnic parties 
as well” (Ibid) was at the core of the political discussion which led to an 
electoral reform in November 2011.  
 




Moreover, the need to bring the Montenegrin electoral system in full 
compliance with the Constitution was constantly encouraged by important 
international organizations. In the OSCE/ODIHR official report on the 2009 
parliamentary election in Montenegro, the following is stated: “The 
parliamentary elections were regulated by a comprehensive legal framework 
that generally provided an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic 
elections. However, outstanding issues relating to the reform of the electoral 
framework remain, including harmonizing the election law with the 
Constitution, removing inconsistencies and ambiguities, [etc.]” (2009: 1).333 
In the official Opinion of the European Commission on Montenegro’s 
application for membership of the European Union,334 the country is urged to 
“improve the legislative framework for elections in line with the OSCE-
ODIHR recommendations” (2010: 11).335  
The 2011 Amendments to the Law on the Election of Representatives and 
Deputies (Izmjene i dopune zakona o izboru odbornika i poslanika)336 
abolished the special electoral district that was introduced in 1998. Previously 
reserved solely for Albanians, the affirmative action principle concerning 
electoral representation was now applied to the members of every “minority 
nation or a minority national group in Montenegro” (Article 43).337 To “the 
political parties or the groups of permanent residents” representing minorities, 
the three per cent electoral threshold would here from not apply. Instead, “if 
none of them meets [that] requirement, and individually they gain no less than 
0.7% of valid votes [they] shall acquire the right to take part in allocation of 
seats as a single – collective list of candidates with the total number of valid 
votes won, provided that adding up that ensures winning up to three seats” 
(Article 94/2). This right shall be exercised “by candidate lists representing a 
specific (the same) minority nation or a specific (the same) minority national 
community with the share up to 15% in the total population in the electoral 
 
333 See the report at: 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro/37521?download=true.  
334 The candidate status was granted to Montenegro in December 2010. Two years 
later, the country has opened the accession negotiations with the EU. 
335 The document is available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/mn_opinion_
2010_en.pdf 
336 The text of the Law is available at: 
file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/Montenegro_Law_on_elections_of_councillor
s_and_representatives_1998_am2011_en%20(1).pdf.  
337 This was consistent with the joint Venice Commission-OSCE/ODIHR opinion 
which underlined that, by the existing Election law, “protected minority status 
was extended only to Albanians in Montenegro at the exclusion of other groups” 





district, according to the data from the latest population census” (Article 
94/3). Finally, “in case none of the candidate lists for election of MPs of 
Croatian national members meets the [3% threshold] requirement […], the 
most successful one, with no less than 0.35% of valid votes shall acquire the 
right to one MP seat” (Article 94/2).338  
On the account of the new legal provisions, three national political groups – 
two Albanian and, for the first time, one Croatian – were voted into the 
Parliament in the October 2012 election. Winning 4.2 per cent of the vote, the 
Bosniak Party managed to surpass the electoral threshold and secure three 
seats. By tradition, the non-Serb national parties joined the DPS’s “Coalition 
for European Montenegro” in forming the current Government of 
Montenegro. And while reaffirming the principles of a multi-cultural and 
multi-ethnic Montenegro, their continuous participation in government and 
the demands for a “higher level of the minority peoples’ integration into the 
democratic processes in the society”339 bear certain risks for preservation of 
the country’s civic political identity. As noted by Vuković, “it is hard not to 
notice the collision between the basic legal norm and the increasingly applied 
practice, defining the character of the political system” (2016: 138). How the 
two will be reconciled in the future, considering the complicated process of 
constitutional revision in Montenegro and the EU integration-related growing 
demands for minority rights protection, and how the country will manage to 
preserve the most valuable political legacy, its inter-ethnic harmony, remains 
to be seen.  
 
11. Concluding remarks 
During the last quarter century, Montenegro has, against all odds and against 
the dominant political practices in the region, managed to preserve peace, 
political stability, and multi-ethnic harmony as well as to create strong legal 
and political foundations for the development of a genuine civic state. The 
lack of an articulated national program and the ensuing ethnically/nationally 
“inclusive” political agenda of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists have 
greatly contributed to such course of political events. As a result, minority 
peoples in this country were able to politically identify with and support the 
DPS. Likewise, most of those Albanians, Bosniaks/Muslims, and Croats who 
throughout this period remained in opposition to the party in power endorsed 
other civic political organizations.  
 
338 The 2011 population census showed that Croats make up around 1% of 
Montenegro’s population 
339 Under this condition, written in the joint political platform with the DPS’s coalition, 
have the minority parties agreed to enter the incumbent government. The 





On the other hand, only after the renewal of state independence would 
national parties in Montenegro gain a certain level of political prominence. At 
the same time, for the reasons previously elaborated, most of these parties 
were invited to join the DPS in forming each of the three post-2006 
governments. This has allowed their representatives to take an active part in 
the processes of democratization and Europeanization of Montenegro which, 
in return, has brought about their very positive outlook on the political status 
of the country’s national minorities. As recently pointed out by Rafet 
Husović, Bosniak Party leader and Vice President of the Montenegrin 
Government:  
The status of Bosniaks in Montenegro could be analyzed against 
two criteria – their representation in the state institutions and the 
level of respect for the internationally recognized minority rights. 
In both fields, the progress we have made is obvious. We have 
demonstrated that Montenegro is a positive example in the 
region.340  
In contrast, there are a few smaller Albanian national parties whose 
representatives – left out of the power-sharing political arrangements – tend to 
be very critical vis-à-vis the status of this particular minority group in 
Montenegro. Their political argumentation is largely based on the 2011 
abolishment of the separate electoral unit for Albanians, their low 
representation in the Montenegrin state institutions, and the thus far failed 
expectations concerning the transformation of Tuzi – a predominately-
Albanian populated area within the Podgorica (state capital) region – into a 
separate municipality.  
It is hard to tell which of the two minority perspectives will prevail in the 
future. Montenegro has celebrated its tenth  anniversary of independence as a 
widely-praised positive example of politically stable and ethnically-nationally 
inclusive Western Balkan state. And whether that will still be the case in a 
decade from now depends primarily on the way its minorities see themselves 
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Recognition, representation and reproach: new institutional 
arrangements in the Hungarian multiculturalist model 
 
1. Terminologies  
 
1.1. From ethnic to national minorities 
 
The new 2011 Hungarian Constitution and the subsequently newly 
adopted Act on the Rights of Nationalities341 re-labeled Hungarian 
minorities from “national and ethnic minorities” (“nemzeti és etnikai 
kisebbségek”) to “nationalities” (“nemzetiség”). There is no evidence (in 
parliamentary debates or government documents, for example) that this 
shift in terminology was based on overarching theoretical or conceptual 
reasoning, or that it would will be accompanied by a paradigm shift in 
political commitments. It is not clear what the legislator's problem was 
with the previous definition of “national and ethnic minority.” Presumably 
the constitution-maker neither disputed that “nationalities” constitute a 
numerical minority within society, nor that they suffer from certain 
disadvantages (which the minority law is designed to redress by setting 
forth minority rights). Furthermore, putting aside the difficulty of 
differentiating between “national” and “ethnic” minorities, nothing 
supports the understanding (and even the Hungarian legislator failed to 
make this claim) that a “nationality” could or would be regarded as a 
greater set comprising both. Thus the most accurate description would be 
that it is synonymous with “national minority.” It is no coincidence that 
the terminology used in international documents also employs this 
distinction, and that the original draft of the Fundamental Law talked of 
“nationalities and ethnic groups.” 
During the drafting of the new constitution in 2011, the Croatian342 and 
the Ruthenien343 minorities, represented by their respective national 
minority self governments (to be described below), welcomed the change 
in terminology, which was also recommended by the minority rights 
ombudsman, because for an unexplained reason, they considered the term 
 
341  Act CLXXIX of 2011 on the Rights of Nationalities. 
342  http://www.parlament.hu/biz/aeb/info/horvat_onk.pdf. 
343  http://www.parlament.hu/biz/aeb/info/ruszin_onk.pdf. 
 
 
“minority” to be demeaning. It needs to be added that only four national 
minority self-governments took the effort to comment on the draft 
constitution, as requested by the parliamentary committee in charge. The 
largest, the Roma minority self-government, also remained silent. 
The preamble of the new constitution (which is is repeated in Article 
XXIX), proclaiming that “the nationalities living with us form part of the 
Hungarian political community and are constituent parts of the State,” 
needs interpretation and clarification. Though it is a restatement of the 
previous constitution's relevant provision (not a verbatim reiteration, but 
substantially the same), despite several Constitutional Court decisions344 
seeking to construe its meaning, it remains ambiguous. It would not raise 
interpretational questions if minorities were constituent elements of the 
nation/the political nation, but the semantic connotations of minorities or 
nationalities that are constituent parts of the state is rather confusing 
outside of the context of a Bosnian-style ethnic federation. All in all, it 
appears therefore that members of the Hungarian nation, who are giving 
themselves a constitution, share public power with the nationalities that 
live here. Incidentally, these nationalities are not subjects of the 
constitution (the preamble of the Fundamental Law states that it is 
authored and framed by members of the Hungarian nation),  even if there 
may be, and in fact there have been, members of parliament (even some 
governing party MPs) who were citizens of Hungary but were not 
ethnically Hungarian, but members of one of the national 
minorities/nationalities. The 2011 nationalities act practically left the 
previous legislation intact, and a separate legislation introduced the 
parliamentary representation of all nationalities. 
 
1.2. Minority representatives (election procedures, legal framework) 
 
After several unsuccessful legislative attempts and a two-decade long 
political debate, for the first time since the 19898 political transition, as 
part of a sweeping reorganisation of electoral law, the Orbán government 
 
344  1041/G/1999 AB határozat (Constitutional Court decision), AB 
Közlöny: Vol. IX., No. 8–9, 35/1992. (VI. 10.) and 24/1994. (V. 6.) AB 
határozat (Constitutional Court decision). 
bla3 
 
adopted and actually implemented legislation that set forth the 
parliamentary representation (or at least, presence) of minorities. 
The Fundamental Law does not contain any express provisions 
concerning the parliamentary representation of nationalities; it merely 
states that the participation of nationalities in the work of Parliament must 
be ensured. The detailed regulations are laid down in two acts of 
parliament, one approved in 2011 and the other in 2013, on the electoral 
system.345 Nationalities are entitled to win preferential seats in the 199-
member Parliament as part of the contingent of 93 seats that are 
distributed based on national lists. If any of the nationality lists win a 
preferential seat, then the seats that must be allocated between party lists 
will be reduced by the corresponding amount. Nationality lists can only be 
nominated by national-level nationality self-governments. In other words, 
the parliamentary representation of minorities is based upon representation 
through minority self-governments, which implies that other players, such 
as parties for example, have no influence on the composition of the list 
and cannot nominate candidates. Only a single preferential seat can be 
won by each national minority; to win more than one seat, a nationality 
list can compete for additional seats based on the general election rules 
that require securing enough votes to take the five per cent threshold. A 
citizen can choose to vote either for a party list nominated according to the 
general election rules or, if she is registered in the nationality voter roll, 
for one of the nationality lists. One can only enrol in one minority register. 
Thus, the expression of multiple identities is not supported in electoral 
law. 
According to the 2013 Act XXXVI on Electoral Procedures, the rules 
for registering in the nationality voter rolls are not different from the rules 
applicable to nationality self-government elections – essentially, a 
principle of free and unfettered self-identification prevails in this 
context.346 According to the 2011 Act CCIII on the Election of the 
Members of Parliament, a national list can be nominated either as a 
 
345  Act CCIII of 2011 on the Election of the Members of Parliament Articles 7-18. §, 
Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure Articles 86-87. §, 255-257. §. 
346  According to Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly Section 
86, requests for registration as a nationality voter shall contain: a) an 
indication of the nationality; b) a declaration by the voter, in which the voter 
professes to belong to said nationality; c) an indication of whether the voter 
also requests to be registered as a nationality voter with regard to the election 
of Members of Parliament. 
 
 
regular party list or a nationality list. Nationality lists can be nominated by 
national-level nationality self-governments, and such a nomination 
requires the endorsement of at least one per cent of nationality voters 
enrolled in the central registry, though the maximum necessary number is 
1,500 endorsements. A candidate on the list must be someone who is also 
enrolled in the central registry as a person affiliated with the given 
national minority, and, moreover, a list must contain at least three 
candidates. An important condition is that two or more national (level) 
nationality self-governments cannot nominate a joint list. All 
organizations representing minority interests are excluded from the 
possibility of nominating lists for the parliamentary election. The law also 
provides for a minimum number of votes necessary to win a seat. These 
effectively imply that some 20,000 to 25,000 votes are needed for 
parliamentary representation. This number is considerably less than what 
would be needed based on the generally applicable rules,347 yet, as we will 
see below in part two, given the demographics of minorities in Hungary, 
only the Roma and the German minorities have a chance at actually 
succeeding in passing this threshold. Therefore, the nationality advocate is 





347 According to Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly Section 
16, Mandates which may be won from a national list shall be distributed in the 
following procedure: The total number of national list votes shall be divided 
by ninety-three, and the result shall be divided by four; the preferential quota 
shall be the integer of the resulting quotient; If the number of votes for a 
particular nationality list exceeds or is identical to the preferential quota, the 
particular nationality list shall win one preferential mandate; one national 
minority list may win one preferential mandate; the number of allocated 
preferential mandates shall be deducted from the number of mandates which 
may be won on the national list; Mandates remaining after the procedure 
described above shall be distributed among party lists entitled and nationality 





1.3. Nationality advocates (election procedures, legal framework) 
 
According to Article 18 of the Act on the Elections of Members of 
Parliament, "(1) Any nationality, which drew up a nationality list, but 
failed to win a mandate by such list, shall be represented by its nationality 
advocate in Parliament. (2) The nationality advocate shall be the candidate 
who ranked first on the nationality list." 
Let us review the legal status of the nationality advocate (who, just like 
a member of parliament representing a nationality, cannot be the president 
or member of a nationality self-government, even though she was to be 
nominated by the latter). According to the 2012 Act XXXVI on 
Parliament, the advocate may speak during plenary sessions – if the House 
Committee (the committee in charge of parliamentary procedures) 
assesses that a given issue pertains to the rights or interests of 
nationalities. Indeed, she may even submit proposals for a decision to 
Parliament, submit questions to the government, members of the cabinet, 
the Prosecutor General, the president of the National Audit Office, or the 
Commissioner of Fundamental Rights on issues pertaining to the rights 
and interests of nationalities.  
Although it has not (yet) been documented to have occured, the fact that 
the House Committee (which is made up of the Speaker of Parliament, 
his/her deputies, and the leaders of the parliamentary factions) is entitled 
to decide whether a given item on the agenda pertains to the rights and 
interests of nationalities constitutes an inherent limitation of the advocate's 
powers.348 It may even decide that such an issue does not exist. 
 
348 According to Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National 
Assembly Section 11, Within the framework of the provisions of 
the Rules of Procedure, the House Committee shall …specify the 
items on the orders of the day affecting the interests or rights of 
nationalities. … Section 13 holds that the chair of the committee 
representing the nationalities or, if he or she is prevented from 
acting, the deputy chair of the committee delegated by the chair, 
may attend the sitting of the House Committee… The chair of 
the committee representing the nationalities may initiate with the 
Speaker the convening of the House Committee in the interest of 




Parliament is also under obligation to set up a parliamentary committee 
that represents nationalities. This committee submits initiatives and 
proposals that serve the interests and rights of national minorities, issues 
opinions on relevant proposals, and is also involved in monitoring the 
government's work relating to nationalities.349 This is the only 
 
day as an item affecting the interests or rights of nationalities. 
The Speaker shall decide on convening the House Committee. 
349  Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly Section 
22 (1) The committee representing the nationalities shall be an 
organ of the National Assembly acting in the field of the interests 
and rights of nationalities, in charge of putting forward 
initiatives, making proposals, delivering opinions, and 
contributing to supervising the work of the Government, 
exercising the powers specified in the Fundamental Law, in Acts, 
in the provisions of the Rules of Procedure laid down in a 
resolution and in other resolutions of the National Assembly. (2) 
The committee representing the nationalities shall take a position 
on the report prepared by the Government on the state of the 
nationalities, and on the annual report of the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights. (3) The members of the committee 
representing the nationalities shall be the Members obtaining 
mandate from a nationality list, and the nationality advocates. (4) 
After considering the motions put forward by the Members 
obtaining mandate from a nationality list and by the nationality 
advocates, the Speaker shall make a proposal to the National 
Assembly concerning the name, the adaptation of the functions, 
the persons of the chair and deputy chair of the committee 
representing the nationalities. (4a) The costs incurred in relation 
to using mother tongues by the Members belonging to a 
nationality, the Members obtaining mandate from the list of 
nationalities, and the nationality advocates shall be borne by the 
relevant targeted expenditure of the committee representing the 
nationalities. … Section 15 (4) The … committee may discuss, at 
the request of the National Assembly or in its discretion, any 
question concerning its functions, and may take a position on it. 




parliamentary committee in which the nationalities advocate is a voting 
member.350 Apart from the limitations on his/her right to vote, and the fact 
that his/her competencies are limited to nationality affairs, the advocate 
and his/her status is equal to that of other members of parliament: she 
 
sending it to the Speaker, in an information paper of the 
committee. 
350  Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly Section 
29 (1) The nationality advocates shall have equal rights and 
obligations, they shall perform their activities in the interest of 
the public and the nationality concerned, and they shall not be 
given instructions in that respect. (2) The nationality advocate 
may speak at the sitting of the National Assembly if the House 
Committee considers that the item on the orders of the day 
affects the interests or rights of nationalities. In an extraordinary 
matter, following the debate on the items on the orders of the 
day, the nationality advocate may speak in the manner 
determined in the provisions of the Rules of Procedure laid down 
in a resolution. The nationality advocate shall have no right to 
vote at the sittings of the National Assembly. (3) The nationality 
advocate shall participate with a right to vote in the work of the 
committee representing the nationalities, and he or she may – on 
the basis of the decision of the chair of the standing committee or 
of the committee on legislation, or if the House Committee 
decides so in the framework of its decision according to 
paragraph (2) – attend, in a consultative capacity, the sittings of 
the standing committees or of the committee on legislation. (4) 
The nationality advocate may address questions to the 
Government, the member of the Government, the Commissioner 
for Fundamental Rights, the President of the State Audit Office 
and the Prosecutor General about matters within their functions 
and affecting the interests or rights of nationalities. Section 29/A 
(1) The nationality advocate shall be entitled to immunity. The 
rules pertaining to the immunity of Members shall apply to the 
immunity of the nationality advocate. 
 
 
enjoys immunity, receives remuneration, has an expense account, et 
cetera.351 
The nationality advocate, or a member of parliament who is a member 
of a nationality and obtained his/her seat as a nominee on a nationality list, 
may speak and submit bills and other documents in his/her native 
language. At the same time, if Parliament or one of its committees takes 
up his/her proposal, then it is debated in Hungarian. 
 
1.4. Objectives and justifications 
 
 
351  Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly Section 
98 (1) State authorities shall assist the Members in the fulfilment 
of their mandate and shall provide the Members with the 
information necessary for their work. Should the Member 
request in writing information from a person obliged to provide a 
report to the National Assembly, and the Member’s question is 
related to a matter falling within the person’s functions he or she 
is obliged under an act to provide a report on to the National 
Assembly, the person obliged to provide a report to the National 
Assembly shall reply to the Member in writing within fifteen 
days of the receipt of the request. …(4) The Member’s ID card 
shall grant access to all public authorities as well as public 
institutes and public institutions. The Member shall also be 
entitled to enter … the territory operated by the Hungarian 
Defence Forces, the Military National Security Service, the law 
enforcement authorities and the customs authority of the 
National Tax and Customs Administration. …. Section 104 (1) 
The Member shall be entitled to receive a monthly remuneration 
from the date of his or her oath-taking until the termination of his 
or her mandate; the amount of the remuneration shall be equal to 
the remuneration of the Deputy State Secretary consisting of 
basic remuneration, remuneration supplement and executive 
supplement, as determined in the Act on Public Service Officials. 
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The introduction of the preferential representation of nationalities is rooted 
in several arguments in Hungarian political discourse.  
One was a reference, reiterated and cited in numerous recommendations 
and reports by international organizations,352 to a 1992 Constitutional 
Court decision, which held that a constitutional omission has occurred 
when such a solution failed to be enacted. The 1949 Constitution, in force 
until 2011, set forth that “The national and ethnic minorities living in the 
Republic of Hungary participate in the sovereign power of the people: 
they represent a constituent part of the State. (2) The Republic of Hungary 
shall provide for the protection of national and ethnic minorities and 
ensure their collective participation in public affairs, the fostering of their 
cultures, the use of their native languages, education in their native 
languages and the use of names in their native languages. (3) The laws of 
the Republic of Hungary shall ensure representation for the national and 
ethnic minorities living within the country.”353 In 1992, before the 
adoption of the comprehensive 1993 minority rights act,354 the 
Constitutional Court decision declared the omission, and in 1994,355 again, 
referred to its holding. However, the Court’s position was not 
unambiguous. It did not explicitly mention “parliamentary representation,” 
but referred to “general representation,” thus, the legislation in question 
could be regarded as completed by 1993. The 1993 Act356 stipulated 
parliamentary representation, but never actually instituted it, and since 
there was no direct constitutional language on the issue, the debate was 
never resolved. But Hungary was repeatedly criticized for not meeting its 
self-induced obligations. The issue was lingering and dozens of 
 
352  See for example, Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic 
Minorities - Minority Rights Group International - Serbian Institute of 
Budapest: Submission to the 100th session of the Human Rights Committee: 
Shadow report to Hungary's fifth Periodic Report under the ICCPR, 
Parliamentary representation of minorities in Hungary: Legal and political 
issues, Project on Ethnic relations, Princeton, USA, 2001, Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Republic of Hungary 
Parliamentary Elections 11 April 2010, OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment 
Mission Report Warsaw 9 August 2010, ECRI Report on Hungary, (fourth 
monitoring cycle), Adopted on 20 June 2008 Published on 24 February 2009. 
353  Article 68.  
354  Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities 
355  Resolutions 24/1994. (V. 6.) and 35/1992. (VI. 10.). 
356  Article 20. 
 
 
consultations and meetings were held over the two decades since the 
political transition.  
Although it never really entered into effect because it was never fully 
specified in the form of concrete electoral law provisions, the May 25th, 
2010 amendment to the constitution357 actually instituted sui generis 
minority representation by setting forth that "the number of Members of 
Parliaments cannot be higher than two hundred. No more than thirteen 
Members of Parliament may be elected to represent the national and ethnic 
minorities." Henceforth, minority parliamentary representation could also 
have been interpreted as an established precedent and an acquired right.  
During the constitution-making process, the recognized nationalities 
mostly remained silent – except for on the aforementioned issue of 
replacing the term "minority" with "nationality" and parliamentary 
representation. The National Croatian358 and Ruthenian359 Self-
Governments each formulated their request for parliamentary 
representation, similarly to the Bulgarian National Self-Government360 
and the National Self-Government of Germans in Hungary.361 The 
specialized minority commissioner (ombudsperson) supported these 
claims.362  
The Jewish community in Hungary has been divided on the question of 
seeking recognition as a (national or ethnic) minority. In 2005, the 
Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities (MAZSIHISZ) launched a 
popular initiative, but failed to build up support on behalf of the 
community.363 Thus, they did not take a position on the issue during the 
debate on the new constitution or the electoral law. Despite the fact that 
back in 1990 the Jewish community was among the eight so-called co-
opted minorities that were supposed to be provided a form of 
representation (Gypsies, Croatians, Germans, Rumanians, Serbs, Slovaks, 
and Slovenians) – according to another piece of legislation that was 
amended before actually being implemented. 
 
 
357  http://www.kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/MK10085.pdf 
358  http://www.parlament.hu/biz/aeb/info/horvat_onk.pdf 
359  http://www.parlament.hu/biz/aeb/info/ruszin_onk.pdf 
360  http://www.parlament.hu/biz/aeb/info/bolgar_onk.pdf 
361  http://www.parlament.hu/biz/aeb/info/mnoo.pdf 
362  http://www.parlament.hu/biz/aeb/info/jovo_memz_bizt.pdf 
363  http://www.parlament.hu/biz/aeb/info/mazsihisz.pdf 
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2. General context: The place that the setup and approach occupies within 
the broader policies of diversity management, ideologically and 
institutionally. Parliamentary Representation as an extension of the 
unique Hungarian minority self-governments 
 
The comprehensive 1993 Minority Rights Act enumerated 13 recognized 
minorities: Armenian, Bulgarian, Croatian, German, Greek, Polish 
Romanian, Ruthenian, Serb, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian, and Roma. It 
set forth a complicated procedure to extend the list, which involves a 
popular initiative, an advisory opinion of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, and a vote in the Parliament to amendi the act. None of these 
initiatives were successful. The act guaranteed cultural and linguistic 
rights for these groups, and contained provisions on the establishment and 
maintenance of minority education and established a unique Hungarian 
institution: minority self-governments (hereinafter MSG). Funded by the 
local authorities (or when concerning national bodies, by the state), MSGs 
operate at the local, regional, and national levels. They have special 
competences for protecting cultural heritage and language use, scheduling 
festivals and celebrations in the calendar, fostering the preservation of 
traditions, participating in public education, managing public theatres, 
libraries, and science and arts institutions, awarding study grants, and 
providing services to the community (legal aid in particular).364 MSGs are 
elected bodies that function parallel to mainstream institutions, and they 
have certain rights regarding decision making in the areas of local 
education, language use in public institutions, media, and the protection of 
minority culture and traditions. MSG representatives have the right to 
provide input on public policy matters through their access to local council 
committee meetings.  
 
Before delving into an assessment of the 1993 Act and the MSG 
system, it needs to be pointed out that debates and theories applied to 
multiculturalism in a diversity management context need to be adjusted 
accordingly when talking about Hungary. Two important demographic 
and political features need to be stated in the outset: 
As for demographics, in the 2011 census, 6.5 per cent of the population 
declared that they belong to one of the minority groups. Immigration 
 




figures are very low, and the overwhelming majority of immigrants are 
ethnic Hungarians from a neighbouring state who thus do not constitute a 
cultural minority. With an overall population of about 10 million, the 
immigration authorities recorded 213,000 foreigners living legally in 
Hungary in 2012.365 Based on the 2011 census, the number of minorities 
living in Hungary is as follows: 3,571 Armenians; 6,272 Bulgarians; 
315,583 Roma; 26,774 Croatians; 185,696 Germans; 4,642 Greeks; 7,001 
Poles; 35,641 Rumanians; 3,882 Ruthenians; 10,038 Serbs; 35,208 
Slovaks; 2,820 Slovenians; 7,396 Ukrainians. Roma constitute the largest 
minority group in the country. In the 2011 population census, about three 
per cent of the population identified as Roma,366 but estimations suggest 
that the number is actually between 700,000-1,000,000.367 
As for the political component: the starting point to understand 
contemporary Hungarian minority rights framework dates back in 1920, 
when in the post-WWI treaty,368 Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory 
and its corresponding population. This left the formerly multinational state 
practically homogenous, but with about a third of ethnic Hungarians (cca. 
 
365  , Council of Europe/ERICarts, "Compendium of Cultural Policies 
and Trends in Europe, 15th edition", 2014, 
http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/hungary.php?aid=424. Also see Hungary, 
Central Statistical Office (2013), Országos adatok: 1.1.6.1 A népesség 
anyanyelv, nemzetiség és nemek szerint, (Population according to native 
language, nationality and gender) available in Hungarian at: 
www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/docs/tablak/ter 
uleti/00/1_1_6_1.xlsThe official English translation of the census 
questionnaire is available at: 
www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/docs/kerdoivek/szemely_angol.pdf 
366  Hungary, Central Statistical Office (2013), Országos adatok: 1.1.6.1 
A népesség anyanyelv, nemzetiség és nemek szerint, available in Hungarian 
at: www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/docs/tablak/ter 
uleti/00/1_1_6_1.xlsThe official English translation of the census 
questionnaire is available at: 
www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/docs/kerdoivek/szemely_angol.pdf 
367  Council of Europe (2010), Statistics, available at: 
www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/default_en.asp, Document prepared by the 
Council of Europe Roma and Travellers Division, last updated in 2010 
368  Treaty of Peace Between The Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary And 




three million people) in the neighboring states. Since 1920, aspirations to 
reunite old glory and territorial integrity, or at least a responsibility for 
ethnic kins in the neighbouring countries, has always been a cornerstone 
of conservative domestic politics, and after the political transition in 1989, 
a constitutional responsibility and a foreign policy priority as well. 
Arguably,369 the 1993 Act on National and Ethnic Minorities370 was 
designed to provide a politically marketable example for neighbouring 
countries with a substantial Hungarian minority.371 
 
Therefore, the 1993 and the subsequent 2011 minority rights laws and 
the MSG-system should be scrutinized with consideration of this 
background. The function and design of the MSG’s (which, as we have 
seen are also instrumental in parliamentary representation) is quite 
ambiguous: political representation and empowerment, cultural 
competences, and a vague promise of social integration potential are 
bundled together. In 2006, the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) published a detailed report372 that pointed to 
many problems within system. “These included unclear competencies, the 
lack of differentiation between various minority needs, deficiencies in 
 
369  See for example Pap, A.L. ‘Minority Rights and Diaspora-claims: 
Collision, Interdependence and Loss of 
Orientation’. In Beyond Sovereignty: From Status Law to Transnational 
Citizenship, 
ed. O Ieda, 243-254. Sapporo, Hokkaido University Slavic Research Center, 
2006. 
370  Hungary, Act NLXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and 
Ethnic Minorities (1993. évi LXXVII. törvény a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségek 
jogairól).  
371  See András Bíró: The price of Roma integration, Will Guy (ed.) 
From victimhood to citizenship. The path of Roma Integration. A debate., 
Pakiv European Roma Fund- Kossuth, Budapest, 2013, p. 26. 
 
372  The Hungarian Minority Self-Government System as a Means of 
Increasing Romani Political Participation, National Democratic Institute 
Assessment Report, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of 




financing, and voter enfranchisement regardless of ethnic affiliation.”373 
According to the report, the institution is “tinkered with a fundamentally 
flawed concept that offers the illusion of political power rather than 
genuine inclusion.374 … The MSGs tend to marginalize … issues by 
depositing them in a parallel, fairly powerless, quasi-governmental 
structure rather than addressing them through established governing 
bodies. … The MSG system is inaccurately named. The local and national 
MSGs fall far short of the range of competencies that the title ‘self 
government’ implies. They lack the authority to take action outside of a 
very limited scope of issues and function more like NGOs than elected 
governing bodies. The use of the term ‘self-government’ is not merely 
inaccurate, but actually damages the credibility and legitimacy of the 
entire system … as it raises unrealistic expectations on the part of 
constituents regarding what they can accomplish through the MSGs. In 
truth, the very design of the system prevents it from having a significant 
impact on issues of greatest concern to most … This is due in part to the 
fact that these were not the government’s initial aims in creating the 
system. Rather, its goal was to give minorities a safeguard for preserving 
their distinct cultural and linguistic traditions, and … to provide the means 
for encouraging neighboring countries to allow Hungarian minority 
communities the same privilege.”375 The OSCE also points to flaws in 
funding, claiming that “MSGs lack adequate funding to carry out either 
socio-cultural projects, per the system’s original intent, or additional 
projects to improve the living standards of community members. With a 
budget of approximately $3,000 per year, with no consideration for the 
size of the town… MSGs can not cover even a modest stipend for a part-
time employee to coordinate the work of its elected representatives or 
implement projects.376 … [MSGs] lack the authority to take action on 
problems outside of a limited scope of issues and have minimal funds to 
address the needs of their constituents… This lack of authority leaves 
MSGs as a ‘half-way house’ between a government institution and an 
NGO, with an undefined, under-funded mandate. Other than very limited 
government funding and the right to consent in issues of education, 
language, and cultural preservation, the MSGs have few advantages over 
 
373  Id. P. 5. 
374  Id. P. 4. 
375  Id, Pp 6-7 
376  Id. 
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NGOs. In fact, those MSGs that have the greatest impact function much 
like a local NGO, securing outside resources for small-scale projects. ”377 
In sum, the OSCE report pointed out that378 “the government’s stated 
purpose for creating the Minority Act was to assure the cultural autonomy 
of minorities and to fulfill international obligations regarding the 
protection of minority rights. However, another important factor in the 
development of the act was Hungary’s desire to protect the rights of the 
large number of ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries. By 
developing the MSG system and other minority institutions, the 
government hoped to build leverage that it could use in bi-lateral 
negotiations with neighboring states on guaranteeing the rights of 
Hungarians abroad …  
 
The new, 2011 minority rights law did not change the basic philosophy 
underlying the institution of self-governments. The new regulation failed 
to effect substantial change in terms of national minority elections. As 
compared to 2010, there was only a slight rise in the number of those on 
the voter rolls: There were 228,038 names in 2010, while in 2014 the 
number had risen to 241,030 persons. The Roma national minority was the 
only one that actually increased the number of those in its voter registry, 
from 133,492 to 158,101, by 18%. Most national minorities saw their rolls 
decline: 35% in the case of the Bulgarians, 33% for Slovenians and 30% 
for Serbs. In terms of participation, there were no substantial changes 
either: In 2006, turnout had stood at 63.81%, in 2010 it was 63.47% and in 
2014 it reached 65.14%.379 Nor did the results change appreciably: 2321 
local national minority elections were held in 2010, and in 2014 this 
number increased to 2163.380 
 
377  Id, pp 22-25. Also see Molnár, Emilia and Kai A. Schaft: Preserving ''Cultural 
Authonomy'' or Confronting Social Crisis? The Activities and Aims of Roma 
Local Minority Self-governments 2000-2001, Review of Sociology of the 
Hungarian Sociological Association, Volume 9, Number 1, 28 May 2003 ,pp. 27-
42 (15) 
378  Id. P. 10. 
379  http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/files/205796771.pdf 
380  http://valasztas.hu/hu/nemz2014/987/987_0_index.html, 
http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/23865, 
http://www.valasztas.hu//hu/onkval2010/576/576_0_index.html, Szalayné 
Sándor Erzsébet: A 2014. évi választások a magyarországi nemzetiségekért 
felelős biztoshelyettes szemszögéből (The 2014 elections as seen by the 





We may conclude that building on the same institutional and conceptual 
structure, i.e. the definition of the minority communities and eligibility 
criteria for the right to vote, the newly established parliamentary 
representation is an extension of the minority self-governments. 
 
3. Functionality: The role of minority political parties, legitimacy, 
influence on decision-making, performative functions, 
representation 
 
3.1. Performative and functions and representation 
 
A significant amount of criticism of the Hungarian model for minority 
parliamentary representation concerns its conceptual background and 
questions about the representative capabilities of the system. There are 
three basic recognized forms of minority representation and representation 
of their interests in legislative bodies: (a) through the second chamber of a 
bicameral legislature, i.e. a functionally distinct body within parliament; 
(b) through parliamentary representatives within a unicameral system; (c) 
legislative and political decision-making realized through specialized and 
particularized solutions.  
Representation through minority MPs can be realized in one of three 
ways: through the election of minority parties and candidates based on the 
general rules of the election laws (majoritarian, proportional, or mixed); 
‘other’ candidates nominated by competitive/majority parties but in some 
form of official alliance with minority organizations; and preferential 
procedures, e.g. quotas established for minority representatives or seats 
allotted in the form of delegation or cooptation. There are serious concerns 
about this last form of minority representation that stem from the theory of 
representation, briefly outlined as following: (i) a Member of Parliament 
represents only and exclusively the politically unitary nation which 
embodies sovereignty (which does not rule out and is not antithetical to 






duties in the interest of the public, safeguarded by the guarantees attached 
to a free mandate. (ii) A representative whose role is exclusively to 
represent a minority does not mesh well with a party system based on 
competing parties, because in debates on issues that are neutral to the 
needs of minorities, it would be difficult for an MP or a faction who won 
their seats exclusively to provide minority representation to justify their 
presence. Moreover, the votes they cast would be mired in the problem of 
lacking real legitimacy of representation, for they would have won their 
mandates outside regular political competition. (iii) In light of the fact that 
MPs who won a preferential seat cannot actually prevent anti-minority 
decisions, their presence in Parliament will end up being yet another 
symbolic gesture meant to provide media publicity. This symbolic act 
comes with significant costs, however, that stem from both constitutional 
theory and theory of representation.  
Based on the electoral rules and the regulations on the actual legislative 
powers of the nationality representatives and their factions, the Hungarian 
model of parliamentary presence of nationalities creates a forum for the 
presence of the representatives of nationalities rather than a platform for 




The draft constitution drawn up by constitutional scholar András Jakab381 
in 2011 explicitly rejected the idea of parliamentary representation for 
minorities. He argues:  
 (a) It is not clear why nationality should be treated as the one minority feature 
that ought to be afforded distinct parliamentary representation. (b) There is a risk 
that resentments against national minorities might increase. A situation when the 
parliamentary support of a government teeters on the brink of a majority could 
prove very awkward. If national minority representatives support the government 
in such a situation, then anti-national minority sentiments might surge on the 
opposition side; and if they side with the opposition, then resentments could rise 
among government party politicians. If they abstain or fail to vote, then they could 
be subject to the charge that they are indifferent towards national affairs, which 
 
381 See Jakab, András: Az Alaptörvény keletkezése és gyakorlati következményei, 




could arouse the ire of both sides. (c) It is unnecessary for ensuring national 
minority rights (survival, fostering culture). It would be considerably more 
effective to strengthen the school system, supporting cultural activities (be it 
through minority self-governments or outside the minority self-government 
system). (d) Finally, it is also unclear why national minorities would be politically 
united. In light of this, the parliamentary representation of minorities is something 
that at the time of regime transition was benevolently but nevertheless 
unfortunately incorporated into the Constitution, without studying the relevant 
foreign examples (the goal was to provide a model for the policies towards 
Hungarians in the neighboring countries, which has visibly failed to materialize). 
The legitimacy of the representatives of nationalities in parliament has 
been in the centre of severe criticism (a criticism that is more academic 
than political). These arguments concern four points: the overall 
conceptualization of the recognized minority communities, the lack of 
proper affiliation criteria for eligibility for minority rights (which include 
political participatory rights), the use of census data, and equating the 
active and passive right to vote. 
 
3.2.1. The recognized minority communities 
 
The 1993 Minority Act, copied by the 2011 law, defined national and 
ethnic minorities as groups that have been present in the territory of 
Hungary for over 100 years and that “constitute a numerical minority 
within the population of the country, whose members hold Hungarian 
citizenship and differ from the rest of the population in terms of their own 
tongue, cultures and traditions, and who prove to be aware of the 
cohesion, national or ethnic, which is to aim at preserving all these and at 
articulating and safeguarding the interests of their respective historically 
developed communities.” According to the Act, these minorities are: 
Bulgarian, Roma (Gypsy), Greek, Croat, Polish, German, Armenian, 
Rumanian, Ruthenian, Serb, Slovak, Slovene, and Ukrainian; and in order 
to register a new minority group, a popular initiative signed by 1,000 
citizens has to be submitted to the Speaker of the Parliament.  
As mentioned above, the act, in addition to defining the two group 
constituting requirements, also contains an enumeration of the thirteen 
minority groups that are recognized by the act, which means that the 
Parliament will actually need to pass a formal amendment to these 
provisions for a new group to qualify. The House (which is sovereign), 
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however, is not obliged to vote affirmatively on the question. This is in 
sharp contradiction with the otherwise clearly defined requirements.382 
 
3.2.2. Ethnocorruption: Who are members of the recognized minority 
communities?  
 
Another, even more controversial element of the Hungarian framework 
relates to the lack of satisfying legal guarantees regarding minority 
affiliation. The Hungarian data protection law prohibits the handling of 
sensitive data, such as ethnic origin, without the concerned person’s 
explicit permission.383 This gives rise to what is commonly known as 
“ethno-business” or “ethno-corruption,” the utilization and misuse of 
remedial measures for private means that are contrary to the legislators’ 
intentions. In the Hungarian model, the exercise of minority rights is not 
dependent on minimal affiliation requirements. Consequently, several 
forms of ethno-corruption exist: 
Deets documents how school officials pressure parents of Hungarian 
students to declare their children to be German: “[A]ccording to 
Hungarian government statistics, in 1998, almost 45,000 primary school 
students were enrolled in German-minority programs, which, by the 
census, was about 8,000 more than the number of ethnic Germans who are 
even in Hungary.”384 The Minority Rights Ombudsman’s 2011 report 
drew attention to a school that advertises its German minority class as a 
“window to Europe,” while not requiring either of the parents to even 
speak German, or requiring eligibility requirements for the students or an 
actual curricula on German ethnography or culture.385 The Minority 
Rights Ombudsman also pointed out that in the 2001 census, 62,233 
 
382  A number of Parliamentary and Constitutional Court decisions have been passed 
on petitions of various ethno-national groups, like the Jews, Aegean Macedons, 
Russians, the Bunyevac, or Huns seeking recognition. 
383  Act No CXII of 2011 on Informational Self-Determination and 
Freedom of Information 
384  Deets, Stephen (2002). Reconsidering East European Minority 
Policy: Liberal Theory and European Norms, East European Politics and 
Society 16:1 
385  See A kisebbségi általános iskolai nevelés-oktatás helyzetéről (NEK-
411/2011), OBH, Budapest, 2011. október 5., 78. p., 
<http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/fi les/217986220. pdf> p. 20. 
 
 
people claimed to be German, while in 2011 there were 46,693 students 
(aged six to fourteen years) enrolled in the German minority education 
scheme.386 The Ombudsman also drew attention to the fact that German 
minority education takes place in several municipalities, where neither the 
2001 nor the 1944 census (which predated the mass expulsion of some 
380,000 ethnic Germans from Hungary) indicated the presence of a 
German minority.387 A similar trend can be seen when looking at minority 
education initiatives targeting Romani students. In most cases, financial 
incentives are the obvious reason for this, since schools receive additional 
public funding for minority education – which is often the only source of 
extra income for educational institutions in underdeveloped, poor regions 
or small villages. In order to secure this funding, school administration 
and teachers will do anything it takes: learning a language, getting training 
in Roma ethnography and culture, and pressuring parents to request 
minority education.388 
 
 Legal tools developed as instruments for minority protection can, 
in practice, be abused to promote members of the majority community. 
Minority protection schemes can also be used in a cynically abusive 
manner, particularly in relation to segregation: either when Roma parents 
are convinced or forced – without their informed consent – to request 
specialized minority education for their children389 or when non-Roma 
 
386  Id at 39. 
387  Id.  
388 See also Lakatos, Szilvia: A romani nyelv helyzete a magyarországi 
közoktatásban (The role of Romani education, PhD-dissertation), Pécsi 
Tudományegyetem „Oktatás és Társadalom” Neveléstudományi Doktori 
Iskola, Pécs, 2010, 
<http://nevtud.btk.pte.hu/fi les/tiny_mce/Romologia/Kutatas% 20-
%20Fejlesztes/phd-doli-v%C3%A9gleges.rtf 
389  See Lídia Balogh: “Minority Cultural Rights or an Excuse for 
Segregation? Roma Minority Education in Hungary.” In Daniel Pop (ed.): 
Education Policy and Equal Education Opportunities. New York: Open 
Society Foundations, 2012. pp. 207-222 and Balogh, Lídia: “Jog a kultúra 
őrzésére – vagy ürügy a szegregációra? A roma nemzetiségi oktatás mint 
kétélű kard Magyarországon”(The right to protect culture or a reason for 
segregation?). Pro Minoritate 2012/Tavasz pp. 207-223. In its report on 
minority education the Parliamentary Commissioner for (Ombudsman) for 




parents claim that they are Roma in order to justify and legitimize racial 
segregation.390 Another scenario concerns cases where foundations of 
national minorities are helped to recreate their culture as a way to pressure 
neighboring states, so that the demand for minority rights is “fueled by 
supply.”391 Deets is correct in concluding that the Hungarian government 
has an interest in developing programs that offer incentives to local 
governments to ‘create’ minority children.392  
 Minority self-government elections have also been constant 
sources of fraud, as the decision to vote at these elections was left solely to 
the political culture and conscience of the majority. After repeated reports 
on permanent abuse of the electoral scheme, in 2005 a “soft” form of 
registration was implemented, in which minority voters need to sign up in 
 
choice of parents can be seriously questioned, and evidence points to various 
forms of pressure in regards of requests for minority education. See Nemzeti 
és Etnikai Kisebbségi Jogok Országgyűlési Biztosa: Jelentés a nemzeti és 
etnikai kisebbségi általános iskolai nevelés-oktatás helyzetéről (The minority 
rights’ ombudpersons report on education) (NEK-411/2011), OBH, Budapest, 
2011. október 5., 78. 
p.,<http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/fi les/217986220. pdf> pp. 20-
22. The ombudsman reaffirmed these findings in his report on 2011 pre-
school report in regards of Roma kindergartens. Nemzeti és Etnikai 
Kisebbségi Jogok Országgyűlési Biztosa: Jelentés a nemzeti és etnikai 
kisebbségi óvodai nevelés helyzetéről (NEK-368/2010), OBH, Budapest, 
2011. március, 28. p. <http:// 
www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/fi les/205104474.pdf>, p. 42. In one of 
the minority kindergartens, actually a completely different dialect was taught 
from what the Roma families spoke (or understood.) Id. p. 43. Also, Roma 
language is instructed in several kindergartens, where Romungo Roma live, 
who have been only speaking Hungarian for generations. Id. p. 44. 
390  For a detailed case description see Roma Rights 2003/1-2, pp. 107-
108. In the summer of 2003 the Roma Press Center’s fact finding revealed 
that at one point non-Roma parents signed a petition in which they too 
claimed to be Roma. 
391  See Andreea Carstocea: Ethno-business – the Manipulation of 
Minority Rights in Romania and Hungary In: Tul’si Bhambry, Clare Griffin, 
Titus Hjelm, Christopher Nicholson, Olga G. Voronina (eds.) Perpetual 
motion? Transformation and transition in Central and Eastern Europe & 
Russia, UCL, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 2011, p. 19. 
392  Deets, supra n. 187.  
 
 
a special register even though no objective criteria or formal requirements 
for affiliation are set forth. The 2011 law has subsequently preserved 
this.393 If they are willing to spend some time navigating the bureaucracy, 
Hungarian citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin, can vote for minority 
self-government candidates. Although the phenomenon is not widespread, 
this also enables members of the majority to abuse the system by taking 
over minority self-governments. For example, the non-Roma wife of the 
mayor of Jászladány – a village notorious for segregating Roma, primary 
through schools – held an elected office in the local Roma minority self-
government.  
 According to a December 2012 poll by the think tank Századvég, 
49 per cent of Hungarians heard about candidates running in minority 
elections without actually being a member of the given group.394 
Hungarian minority representatives also repeatedly claim that the fact that 
some candidates ran as “Gypsies” in one election and then later as 
Germans in the following term (which is permitted by both the law and the 
ideal of multiple identity-formation) proves the flourishing of local ethno-
business.395 Similarly, both the President of the National Romanian 
Minority Self-Government396 in Hungary and the (Romanian) Secretary 
for Romanians Living Outside Romania found it worrisome that the 2002 
local elections brought an increasing number of candidates for Romanian 
minority self-governments, while the number of those identifying 
themselves as Romanian in the national census is decreasing.397 In their 
view, the answer lies in the fact that “Gypsies” and Hungarian immigrants 
who moved from Romania are running as Romanians.398 According to 
 
393  Act CLXXIX of 2011 on the Rights of Nationalities 
394  http://www.szazadveg.hu/files/hirek/nemzetiseg_sajto.pdf 
395  See the minority-ombudsman's annual parliamentary reports or an 
interview with Antal Heizler, President of the Office for National and Ethnic 
Minorities, Népszabadság (the leading Hungarian daily), 2002.07.24. 
396  The President did not predict that more then 7 out of the 17 local self-
governments running in the 2002 elections in Budapest (and some 30 out of the 
48 registered nationally) would be "authentic Romanian." Out of the 13 local 
Romanian minority self-governments operating between 1998 and 2002, he 
estimated that only three have "real Romanian blood" running in their veins. See 
the summary of an interview with Kreszta Trajan, Népszabadság, 2002.08.21. 
397  See the statement of Doru Vasile Ionescu in Népszabadság, 
2002.08.15. fix cite 
398  In 2005 the law was amended, introducing a self-assessment based registration 




political scientist Andreea Carstocea, the minority most affected by the 
phenomenon was the Romanian minority in Hungary, where non-
Romanians were said to head approximately forty percent of the 
Romanian self-governments. 399 
In order to demonstrate the fallacies of the legal framework, some 
Roma politicians publicly decided to run under different labels (in most of 
the reported 17 cases, they ran as Slovakian). There are also several 
municipalities where (according to the national census) nobody identified 
herself as a member of any minority group, yet numerous minority 
candidates were registered.400 Following the 2010 elections, several new 
members of both the Romanian and Ukrainian minority self-governments 
were accused of not being actual members of the minority community by 
other members of the newly elected self-government. A faction of the 
National Ukrainian Self-government failed to stand up during the 
Ukrainian national anthem, and claiming that they are Hungarian, 
requested that no Ukrainian be spoken during official sessions because 
they did not understand it.401 Finally, in 2010, a Hungarian appellate court 
recognized the existence of ethno-business in minority self-government 
elections.402 The defendant, an editor-in-chief of a minority newspaper, 
was brought up on libel charges for calling newly elected members of the 
Romanian minority self-government “ethno-business doers and not 
members of the Romanian minority community in Hungary.”403 The court 
acquitted him.404  
These loopholes in the legal regime sometimes result in complete 
absurdity. In order to express their admiration of German football, for 
example, a small village's entire football-team registered as German 
minority-candidates for the election.405 In 2010 the mayor of a 
marginalized village at the edge of bankruptcy and unable to finance its 
 
ombudsman, no significant changes followed in electoral behaviour and results. 
See his report: http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/files/187663711.pdf 
399  Carstocea, p. 20.  
400  See Népszabadság, 2002.08.15. 





403  For purposes of this discussion, ethno-corruption and ethno-business 
can be understood as synonymous. 
404  http://www.emasa.hu/print.php?id=6880 
405  Interview with Mr. Heizler, supra n. 400. 
 
 
public school requested all 13 students to declare themselves Roma and 
request minority education.406 As previously discussed, this qualified the 
school for extra funding. No Roma officially lived in the village.407  
Ethno-corruption is also prevalent in many other facets of collective 
rights. In 2010, the parliamentary commissioner for minority rights (a 
specialized ombudsman) published a lengthy report showing how 
members of the majority benefited from a government program designed 
to employ members of the Roma minority community.408 As the above 
cases demonstrate, the institutionalized cynicism concerning preferential 
treatment for minorities may have far-reaching consequences. Besides 
obstructing and discrediting minority rights, there is also potential for 
electoral gerrymandering. 
 
3.2.3. The issue of census data  
 
Several concerns regarding the legitimacy of the system have been 
raised with respect to one of the major novelties of the post-2011 
regulations: the use of census data in the context of national minority 
election rules and in the determination of levels of state funding and 
minority elections. Pursuant to Government Decree 428/2012. (XII. 29.) 
on the conditions of funding disbursed through budget allocations 
earmarked for national minorities,409 "[t]he budgetary allocation to fund 
the operations of municipal national minority self-governments and some 
national minority self-government is defined as a proportion of the 
average funding available for all local national minority self-
governments.”410  
 
406  Jozsef Nagy: Angyalok kertje, (Angels’ garden) Népszabadság, 2010 
July 7. http://nol.hu/lap/gazdasag/20100707-angyalok_kertje 
407  Id. 
408  http://kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/hir-526-rovid-osszegzes-nemzeti-es-etnikai.html. 
Also see , p. 19. Also see: Bogdan Aurescu: The June 2012 opinion of the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe on the act on the rights of nationalities of 
Hungary, Lex et Scientia Vol. 19. Issue 2. (2012), p. 173 
409  Article 2. § (3) 
410  According to the following formula: It amounts to a) 100% of the 
aforementioned average amount if the number of persons who belong to a 




The issue is relevant in the context of voting, as according to Article 56 
(1) of the new minority law, elections for new local national minority self-
governments must be held when the number of persons who belong to the 
given minority in the municipality reaches 30. The number is determined 
by aggregating responses that indicate an affiliation with the given 
national minority in the most recent census questionnaire. Nevertheless, 
according to Article 242 (2), until 2024 25 persons will suffice to meet 
this requirement.  
As the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights noted in his submission 
to the Constitutional Court, it is problematic that when the last census was 
compiled, respondents were unaware of the electoral implication of their 
responses to the question concerning their national minority identity, or 
specifically of the consequences of failing to identify themselves as 
belonging to a given minority group. Unfortunately, the Constitutional 
Court addressed these concerns with unprecedented cynicism in its 
decision,411 in which it rejected the petition and held: "[36] The petition, 
the observations of certain national minority self-governments, and the 
 
b) it is 200% of the average if the number of those who belong to a national 
minority exceeds 50 persons. The budgetary allocation to fund the operations 
of regional national minority self-governments is defined as the proportion of 
the average funding available for all local national minority self-governments, 
according to the following formula: It amounts to a) exactly the 
abovementioned average amount if the total number of municipal (including 
the districts of the capital) national minority self-governments and 
transformed national minority self-governments in the county (the capital) is 
fewer than ten; b) twice the abovementioned average amount if the total 
number of municipal (including the districts of the capital) national minority 
self-governments and transformed national minority self-governments in the 
county (the capital) is more than 10 but fewer than 20; c) four times the 
abovementioned average amount if the total number of municipal (including 
the districts of the capital) national minority self-governments and 
transformed national minority self-governments in the county (the capital) 
exceeds 20." Also see Móré, Sándor: Népszámlálási adatokhoz és konkrét 
létszámhoz kötöttség a nemzetiségi önkormányzatok szabályozásában 
(Connecting census to local governance), Új Magyar Közigazgatás 2014. évi 
4. szám, p. 21. and Móré, Sándor: Új irányok a nemzetiségi önkormányzatok 
létrehozásában (New directions in electing nationality local governance), 
Jogtudományi Közlöny 2014/9. 
411  41/2012. (XII. 6.) AB 
 
 
documents of the Venice Commission412 referenced here all emphasize the 
notion that respondents were not aware that the aggregated results would 
have an influence on whether a minority self-government would be 
established. [...] However, ...]already before the census was conducted, in 
2010, the government had indicated that census data would play a far 
more substantial role than hitherto; that in essence it would use these as 
the starting point in charting its [minority policy] measures and in setting 
levels of funding." 
As the minority commissioner noted: "By using census data they wish 
to prevent elections from being held in municipalities where the given 
community is not present at all, and voter rolls from becoming 'inflated' as 
a consequence of deliberate actions to abuse the system. But whether 
elections ought to be held cannot be determined solely on the basis of 
census data, since these also include persons who are not entitled to vote 
(e.g. children). Moreover, census data cannot be considered an accurate 
reflection of how large the national minority population of a given 
municipality is, for they rely on voluntary statements concerning sensitive 
information. That is why I think it is important that elections be held – in 
line with the prevailing regulations – in municipalities where the number 
of persons in the voter rolls indicates this. In my assessment, the current 
30 person voter roll does not provide sufficient community legitimacy for 
establishing a representative body; it would be necessary to raise this 
number to ensure legitimacy."413 
It is important to keep in mind Léna Pellandini-Simányi’s observations 
about the census questions concerning ethnic identity: "This method only 
helps to measure how many people consider themselves Roma, which is 
nowhere near identical with how many people are identified as Roma by 
others. The two are not the same. Previous research shows that leaving it 
up to external observers – the interviewer, neighbors, etc. – to determine 
who is Roma will yield a Roma population that is up to 2.5 to 3 times 
larger than the numbers indicated by surveys based on self-identification. 
[…] The results can be distorted by several factors. […A]ccording to 
earlier research, the data reveal fluctuations that cannot be explained by 
demographics [...] presumably because responses depend to a significant 
extent on the prevailing strength of racism, and on whether the respondent 
is confident that his/her answer professing his/her ethnic identity will not 
 





result in further discrimination. [...O]nly a third of persons who are 
identified as Roma by their social environment appear in these data."414 
Nóra Chronowski points out that even though census data show that the 
number of citizens who are members of a national or ethnic minority has 
surged from 313,812 in 2001 to 555,507 in 2011,415 since estimates 
suggest that the Roma minority alone makes up 5-10% of the entire 
population,416 and since roughly a million and a half persons did not make 
a statement concerning their national or ethnic identity, these estimates 
cannot be regarded as exact."417 
 
3.2.4. The active and passive right to vote 
 
It is important to discuss the regulation of the right to vote and the right to 
stand as a candidate in minority elections (also relevant in the context of 
parliamentary representation), which are also handled in a problematic 
manner. Viewed from the perspective of representation theory, the rule 
mandating that minority representatives and candidates must belong to the 
minority is unfounded, for representation itself is but the exercise of the 
decision-making rights of a community of voters by a smaller and more 
operative body. Thus from a voting rights perspective, it appears 
unnecessary to limit the right to stand as a candidate to members of the 
minority community, since a representative does not need to share the 
 
414  Mire (nem) jók a népszámlálás etnikai adatai?, 
http://www.ideaintezet.hu/sites/default/files/Mire_nem_jok_a_nepszamlalas_e
tnikai_adatai_Simanyi_IDEA.pdf 
415  www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tables_regional_00 
416  MAGICZ András (2013): „Re-regulation of National Minority Rights” in HAJAS 
Barnabás – SZABÓ Máté (ed.): Their Shield is the Law. The Ombudsman’s 
Protection for Vulnerable Groups (Budapest: Office of the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights 2013) 27. 
417  Chronowski, Nóra: Alaptörvény és etnicitás – avagy az 
alkotmányozás viharaiban részekre szakadt nemzetünk, (Ethnicity and the 
Fundamental Law: our nation divided in the storm of constitution-making) 
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attributes of those she represents. Auto-representation is not a requirement 
in any serious body that serves as a representative institution. Beyond 
jurisprudential reasons, the prevailing practice also does not indicate a 
reason for excluding a candidate from the electoral procedure if she can 
credibly and successfully persuade voters that they should elect her. Just 
as there is no general requirement that an executive managing an athletic 
association be herself an athlete, or even a former athlete, the 
representative of a local Roma self-government could be a non-Roma 
doctor. Likewise, a member of a national-level nationality self-
government could be a former president of the republic.  
Prohibiting a person who served as the representative of any nationality 
to run on the list of another nationality – which is legitimated by the 
nationality law418– is a radical and unjustifiable restriction of the 
previously broad recognition of the principle of multiple identity 
affiliations, and is incompatible with international legal recommendations. 
The possibility of winning preferential seats, which is a necessary 
concomitant of providing minority representation, inherently implies a 
restriction of equal voting rights. But the particular solution used by the 
legislator also restricts the right to freely nominate candidates and party 
lists. This is in addition to the fact that an unjustifiable condition of auto-
representation and an unnecessary restriction on multiple identity 
affiliations are also part of the effective regulations.  
 
3.3.The role of minority political parties vis-á-vis the institution 
 
Minority political parties are not relevant actors in Hungarian political life, 
and their role in parliamentary representation is subsequently 
insignificant.419 There are several reasons for this. In particular, the 
 
418  Article 11. § (3)  
419  See Dobos, Balázs: The Role of Elections in Minority Contexts: The 
Hungarian Case. In: Nimni Ephraim, Osipov Alexander, Smith David J (eds.): 
The Challenge of Non-Territorial Autonomy: Theory and Practice. Oxford: 
Peter Lang Academic Publishers, 2013. pp. 163-180., Dobos, Balázs (2013): 
Roma political parties in Hungary after 1989. In: Dácz Enikő (ed.): 
Minderheitenfragen in Ungarn und in den Nachbarländernim 20. und 21. 
Jahrhundert.Nomos, Baden-Baden. 279-291., McGarry, Aidan (2009): 




legislative framework for both national (minority) self-governments and 
the parliamentary lists builds on one political entity representing the 13 
recognized communities, and the composition of these bodies presupposes 
an indirect internal political competition among various minority 
organizations – which in practice are following majority political party 
lines, with the major political parties having their “own” minority 
organizations. As mentioned above, elections to minority party lists are 
severely restricted in parliamentary elections and there is no procedural 
option for several minority organizations to compete. 
 
3.4. Influence on decision-making 
 
As argued above, the competence of minority representatives and, even 
more, of minority advocates is severely limited, both by the very 
definition given by the legislator as well as the practical authority of 
majority-led respective parliamentary committees and the speaker to 
define “minority related” issues.  
Although it has not been clearly stated by the legislator, it can be 
inferred that the model is primarily meant to provide a symbolic presence 
for representatives of nationalities, and to create a venue for the 
recognition of their viewpoints, but actual decision-making influence, for 
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4. Dynamics and outcomes: Achievements, failures, unintended 
consequences 
 
Given that we are in the midst of the first parliamentary cycle with the 
new legislation, it is too early to draw conclusions on its achievements. 
We can see that although the worst fears for fraud and abuse of the 
preferential mandates did not materialize in the 2014 elections, or even 
any other unintended consequences, the new regime failed to bring a 
breakthrough in nationality representation and interest-protection. 
Electoral turnout did not indicate an overwhelming need or support for the 
institution. Even the two largest minorities failed to gain the required 
votes for a preferential mandate, and minority advocates had not been 
particularly active in parliamentary work either.  
By April 2016, within 23 months, the committee of nationalities,420 
consisting of all the advocates, submitted six motions421 and co-sponsored 
another 43.422 All four amendment motions (electoral law, the minority 
rights act, the budget and provisions on the advocates’ funding) received 
government support and were adopted by parliament. The committee held 
46 meetings (the shortest was 10 minutes, the longest almost four hours 
long). Its enforcement sub-committee met three times, the other two six 
times, for 151, 556, and 538 minutes respectively. 
The activity of the advocates varied.423 Romanian advocate Traján 
Kreszta never once spoke during the plenary sessions. Félix Farkas, vice-
chair of the committee and advocate for the Roma community, only spoke 
once when he addressed the budget subchapter on minority expenditures 
 
420  The committee established three sub-committees on minority rights 
enforcement; self-government, foreign affairs and budget; and education and 
culture.  
421  These included proposed amendments to the minority rights act, the 
electoral procedure law, the budget, and the law on national trademarks. Two 
were withdrawn and resubmitted. 
422  For example 13 on budget, 4 on the report of the reports of the 
ombudspersons, 6 on education and on trademarked products, 2 on census, on 
petty criminal law, on the situation of nationalities, on the national cultural 
fund, on consular protection, on museums, and on curtailing bureaucracy, 1 on 
the report of the national audit, and on parliament. 
423  See the webpage of the parliament, http://www.parlament.hu/szoszolok-listaja 
bla3 
 
and remained quite loyal and appreciative towards the government. The 
Ukrainian Jaroszlava Hartyányi only spoke once as well. She praised the 
activity and the diligence of their committee, which at the time, in fact, 
was the third most active in the House. She also commended the 
successful budget amendment, which provided additional resources to 
underfinanced regions. Ruthenian advocates Laokratisz Koranisz Greek 
and Vera Giricz spoke twice on trademark, registration and education, and 
the ombudspersons’ report, respectively. Croatian advocate Mihály Hepp 
and Polish advocate Lászlóné Csúcs Polish took the floor three times (on 
trademark, census, and on the good Hungarian-Polish interstate 
relationships, respectively). Armenian advocate Tamás Turgyán spoke 
five times, twice in the budget debate and once on curtailing bureaucracy 
around minority theatre funds, but mostly on the deterioration of the 
Armenian-Hungarian state relationship. He also criticized the 
government’s refugee-policy. Slovenian advocade Erika Kissné Köles 
spoke seven times. Bulgarian advocate Szimeon Varga 11 times – on 
education, budget and the report on the situation of minorities, 
respectively. Slovakian advocate and chair and the committee János Fuzik 
spoke 12 times: on the minority rights act, on budget, on the law on 
parliament, and on the ombuds reports. In other speeches, he praised the 
government’s refugee-policy and international coopoerartion in building 
fences. German adcovate Imre Ritter was the most active, speaking 26 
times (11 on budget, two on the report on minorities, three on registration 
and education, two on state audit, on petty offences, and on cultural funds, 
one on the minority rights act). Once he questioned the prime minister on 
the government’s restrictive refugee policy, and on a speech held in 
Strasbourg where he claimed that Hungary has never been a multicultural 
society and cultural homogeneity is a value that should be maintained. 
We can conclude that the advocate committee and sub-committees sit 
regularly, but are not very active in the legislative process. The 
government and the House have supported most of their motions. The 
advocates are also not very active in the parliamentary and political 
advocacy work. Only two formal questions on instruments for the political 
control and accountability of the government were submitted. Most 
interventions concerned the debates of bills, particularly around the 
budget. Besides the many interventions consisting of government 
appraisal, a significant number regarded issues that are actually outside the 
scope of the minority rights law, such as inter-state relations (between 
their home and kin states), refugee policy, and consular protections. This 
last point suggests that this newly introduced institution succeeded in 
 
 
providing a forum for the representatives (advocates) of minorities to 
make their voices heard in public in whichever issue they consider 
relevant.  
 
5. Beneficiaries, reactions and critics 
 
As mentioned above, it is too early to have a deep-running comprehensive 
overview of the new regulation, but it is safe to say that no group can be 
identified as a clear beneficiary besides members of the minority elite who 
have been affiliated with mainstream majority party politics. Also, the 
newly established institution failed to generate a substantive political 
debate or discussion: reactions as well as criticism remained within those 






The representation of minorities in parliaments can serve a number of 
goals: power-sharing, the aim for equality through recognition,424 “real” 
substantive representation, or a cover story for other policy goals, such as 
advancing rights of the diaspora, et cetera. This chapter argued that the 
Hungarian model appears to be inconsistent, as it does not set forth clear 
policy goals, nor does it answer documented minority demands. 
Subsequently it cannot and does not seem to be able to fulfill its goals. 
While it carries several risks for potential fraud and abuse, it also suffers 
from theoretical and procedural weaknesses, such as unclear policy 
objectives, a constitutionally controversial imbalance in the right to vote, 
and a problematic approach to passive and active voting rights. Also, the 
parliamentary representation of nationalities carries the theoretical, 
political, and constitutional stigma of long held deficiencies in the 
Hungarian model of defining the recognized minorities and affiliation 
criteria.  
As argued above, in the Hungarian context, the following arguments 
were raised in favour of the parliamentary representation of minorities: (i) 
Though it never really entered into effect because it was never fully 
specified in the form of concrete electoral law provisions, pursuant to the 
May 25th, 2010 amendment of the constitution,425 parliamentary 
representation is an acquired right. (ii) The recommendations and reports 
of numerous international organizations and the Constitutional Court have 
determined that a constitutional omission has occurred here through the 
failure to enact such a solution. Moreover, this constitutional requirement 
was already present in the previous constitution. (iii) The Hungarian 
minorities and the Minority Commissioner relentlessly emphasized this 
point. (iv) This is an efficient and necessary instrument of legal protection 
 
424  See for example Christopher McCrudden - Sacha Prechal The 
Concepts of Equality and Non-Discrimination in Europe: A practical approach 
European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality 
Christopher, European Commission Directorate-General for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Unit G.2, 2009 
425  http://www.kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/MK10085.pdf 
 
 
and the representation of interests. (v) This type of legal protection and 
interest representation provides a model that is ready for export: It is a 
form of realizing the underlying objectives that set standards that we can 
also expect the neighboring countries to comply with.  
The following arguments were raised against the parliamentary 
representation of minorities: (i) The notion that the previous constitution 
contained an obligation to provide for the parliamentary representation of 
minorities rests on a mistaken reading of the document. Based on a 
Constitutional Court decision rendered before the adoption of the minority 
law, a plausible reading of the previous Constitution suggested that a 
legally established mode of alternative political representation (realized 
specifically in the form of minority self-governments) was sufficient to 
comply with constitutional standards. Correspondingly, though minority 
self-governments are suboptimal solutions on account of ethno-corruption 
and other deficiencies they are fraught with, they nevertheless undeniably 
constitute acquired rights, and since they happen to comply with 
constitutional requirements concerning political representation, it would 
be logical to retain them in the new constitutional framework, for 
otherwise the latter would genuinely realize a step back in terms of legal 
protections, more accurately in terms of providing special rights. It is also 
important to mention that international organizations did not condemn 
Hungary on the grounds that this particular solution fails to live up to the 
relevant international expectations (in this context we cannot speak of 
standards or generally established practices). Instead, based on an 
interpretation of the Constitutional Court's decision, they called Hungary 
to task for failing to comply with its voluntary commitments. 
 (ii) The phenomenon of ethno-corruption and the abuses experienced 
in minority elections counsels caution the introduction of such an 
institution, primarily because the notion of regulating minority registration 
and the free choice of one's identity is not supported by either minorities 
or by the majority of the political elite. A cause of major concern is that 
based on the prevailing rules, politicians belonging to the ethnic majority 
could be elected to parliament as representatives of the currently identified 
thirteen minorities, which would constitute an abuse of minority privileges 
and could significantly influence the election outcome. Though the 2014 
election results have not validated this concern – none of the national 
minorities won a preferential seat in Parliament (a fact that could also be 
construed as a key critique of the existing regulations, for it seems that in 
its current form this institution is incapable of realizing the legislative 
objective underlying its creation) – in future elections the existence of a 
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13-member faux minority faction among the 199 MPs could significantly 
alter election outcomes. This is especially a cause for concern because, as 
it was shown, the persistent practice of ethno-business and the inadequacy 
of the relevant regulations will continue to allow for this possibility in the 
future.  
(iii) There are serious theoretical concerns about minority 
representation. (iv) The fact that minorities and the minority commissioner 
have relentlessly embraced this position does not imply that there is an 
automatic obligation to accept the underlying arguments. Their mandates 
would naturally lead them towards such a position. 
(v) An approach that places minority law in the service of diaspora 
politics uses the former to advance objectives associated with the latter, or 
in other words, uses minority law to justify its own policies in 
representing the interests of ethnic Hungarians abroad. This may be 
indubitably useful and politically justifiable, but is nevertheless hardly 
defensible on jurisprudential or moral grounds. Though several such 
arguments were voiced during the parliamentary debate on the 1993 
Minority Act, we have never officially encountered such efforts to justify 
legislative proposals concerning minority law.  
The constitutional language does not specify the means of 
parliamentary “presence,” so the Hungarian legislator could have chosen 
several, constitutionally and politically less controversial models. 
Examples include the right of national minority self-governments or other 
minority organizations to initiate legislation (which could be extended in 
certain cases to motions for parliamentary decisions or plenary debates), 
the broadening (and not limiting which the 2011 legislation actually done) 
of the competences of the specialized minority ombudsman (parliamentary 
commissioner), or even a political agreement between the parties that 
formally lays down the rules for ethnic/national minority quotas that must 
be respected in compiling the slate of each party's candidates.  
Nóra Chronowski points out that even though the new regulations allow 
all national minorities to delegate an advocate to Parliament, this could 
also have been achieved if all the national-level national minority self-
governments delegated advocates outside the system of parliamentary 
elections, without a subset of voting-age citizens having to forgo the 
possibility of expressing their political preferences. Those citizens namely 
sacrifice their party list votes in the interest of a representation scheme 
that is embodied by the institution of the advocate, and hence the 
integration of this system into the electoral system is a specious solution 
 
 
that does not create a genuine opportunity for achieving the parliamentary 
representation of national minorities.426  
Overall, the legislator unduly restricted the principle of equal voting 
rights, especially in light of the unbroken string of domestic practices 
involving abuses of minority elections. Though the time bomb of ethno-
corruption failed to explode in the 2014 elections, all the necessary 
preconditions for a future explosion are given. Moreover, in addition to 
legislative choices that are difficult to justify in terms of how they handle 
multiple identities and the right to stand as a candidate, the legislator has 
introduced a model that will in all probability effectively limit the right to 
win a preferential mandate to the Roma and German national minorities, 
while the other national minorities are practically limited to the institution 
of the advocate – which, incidentally, is unproblematic in terms of both 
representation theory and practical application. It is too early to assess 
how this institution works. In any case, the advocates' rather modest 
activities in the first months hardly justify the hopes vested in this 
institution (as an instrument of representing the interests of national 
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A Tool for an Effective Participation in Decision-making 
Process? The Case of the National Councils of National 
Minorities in Serbia 
 
12. Introductory remarks 
This chapter focuses on the current Serbian legislation on 
national minority councils and minority rights in order to provide 
a thorough analyses of the main theoretical and practical issues 
around effective minority participation. The relevant domestic 
acts are compared to international and European legal standards 
and the relevant international jurisprudence based thereupon. 
Additionally, the analyses considers field research data collected 
through an OTKA Research Project in Novi Pazar, a traditional 
center of the Sandzak Region (of Serbia),427 where I was able to 
speak with people working for the Bosniak National Council.428 
The questionnaire used with the Bosniak National Council was 
also sent to the rest of the national minority councils of Serbia, 
though only a couple of people repsponded.429 It also was 
possible to identify the views of certain prominent ethnic 
Hungarian scholars living and working in Serbia on issues 
regarding the effective participation of minorities.430 
Furthermore, this article does not thoroughly examine  the 
historical evolution of the relevant Serbian legislation, though 
 
427 The so-called Sandzak was partitioned between Montenegro and Serbia in 2006 
when the former federal unit of Serbia and Montenegro left the federated State. 
Interestingly, the Serbian part of the Sandzak became more Bosniak dominated 
from the aspect of inter-ethnic proportions. Bosniak leaders working in Novi 
Pazar are of the view that this division worsened the Bosniak minority’s 
possibilities, especially because some settlements lost their traditional markets 
due to the border. Furthermore, the Bosniak community became smaller in terms 
of absolute value.  
428 I would like to thank Mrs. Vasvija Gusinac, vice-president of the Bosniak National 
Council, for responding to my questions.  
429 I am very grateful to Sasa Radic, Slovenian National Council and Ivan Ušumović, 
secretary for foreign affairs of the Croatian National Council in this respect.  
430 Writings of Tamás Korhecz and Katinka Beretka are to be mentioned here.  
 
 
certain aspects will be highlighted.431  
Effective participation of national minorities was an issue even 
in the communist Yugoslavia, though not from a human rightist 
perspective. Although Yugoslavia ratified the minority rights 
related International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as 
early as 1971,432 the participation of members of minorities was 
only granted either in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia by 
recruiting cadres from distinct nationalities, or through the 
autonomous districts of the State.433 Two separate autonomous 
units – though lacking significant powers – were established by 
the People’s Assembly of the People’s Republic of Serbia in 
1945 and recognized later by the 1946 Constitution, namely the 
Autonomous Oblast of Kosovo-Metohija and the Autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina.434 Interestingly, the Yugoslav partisans 
pledged to grant autonomy to the Italians of Istria and the 
Bosniaks of the Sandzak in 1943 as well, but these promises 
remained unfulfilled.435 The republics could potentially establish 
autonomous provinces in geographic areas that had distinctive 
national characteristics or other distinguishing features.436 The 
1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia significantly upgraded the legal 
statuses of the two automous territories, almost placing them on 
the level of republics, though the decision-making process at the 
federal level was ineffective.437 The parliament of the Federal 
 
431 For a brief but proper overview on the historical evolution oft he Serbian minority 
rights.related legislation see: Korhecz,Tamás: National Minority Councils in 
Serbia. In: Tove H. Malloy – Alexander Osipov – Vizi, Balázs (Eds.): Managing 
Diversity Through Non-Territorial Autonomy. Assessing Advantages, 
Deficiencies, and Risks. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015. 72-75. 
432https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en#1 (02/03/2016)  
433 Shoup, Paul: Yugoslavia’s National Minorities under Communism. Slavic Review 
Vol. 22. No. 1. (March) 1963. 75. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Ibid. See footnote 42.  
436 See article 111 of the 1963 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.  
437 Silvo Devetak: The Dissolution of Multi-ethnic States: Yugoslavia. In: Kumar 
Rupeshinge – Valery A. Tishkov (Eds.): Ethnicity and Power in the 




Republic of Yugoslavia – in fact the legislature of Serbia and 
Montenegro – adopted a new constitution in 1992, right after the 
secession of some of its former republics. However, the new 
federal constitution no longer contained provisions on 
autonomous provinces438 and the issue of autonomous territories 
was regulated at a lower level and less extensively from this 
moment on, so that by the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of 
Serbia instead.439 Only the preamble of the Constitutional 
Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro made a 
reference to the existence of two autonomous provinces in 
Serbia. After the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro, the 
current Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was adopted. This 
constitution rebalanced and refurbished the territorial 
organization of the State by strengthening the autonomous 
provinces vis-à-vis the central government, expressly 
recognizing certain participatory rights of national minorities, 
including the possibility to establish national councils. Though 
the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties440 
and the Act on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of 
National Minorities441 – both adopted in 2002 – were the first 
important pieces of domestic legislation to pave the way for 
realizing the right of participation of individuals belonging to 
national minorities, this possibility gained constitutional 
recognition only in 2006. Representatives of minority groups had 
no chance to take part in the elaboration of the 2002 Act, though 
with some exceptions.442 Three years after the current 
constitution entered into force, the Serbian parliament enacted 
the current Act on National Councils of National Minorities. 
Although national councils of national minorities existed 
 
438 See the text of the 1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: 
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Yugoslav_Const_1992.htm/ (04/03/2016)  
439 See especially Title VI. of the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.  
440 See article 44 of the the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties.  
441 See Part IV of the Act on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National 
Minorities.  
442 This includes the representatives of the Hungarian community whose main political 
party was a member of the then governing coalition.  
 
 
between 2002 and 2009, it was not until the adoption of the Act 
on National Councils of National Minorities that they were 
elected directly as a rule. It is important to note that the different 
constitutions of Serbia and its predecessors recognized minority 
rights only around certain language issues. The 2009 Act on 
National Councils of National Minorities (for short: the 2009 
Act) is the primary analysis in the following pages, which 
present the points of views from both public international (and 
domestic) law and the opinions of minority councils. The 
importance of National Councils in realizing the effective 
participation of persons belonging to national minorities has been 
recognized by the Advisory Committee of the Framework 
Convention for the protection of National Minorities as follows: 
[I]n practice, national minority councils play an 
overwhelmingly dominant role in the realisation of minority 
rights in Serbia, having in effect become the main channel of 
participation for national minorities.443 
13. A Brief Summary of the Key Provisions of the 2009 Act444 
 
The 2009 Act regulates both the procedure of electing national 
councils and also their composition. National councils have legal 
personality under Serbian law and are elected either directly by 
citizens or indirectly through an electoral assembly. National 
minorities are entitled to choose either the direct or the indirect 
method of electing the members of national councils, but it is 
mandatory to hold direct elections if more than half of the 
members of the given national minority signs up for the electoral 
list in question before the elections. In addition, the 2009 Act 
governs the competences of national councils. As a rule, each 
national council has general and special competences. General 
 
443 Third Opinion on Serbia adopted on 28 November 2013. para. 196. 
444 For an unofficial English translation of the 2009 Act see: 
www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/ekspertske%2520misije/protection_of_minor
ities/law_on_national_councils.pdf/ (06/13/2016) Please note, the original 
version of the act can be accessed through this link, so that the text before the 
interference of the Serbian Constitution Court.  
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competences include organizational powers such as the right to 
adopt and amend the statute of the national council or to adopt 
the financial plan and similar budgetary documents of a similar 
nature. National councils are also allowed to manage their own 
properties and to establish institutions, associations, funds, and 
business organisations working in different fields. Moreover, 
they have some symbolic powers, such as the possibility to 
define their own symbols, make proposals on the official 
holidays and emblems of national minorities, or award 
recognitions. The Constitutional Court’s verdict declared some 
parts of the article referring to the general competences as null 
and void, including the possibility to initiate the procedure of the 
Constitutional Court itself. National councils still however have 
the power to access ombudsman-like institutions when a 
violation of the rights of the members of national minorities 
occurs. Finally, they can influence the legislation and also the 
implementation of an act and other regulations in the fields of 
culture, education, information, and the official use of language 
and script. Otherwise, these topics are the main and exclusive 
areas in which national councils are allowed to carry out their 




14.  A Critical Approach to the 2009 Act on National Councils of 
National Minorities and the Constitutional Court’s 
Assessment Relating Thereto 
The 2006 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (hereinafter: the 
Constitution) expressly recognizes in its article 75 paragraph 2 
the right of the members of national minorities: 
to take take part in decision-making or decide 
independently on certain issues related to their culture, 
education, information and official use of languages and 
script through their collective rights in accordance with 
the law. 
Besides, “the right to elect their national councils in order to 
 
 
exercise the right to self-governance in the fields of culture, 
education, information and official use of their language and 
script, in accordance with the law”445 has also been 
acknowledged. Consequently, the right of members of national 
minorities to participate in public life is constitutionally 
recognized and guaranteed in Serbia. Based on the paragraph 
cited above, the parliament of Serbia adopted the Act on 
National Councils of National Minorities in 2009. The question 
that is being raised by the codification process of the 
aforementioned act is the following: Who should decide on the 
issue of forms of participation? Few international documents 
have tried to answer this question so far. The Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities signed in 
1995 (hereinafter: FCNM) under the auspieces of the Council of 
Europe states only that the signatories  
“shall create the conditions necessary for the effective 
participation (…)”.446  
The FCNM’s explanatory report clarifies the matter. 
Accordingly, States  
could promote (…) consultation with these persons, by 
means of appropriate procedures and, in particular, 
through their representative institutions, when they are 
contemplating legislation or administrative measures 
likely to affect them directly (…) to create the necessary 
conditions (…).447  
 
445 See Article 75 paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. 
446 See Article 15 of the FCNM. Although having no specific legal relevance 
especially from the point of view of this chapter, it is worth noting the official 
Hungarian text promulgated in an Act of the Hungarian parliament does not 
contain the word “effective” before the term “participation.” Though only the 
English and the French versions of the FCNM are being considered as authentic, 
this translation mistake can mislead the Hungarian authorities when interpreting 
the treaty. Certainly the principal legislative body of Hungary is not authorized to 
amend unilaterally the text of a promulgated international treaty however with 
the only exception of translation mistakes. See Article 8 paragraph 2 of the 
Hungarian Act No. CXXX of 2010 on Legislation in this respect. Oppositely, the 
official Serbian version of FCNM contains the proper expression “efikasno 
učešće” that stands for “effective participation/participation effective.” 
447 See p. 80 of the Explanatory Report. 
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This means that representatives of minority groups should be 
consulted for any draft act on the issue of participation of 
members of national minorities in public life before it is adopted 
by the legislature. Similarly, the 1999 Lund Recommendations of 
the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities refer 
indirectly to the necessity for cooperation between governments 
and minorities when a new piece of legislation on participation is 
to be enacted.448 Alan Phillips is of the view that a drafting 
process on minority participation without involving minorities 
themselves is contrary to FCNM’s article 15.449 Furthermore, a 
recent report elaborated by Ferenc Kalmár (hereinafter: Kalmár’s 
report) that was presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe dealt with the issue analysed above. 
According to Kalmár’s report:  
[M]embers of a society should be able not only to 
formulate their interests, but also to decide, either 
directly or indirectly, the methods and ways they would 
like to use to formulate their interests with due respect for 
democratic principles and the rule of law. In my view, the 
State bodies should involve representatives of the 
minorities concerned in the decision-making process on 
possible ways and methods of participation (Emphasis 
added).450  
Contrarily, the Human Rights Committee interprets article 25 – 
which embodies the right to participate in public affairs as a 
human right – of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights of 1966 as not providing the a directly affected 
group the right to choose the modalities of participation.451 
 
448 See p. 5 of the 1999 Lund Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities. 
449 Alan Phillips: Participation and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). In: Zelim A. Skurbaty (Ed.): 
Beyonf a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy? Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005. 308.  
450 Report Doc. 13445. 24 March 2014. Para 57.  
451 Martin Scheinin: The Right to Self-Determination under the Covenant on Civil and 




Turning back to the elaboration of the 2009 Act, the respondents 
of the questionnaire were of the view that the representatives of 
minorities were involved in the drafting process. However, some 
of them proposed amendments after it was taken into effect, but 
the State authorities rejected these additional initiations. The 
major Hungarian political party was then a member of the 
governing coalition and it was thus able to effectively influence 
the substance of the 2009 Act.452 In addition, the 2009 Act was 
amended by the parliament during the past few years and the 
ideas of the minority communities on these proposed 
amendments were not taken into consideration. Numerically 
larger minority groups are in a much better position in regards to 
their possibilities to influence minority rights related domestic 
legislation since they are represented in the Serbian parliament 
more or less permanently. Representatives of minority 
communities agree that the 2009 Act was a significant step 
towards improving and guaranteeing minority rights in Serbia, 
but the implementation of some of its components is not proper 
enough in practice. In the opinion of one of the members of the 
Bosniak National Council for instance, the 2009 Act itself is only 
of a declarative character. Furthermore, the lack of an effective 
sanctioning system means that the authorities violate the 2009 
Act’s provisions many times.  
After its adoption, the 2009 Act has been challenged by several 
applicants at the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia 
claiming that some of its articles were allegedly contrary to the 
2006 Constitution of Serbia.453 The Constitutional Court spent 
some three years examining the applications and it finally 
delivered its verdict in 2014. According to the Constitutional 
Court of Serbia:  
 
Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination. Institute for Human Rights, 
Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo, 2000. 187. 
452 Korhecz, Tamás: Magyar autonómia Szerbiában. A programcéltól a hatályos 
törvényig. Pro Minoritate. 2010. Tavasz. 70. 
453 Korhecz, Tamás: A nemzeti kisebbségek autonómiájának korlátai a szerbiai 
alkotmánybíróság olvasatában. A nemzeti tanácsokról szóló törvény 
alkotmányossága. Létünk. 2014/különszám. 53. 
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the national councils of national minorities have the 
character of a special (non-state) body or organisation 
constituting an institutional form through which the 
collective rights of national minorities (the right to self-
government) are exercised in the constitutionally 
established areas of social life that are important for the 
preservation of the identity of national minorities 
(culture, education, information and official use of 
languages and scripts), in the way that certain public 
powers to participate in decision-making or to decide 
independently on certain issues in these areas are 
delegated to national councils, whilst taking into account, 
of course, the nature of the power that is being 
delegated.454  
Since national councils are non-state bodies, the Constitutional 
Court stated that they could not have comptenecies in a legal 
sense.455 The right to representation in public life for the 
members of national minorities was significantly diminished by 
the Court’s decision. The original version of the 2009 Act gave 
national councils competence in initializing and proposing new 
legislative or other acts of a regulatory character in fields 
relevant to minorities. The original wording of the Act’s Article 
10 paragraph 10 states:  
[…] the national council shall independently […] 
participate in the preparation of regulations and submit 
motions for amendments and supplements to regulations 
prescribing the national minority rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution in the fields of culture, education, 
information and official use of language and script,” and 
similarly and initially paragraph 11 added they shall 
“submit motions for the adoption of special regulations 
and provisional measures in the domains in which the 
 
454 Assessment of Constitutionality: Published Decision of the Constitutional Court 
Determining the Unconstitutionality of Provisions of the Law on National 
Councils of National Minorities – Official Gazette of RS, no. 20/2014 Section V. 
455 Op. cit. Section VI. P. 2. 
 
 
right to self-government is accomplished in order to 
achieve full equality between the members of the national 
minority and the citizens belonging to the majority 
population; […].  
Though the term ‘regulation’ was considered by the Court as too 
vague since it covered  
a wide range of general legal acts adopted by the 
authorities of the Republic of Serbia, autonomous 
provinces and local self-government units – from the 
laws and other legal acts adopted by the National 
Assembly, through secondary legislation in the narrower 
sense adopted by the Government and public 
administration authorities, statutes, decisions and other 
general acts adopted by the authorities of autonomous 
provinces and local self-government units, by-laws 
adopted by regulatory bodies and other holders of public 
authority in exercising public powers, to the by-laws 
whose adoption is within the purview of independent and 
autonomous state bodies such as, for example, 
Ombudsman, the High Judicial Council or the 
Constitutional Court itself.456  
In the view of the Constitutional Court, the Serbian Constitution 
enumerates the propounders of regulatory acts exhaustively, and 
national councils of national minorities are not mentioned therein 
explicitly.457 In spite of this reasoning, the Court did not find the 
provisions in question to be contrary to the constitution because 
in the Court’s view, they should have been interpreted together 
with some articles of the 2002 Act on the Protection of the 
Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities, which  
“provides only the right of the national council to address 
the authorities (the bodies of the government, 
autonomous province and local self-government units) in 
respect of all issues affecting the rights and status of 
national minorities,” without the right to participate in 
 
456 Op. cit. VI. 3.2. 
457 See article 107 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.  
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preparing and proposing amendments to regulations.458  
Interestingly, the Constitutional Court of Serbia deduces 
relatively ‘soft’ minority participation rights from one of the 
paragraphs of the Constitution459 interpreted in line with article 
15 of the FCNM.460 According to Serbia’s Constitutional Court, 
the Constitution expressly makes a clear distinction on 
participation in a decision-making vis-à-vis the independent 
forms of decision-making regarding persons belonging to 
national minorities.461 Accordingly, “participation in decision-
making,” as opines the Constitutional Court, simply engulfes 
consultative rights that are enjoyed by representatives of persons 
belonging to minorities without having “tougher” tools such as 
practising a kind of “veto power” in a decision-making 
process.462 In line with this reasoning, the Court found the 
preliminary preconditional approval of electing “the director of 
the institution where the majority of classes are taught in a 
national minority language”463 to be unconstitutional. Quite 
similarly, the Constitutional Court of Serbia nullified article 25 
of the 2009 Act in which the State’s legislature recognized the 
National Concils’ right to “submit their proposals, initiatives and 
opinions regarding the issues falling within their competences to 
the National Assembly, the Government or other State bodies 
and special organisations.”464 Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the 
same article stipulated that “[a]n opinion shall be requested from 
a national council by the bodies referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article before consideration and adoption of decisions on the 
 
458 Assessment of Constitutionality: Published Decision of the Constitutional Court 
Determining the Unconstitutionality of Provisions of the Law on National 
Councils of National Minorities – Official Gazette of RS, no. 20/2014 VI. 3.2. 
459 See Article 75 paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.  
460 Assessment of Constitutionality: Published Decision of the Constitutional Court 
Determining the Unconstitutionality of Provisions of the Law on National 




464 See the original wording of the 2009 Act’s Article 25. paragraph 1.  
 
 
issues in the fields referred to in Article 2465 of this Act,” which 
was also considered by the Court as contrary to the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court first interpreted the undoubtedly vague 
term of “other state bodies” as meaning “public administration 
authorities.”466 The Constitutional Court assessed the right 
incorporated to this article, which indeed seemed to be somewhat 
similar to the status of propunding legislative and other acts, and 
found it unconstitutional since article 107 of the Constitution 
contained the exhaustive list of propounders.467 Moreover, the 
right to initiate legislative measures can properly be practised by 
consulting with those ministries inline of the view of the 
Constitutional Court.468 Article 25 paragraph 1 contained the 
word “proposal” but not the term “act” or “law.” In my opinion, 
the contested paragraph of article 25 of the 2009 Act was not 
necessarily contrary to article 107 paragraph 1 of the 
Constitution of Serbia, and the Constitutional Court was a bit 
rigorous in relating to this issue. The difference between the 
status of constitutionally recognized propounders of laws and 
other entities is that while the proposals of the former category 
result in a procedure which is mandated to start when the 
proposal has been filed, the latter causes no similar 
consequences. Furthermore, and referring to the question of 
taking part in the decision-making process versus independent 
decision making, the differentia specifica of these two categories 
needs to be examined. With independent decision making, 
usually the decision-maker has the right to invite others to 
participate but is not obligated to do so. “Participation” on the 
other hand implies a requirement to involve other actors in the 
decision-making process. When someone has the right to a “veto 
power” to hinder the decision-making process, it means simply 
 
465 Fields include: culture, education, information and official use of language and 
script. 
466 Assessment of Constitutionality: Published Decision of the Constitutional Court 
Determining the Unconstitutionality of Provisions of the Law on National 
Councils of National Minorities – Official Gazette of RS, no. 20/2014 VI. 13. 




that the room of manoveur of the decision-maker is not 
unlimited, but is independent within certain limitations. 
Unlimitedness and independence are overlapping but not 
identical categories. Every independent decision-maker has 
limits stemming from law or other sources. Since the “veto 
power” of an entity is supposedly compatible with the concept of 
shared decision-making, some additional parts of the Serbian 
Constitutional Court’s reasoning should be reviewed. According 
to the Court, article 15 of the FCNM suggests that “effective 
participation” only covers cases in which the decision-maker has 
to consult with others when formulating an opinion on a final 
decision. Indeed, the signatory States of FCNM “enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation in how to approach its aim of promoting 
the effective participation of persons belonging to national 
minorities in public affairs.”469 Moreover, the Advisory 
Committee of the FCNM, which has the role to monitor the 
application of the treaty’s rules, emphasises the importance of 
consultation mechanisms470 when speaking about non-territorial 
arrangements such as the Serbian system of national councils. 
This also means that the Advisory Committee rather prefers the 
procedural aspects of effective participation vis-à-vis material 
ones.471 The Advisory Committee’s preference does not mean 
that some other possible variations of participation would 
necessarily be contrary to article 15 of the FCNM, since effective 
participation in public affairs cannot be restricted merely to 
consultative rights. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee 
acknowledges that “mere consultation does not constitute a 
sufficient mechanism for ensuring effective participation (…)”472 
and “if advisory or consultative bodies are established ([P]arties 
should ensure that) they represent national minorities in an 
 
469 Markku Suksi: Effective Participation of Minorities in Public Affairs – European 
Norms and Praxis Evaluated in Light of the Lund Recommendations. In:  
470 Markku Suksi: Ibid. 
471 Marrku Suksi: Ibid. 
472 See the Preamble and paragraph 71. of the Commentary on the Effective 
Participation of Persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social and 
Economic Life and Public Affairs. Adopte on 27 February 2008.  
 
 
adequate manner.”473 The FCNM’s Explanatory Report contains 
a non-exhaustive list474 relating to this matter. The real issue is 
whether or not the original wording of the 2009 Act’s relevant 
articles was compatible with article 15 of the FCNM. Since the 
aim of article 15 of the FCNM is to “encourage real equality 
between persons belonging to national minorities and those 
forming part of the majority,” according to the Explanatory 
Report, the most important benchmark on measuring the 
“effectiveness” of a participatory form is if the possibilities 
attached thereto are proper enough to reach real equality between 
the two categories of indiviudals mentioned above. ‘Real 
equality’ does not simply mean equality under the law, but 
represents something more, including the opportunity to 
substantively influence the decisions that affect him/her.475 Quite 
similarly, the Advisory Committee stated in its “thematic 
commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging 
to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and 
public affairs” that “State Parties should also ensure that 
participation of minorities has a substantial influence on 
decisions which are taken, and that there is, as far as possible, a 
 
473 Rainer Hofmann: The Work of the Advisory Committe under the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, with particular Emphasis 
on the Case of Germany. In: Martin Scheinin – Reetta Toivanen (Eds.): 
Rethinking Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights. Institute for Human Rights, 
Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo, German Institute for Human Rights, 
Berlin, 2004. 83. 
474 See the phrase: “inter alia” in this respect. For the possible modalities of effective 
participation relating to the article 2. paragraph 2. of the UN General Assembly’s 
resolution 47/135 on the „Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities see: Kristian Myntti: The 
Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination and Effective Participation. 
In: (Eds.) Pekka Aikio – Martin Scheinin: Operationalizing the Right of 
Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination. Institute for Human Rights, Åbo 
Akademi University, Turku/Åbo, 2000. 127. 
475 Similarly, in the case of the ILO Convention (No. 169.) Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries adopted in 1989, effective participation 
means “the opportunity to have a real impact on the decisions taken in questions 




shared ownership of the decisions taken.”476 Joseph Marko 
opines, “instruments of participation (…) range on a continuum 
of ‘effectiveness’ of influence in decision-making from 
membership (…) to absolute veto powers.”477 Both consultative 
rights and veto power are possible instruments of participation, 
though the former is less effective than the latter.“Veto rights can 
usually be invoked only in relation to legal acts concerning 
exclusively the rights and status of persons belonging to national 
minorities”478 in the view of the Advisory Committee. In 
conclusion, the Constitutional Court’s reasoning on this issue 
seems to be ill founded. Certainly the parliament of Serbia could 
have decided when adopting the original version of the 2009 Act 
that it conferred the National Councils only with consultative 
rights, but instead it provided stronger powers to them, which the 
Constitutional Court assessed as unconstitutional. In my 
consideration, the Court’s restricted interpretation can 
surprisingly be against the Constitution of Serbia since the 
Serbian fundamental law in its article 16 paragraph 2 expressly 
recognizes the “[g]enerally accepted rules of international law” 
as being “an integral part of the legal system in the Republic of 
Serbia and they are applied directly.” The only important 
question in this respect is if the principle of acquired or vested 
rights (droits acquis/erworbene Rechte) could have relevance in 
this sense. If that principle is acknowledged as being a general 
principle of law, the answer is in the positive. A proper analysis 
on the exact status of this principle would certainly exceed the 
scope of this text, but some initial observations can be made. In 
its judgement Concerning certain German interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
concluded the “principle of respect for vested rights, a principle 
 
476 ACFC/31DOC(2008)001. 19. 
477 Joseph Marko: The Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Protection of 
National Minorities and the Advisory Committee’s Thematic Commentary on 
Effective Participation. In: Marc Weller (Ed.): Political Participation of 
Minorities. A Commentary of International Standards and Practice. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009. 239-240. 
478 ACFC/31DOC (2008)001. 98. 
 
 
which, as the Court has already had occasion to observe, forms 
part of generally accepted international law (…).”479 Although it 
is true, this statement was made in line with issues relating to 
private property (property rights, land laws, et cetera) of 
foreigners. Thus the principle of acquired rights has its origins in 
private law that expanded gradually to certain public law related 
relations,480 like labour laws481 or social security rights482 over 
time. The International Court of Justice confirmed the principle’s 
primarily private law character in its Northern Cameroons 
judgement of 1963.483 Certainly when talking about public 
international legal matters, the principle of acquired rights has its 
strongest underpinnings in questions related to state 
succession.484 F.V. Garcia Amador, then special rapporteur of the 
International Law Commission, dealt with the principle of the 
respect of acquired rights in his fourth report on the issue of state 
responsibility. But his report was restricted only to private, or at 
best, mixed rights of individuals.485 Despite its original character, 
which is economic in nature, the principle of respecting 
acquired/vested rights is being recognized as having some 
 
479  Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A, No.7, p.42. 
480 See in this repsect: Pierre A Lalive: The Doctrine of Acquired Rights. In: Bender 
(Ed.), Rights and duties of private investors aborad - International and 
comparative law center, New York, 1965. pp. 145-200. 
481 Quite early, the German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) declared in its judgement 
in 1932 based on the Weimar Constitution of 1919, that it was not possible to 
reduce the salary of civil servants for it was an acquired right. Köztisztviselői 
szerzett jogok. Jogtudományi közlöny. 1932. 8. szám. 52. 
482 The substance of the principle of acquired rights is not sufficiently clarified by the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, but it means certain limitations regarding social 
rights. Takács, Albert: A szociális jogok. In: Halmai, Gábor – Tóth, Gábor Attila: 
Emberi jogok. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2008. 831-832. 
483 Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 2 December 1963: I.C. J. Reports 1963 p. 
34. 
484 A.M. Stuyt: The General Principles of Law. As Applied by International Tribunals 
to Disputes on Attribution and Excercise of State Jurisdiction. Springer-Science 
Business Media, BV, Amsterdam. 1946. 79. and James Crawford: Brownlie’s 
Principles of Public International Law. Eighth Edition. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012. p. 429. 
485 See Document A/CN.4/119.  
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relevance to pubic law in different domestic legal orders.486 In 
Serbia, for instance, the third state report shows that the right to 
use of languages of minorities can be considered as acquired:  
[O]n several occasions, the National Council was 
requested to provide an opinion for the funds awarded on 
competitions and for the names of new streets in Bela 
Crkva where the Czech language has been in official use 
by the acquired right,487 although the number of its 
members does not exceed the legal threshold.488  
Additionally, the principle of respecting acquired rights is a 
constitutional principle in Serbia in relation to human and 
minority rights: “[A]ttained level of human and minority rights 
may not be lowered.”489 And I agree with Tamás Korhecz that 
the Constitutional Court did not interpret this principle 
thoroughly in the present case.490 Furthermore, and much more 
interestingly, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers 
referred explicitly to vested rights when delivering its resolution 
on the implementation of FCNM relating to the Third State 
Report of Serbia:  
[I]ssues for immediate action: (…) pursue work towards 
revising the Law on National Councils of National 
Minorities, in close consultation with representatives of 
all minorities and of civil society, in order to ensure the 
effective participation of persons belonging to national 
minorities in all matters affecting them, while taking into 
 
486 See for instance the case of Poland, where the Constituional Court recognized this 
principle in certain issues of public la was well. Piotr Tuleja – Krzystof 
Wojtycek: La protection des droits acquis élément constitutif de l'État de droit? 
Remarques sur la jurisprudence constitutionnelle polonaise. Revue internationale 
de droit comparé. Vol. 47 N°3, Juillet-septembre 1995. pp. 737-762.  
487 Emphasis added. 
488 Third Report submitted by Serbia pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 2 of the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Received on 14 
March 2013. P. 7. 
489 See Article 20 paragraph 2. of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.  
490 Korhecz, Tamás: Nemzetiségi autonómia az Alkotmánybíróság szorításában. A 
szerbiai Alkotmánybíróság a nemzeti tanácsokat szabályozó törvénnyel 




account the importance of respecting and protecting the 
vested rights491 of persons belonging to national 
minorities as exercised by National Councils, especially 
with regard to their powers, competences and financing, 
in accordance with the constitution.492  
In Gábor Sulyok’s view, a legal principle can be considered as 
being a general principle of law if it has roots in domestic legal 
orders, is preferably recognized by all of the major legal systems 
of the world, and it is necessary of being recognized by 
international law as such. It is also crucial that the given 
principle should play a role in the relationships between the 
subjects of international law.493 Serbia (or its predecessors) 
concluded bilateral treaties with several (neighbouring) 
countries494 on minority protection and some of these agreements 
are expressly referring to the right of national minorities (sic!) to 
participate in public life.495 It shows that the principle of 
respecting acquired rights might have a sort of international 
relevance. Seemingly, the principle of vested/acquired rights is 
both a principle of the Serbian (and perhaps other domestic) and 
the international legal orders, which also suggests that it might 
be a general principle of law, though its applicability is highly 
 
491 Emphasis added.  
492 Resolution CM/ResCMN(2015)8 on the implementation of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Serbia (Adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 1 July 2015 at the 1232nd meeting of the Ministers’ 
Deputies) p. 2. 
493 Sulyok, Gábor: Az általános jogelvek nemzetközi jogforrási jellegéről. Közjogi 
szemle. 2011/1. 24-41. 
494 For example with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1996, the 
Republic of Croatia in 1996, Romania in 2002 and Hungary in 2003. For the 
English version of these treaties see: Björn Arp: International Norms and 
Standards for the Protection of National Minorities. Bilateral and Multilateral 
Texts with Commentary. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Boston – Leiden. 2008. 
512. pp. 
495 Article 8 of the Convention between the Republic of Hungary and Serbia and 
Montenegro on the Protection of the Rights of the Serbian minority living in the 
Republic of Hungary and the Hungarian minority living in Serbia and 
Montenegro of 2003 stipulates for instance, that: „The Contracting Parties 
recognize the right of national minorities to participate in public life in line with 
their domestic legal order, (…).”  
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controversial. Moreover, if that principle is truly one of the 
general principles of law, another problematic issue occurs in the 
present case. International minority rights law, with its concrete 
rights and standards, is considered to be part of the international 
protection of human rights. As the FCNM stipulates in its very 
first article:  
The protection of national minorities and of the rights and 
freedoms of persons belonging to those minorities forms 
an integral part of the international protection of human 
rights,496 and as such falls within the scope of 
international co-operation. 
Besides, it was established by the Advisory Committee that the 
statement of article 1 covered article 15, too: “Article 15 of the 
FCNM forms also a part of the internatonal protection of human 
rights.”497 Presumably, the principle of acquired/vested rights 
can hardly be interpreted within a framework that is grounded on 
the concept of inherent rights. At the same time, the Serbian 
legislation on National Councils still ensures the possibility of 
participation, albeit on a lower level. Thus the principle of 
acquired/vested rights and the concept of inherent human rights 
are not necessarily in a contradiction in the case in question, 
since the Serbian Constitutional Court reduced only the level of 
participation without completely abolishing the right itself. 
Should the principle of respecting acquired/vested rights be 
inapplicable to the present situation, some other related 
fundamental legal principles such as the requirement of legal 
certainty can also be taken into consideration. In my opinion, the 
Constitutional Court’s unneccesarily strict legal approach 
restricted the application of article 15 of the FCNM. This 
restrictive interpretation of human rights related issues is quite 
unusual, but not unprecedented.498 Security concerns of States 
 
496 Emphasis added. 
497 ACFC/31DOC(2008)001. 5. 
498 See in this respect: Alexander Orakhelasvili: Restrictive Interpretation of Human 
Rights Treaties in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. European Journal of International Law (2003), Vol. 14. No. 3. 529-568. 
 
 
are especially likely to lead to such an interpretation.499 
However, the Constitutional Court of Serbia should not have 
come to the conclusion of diminishing the possibilities of 
national councils based either on international or national 
considerations.  
The different possibilities of the distinct National Councils to act 
or participate in affairs affecting them was also analyzed during 
the research project. Unsurprisingly, it was mostly the less 
numerous communities that complained about the prospects of 
minority councils. Usually they observed that the numerically 
smaller minority communities have less political powers than the 
larger ones since they have the opportunity to become a member 
of a governing coalition through which they are able to more 
effectively represent their interests. Interestingly, concerning a 
larger community like the Bosniaks of Serbia, it seems as though 
the smaller communities would engage only to preserve their 
culture and to maintain relations with their kin-states rather than 
to aim to improve their statuses. Some of the smaller minority 
groups concentrated mainly in the territoriy of the Autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina have better conditions since they can use 
the channels of participation and instruments of the autonomous 
territory. There is no officialy recognized, institutionalized form 
of cooperation among the separate National Councils in Serbia 
through which they could more effectively influence the 
decision-making process. This deficiency was also highlighted 
by the Advisory Committee in its latest opinion on Serbia:  
[T]he Advisory Committee is also concerned that the 
national minority council system, as it is presently 
conceived, may lead to fragmentation in the 
representation of minorities, in so far as each council 
represents only the interests of a single national minority 
and little has been done to encourage co-operation 
 
499 Peter Vedel Kessing: Terrorism and Human Rights. In: Stéphanie Lagoutte – Hans-
Otto Sano – Peter Scharff Smith (Eds.): Human Rights in Turmoil. Facing 
Threats, Consolidating Achievments. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston-
Leiden, 2007. 160. 
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between the various councils.500  
Furthermore, the monitoring body of the FCNM also emphasised 
that  
(Serbia should) promote a more effective participation of 
numerically smaller national minorities in elected bodies at 
national level.501 
15. Concluding observations 
The 2009 Act ensures and improves the right to effective 
participation in political or public life for minorities, yet the 
Constitutional Court’s verdict unnecessarily restricted this right 
to certain kind of modalities. In addition, the approach of the 
Constitutional Court is quite controversial from a political as 
well as a legal perspective. In fact, its verdict downgraded the 
status of national councils to a more or less consultative role in 
issues such as adequately influencing the quality of legislation 
concerning minorities. It is true that consultative status and the 
possibility to give preliminary opinions to draft laws are 
compatible,502 but the current Serbian legal framework makes it 
difficult to effectively absolve this task.  
In sum, minority communities are of the view that the 2009 Act 
is a significant step forward for the effective participation of 
individuals in political and public life. However, they claim the 
improper implementation of its rules weakens its efficiency. 
Especially on a lower level, state authorities of self-governments 
do not really treat national councils as their equal partners. The 
Bosniak National Council is even more critical because they 
think central authorities refuse to accept them. It is important to 
note that the Bosniak National Council makes an effort to create 
an additional framework of participation of their own, notably 
regarding territorial autonomy, but this idea does not necessarily 
meet the concepts of the central government. In its current status, 
 
500 Third Opinion on Serbia adopted on 28 November 2013. para. 196 
501 Third Opinion on Serbia adopted on 28 November 2013. Para. 180. 
502 Yash Ghai: Public Participation, Autonomy and Minorities. In: Marc Weller (Ed.): 
Political Participation of Minorities. A Commentary of International Standards 
and Practice. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009. 18. 
 
 
The 2009 Act provides less effective participation than before 
the decision of the Constitutional Court was made. Revision of 
the constitution is required in order to restore the pre-2014 
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Twenty-one years ago the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) was signed and entered 
into force. The basic achievements of the Dayton-Paris Agreement were 
two-fold: it terminated the four-year war and started the overall 
democratization process in the country. However, the Agreement did not 
create a politically sustainable and socially stabile union of three 
‘constituent peoples’ and “Others.” In the human rights protection sphere, 
the Agreement created a rather bizarre political structure that is 
exclusively based on the ethnic representations of the three ‘constituent 
peoples.’   
Under the “political integration” motto, the country had undergone an 
artificial institutional reanimation under the auspices of International 
Community (IC). From the constitutional and legal point of view, both 
theoretically and practically, BiH was founded as a sort of unfinished 
country, which was constitutionally, legally, and politically affirmed and 
fashioned sui generis as a union. The State is a strange legal creation 
consisting of two entities: one ‘republic’ and one ‘federation.’ This 
peculiar state, consisting of these two entities, cannot be labelled as a 
simple sovereign (unitary) state, or a complex one. Furthermore, it is 
neither a republic nor a federation; it is not even a union. The geopolitical 
side effects of war and the Balkan melting pot materialized in a  creature 
that might be considered  a post-modern anti-state without precedent. 
In the US military base Wright Peterson (Dayton, Ohio), the Bosnian state 
was revitalized, re-established, and re-contextualized as, above all, a very 
odd “union” based on an unsteady principle of ‘one state – two entities – 
three constitutive peoples.’ This principle played a key role in long-term 
and constant disintegrative processes and tendencies within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina ever since the Agreement was entered into force. 
Ethno-nationalistic exaltation and crude form of nationalism—side-effects 
induced by the crashing of the East-European communist totalitarian 
regimes—have turned into basic obstacles for the genuine democratization 
of former communist countries and societies, including the Bosnian state 
 
 
and its society. By virtue of the BiH Constitution, ethnic-based 
nationalism became institutional: the Preamble of the Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (as well as a number of its normative parts) is a 
serious obstacle to the creation of an efficient state with a steady legal 
environment in which power-sharing is situated within the civil society. 
On the contrary, the Constitution, as the highest legal and political 
normative instrument in the country, favours ethno-nationalism and the 
collective (national) rights of ethnic communities over individual citizens’ 
rights503. 
The Preamble of the BiH Constitution defines Bosniacs504, Croats, and 
Serbs as ‘constituent peoples,’ while ‘Others’, i.e. ‘citizens,’ are 
considered to be second-class citizens. By recognizing the collective 
rights505 of ethnic groups (nations), the anachronistic notion of 
‘constituent peoples’ represents a rather obvious violation of the European 
 
503 „Ethnical, cultural, traditional, habitual as well as other components of complicated 
BiH social milieu is composed of sophisticated net of Bosnian concord of 
diversity, so territorial principle taken as a base to form an opinion on 
somebody's ethnic affiliation has no either theoretical or practical rationalization. 
Thereby any idea and/or theory of "ethno-cantonisation" or any other "ethno-
regionalisation", notwithstanding if it comes from "outside" or "inside", is 
absolutely incompatible with multiethnic concept of the BiH society and entails 
latent threat to survival of the State of BiH. Cantonisation, of course, might be 
concept of internal institutional structure of the multi-ethnic state under the 
condition that it is a civilized state in which any form of diversity cannot be 
ground for human rights violation whatsoever. On the other side cantonisation 
and/or regionalisation based on natural and geographical distinctiveness, as 
model of "de-entitetisation" of BiH seems to be the reasonable and logical 
constitutional solution for internal state organization of BiH.”,  Seizovic, Zarije, 
Constitutuen Peoples and Constitutional Changes, 2nd updated edition, Dobra 
knjiga, Sarajevo, 2014. p. 23-24. 
504 Constitutional title for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Muslim (Islam) 
religious origins. In Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, they were know as 
Muslims (capital letter „M“). 
505Collective rights, although nowadays increasingly acknowledged in both theory and 
practice in Western states, are nonetheless secondary to rights based on individual 
citizenship. The language and cultural rights of national minorities are protected (in 
some cases by international conventions), and native peoples have often reasserted pre-
existing territorial entitlements, but they remain citizens of the states in which they live 
(International Crisis Group, Implementing Equality: The “Constituent Peoples” 
Decision in Bosnia & Herzegovina, 16 April 2002, ICG Balkans Report No. 128, 
Sarajevo/Brussels, p. 2, foot-note 5). 
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), since the guiding idea of human rights protection has 
been placed in correlation with the citizen as an individual, not as a 
member of a social/religious/ethnic/national group. The very Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Constitution introduces the anti-discrimination clause506 in 
Article II (4), but at the same time, the Constitution itself directly breaches 
that clause as well as Article 14 of the ECHR (Prohibition on 
Discrimination). The existing concept of ‘constituent peoples’ as state-
building nations and the impacts of this concept on the constitutional and 
legal position of ‘Others’507 is discrimination par excellence. This concept 
perpetuates institutional discrimination towards a certain number of 
citizens who do not belong to ‘the chosen ones,’ including those who 
opted to exercise their right to ‘not to belong’ (both of these groups are 
being labelled as ‘others’). It is clear that the BiH Constitution 
incorporates a discriminatory concept that recognizes different 
legal/political/constitutional statuses for Bosnian citizens. The European 
Court of Human Rights clearly and explicitly noted this unbearable state 
of affairs in the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina case, as well 
as in a few cases following this one. The ‘national veto’ principle, a 
principle to protect ‘national interests,’ provides ethno-nationalistic elites 
with unlimited power to block the enactment of laws if they find that the 
law would run counter to the “national interests” of any of the three 
constituent peoples. 
Nowadays, sadly, the public arena in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a testing 
ground for a collectivism that enjoys absolute freedom in subsuming the 
individual to the utmost possible extent under its abstract categories. The 
democratic system of the three ethno-religious groups is thus a democracy 
of oligarchies—a set of groups of authoritarian members or ethnic groups 
engaged in shaping ethnic, collectivist narratives. Such a democracy is 
 
506 „All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of 
origin. They have the right, in accordance with Annex 7 to the General 
Framework Agreement, to have restored to them property of which they were 
deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any 
such property that cannot be restored to them. Any commitments or statements 
relating to such property made under duress are null and void“. 
507 Individuals that do not belong or title themselves as Bosniacs, Croats or Serbs – 




The international position and status of national minorities influence the 
position and status of national minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) in regards to national minority protections and the legal framework. 
According to records and experience of the OSCE, there is certain social 
and political marginalization of the Roma and Jewish population in BiH. 
Traditionally, the Roma population was not subject to social inclusion. 
Despite an acceptable legal framework, the remains of this status are still 
felt nowadays. As far as Jewish population is concerned, taking into 
consideration its traditional position, the level of inclusion is much higher 
in comparison to the Roma population. Yet there are also evident 
experiences of discrimination that both national minorities have in 
common due to the systemic errors of the Dayton constitutional 
settlement.509 However, apart from these two national minorities, there are 
“constituent/constitutional minorities” that would be closely explored in 
terms of   their constitutional position as well as their right to political 
participation. 
 
2. National Legal Framework for National Minority Protection 
Annex I to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Constitution of 
BiH) introduces a list of human rights agreements to be applied in BiH, 
amid which there are few very important agreements regarding the 
protection of national minorities: International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms for Racial Discrimination (1965), International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Optional Protocols (1966 
and 1989), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966), and the most important ones being Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities (1994) and European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages (1992). 
The State of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Law on Rights of 
National Minorities based on the international standards provided for in 
the listed human rights instruments.510 In Article 1, the Law provides for 
 
508Mujkic, Asim, We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis, Human Rights Center of the 
University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, 2008, p. 39. 
509 The OSCE Mission to BiH, available at: 
http://www.oscebih.org/Default.aspx?id=53&lang=HR (23.08.2016.).  
510 „Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina” No 12/03, 76/05, 93/08). The Law 




rights and obligations of members of national minorities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as well as duties of the authorities in BiH as to respect and 
protect, preserve and develop the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity of each member of national minorities in BiH being citizen of 
BiH. Starting from international standards on definition of national 
minorities511, the Law states 
 
 A national minority, in terms of this Law, shall be a part of the 
population-citizens of BiH that does not belong to any of three 
constituent peoples and it shall include people of the same or similar 
ethnic origin, same or similar tradition, customs, religion, language, 
culture, and spirituality and close or related history and other 
 
of National Minorities and states that the law is an integral part of the legal 
system of State of BIH and its two Entities (Article 2.). Similar laws had been 
adopted in both Entities: in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Official 
Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” No 56/08) and Republic of 
Srpska (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska No. 2/04). 
511 There is no single and internationally agreed definition as to which groups 
constitute minorities.The United Nations Minorities Declaration (1992) in its Article 1 
refers to minorities as based on national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic 
identity, and provides that States should protect their existence. The very existence of a 
minority is a question of fact and any definition must include both objective factors 
(existence of a shared ethnicity, language or religion) and subjective factors (an 
important one being the one that individuals must identify themselves as members of a 
minority). As such, members of the group have the right to exist, right to equal 
treatiment and freedom from discrimination, right to adequate political representation 
and participation in the political decision-making processes, right to use their own 
language for private and public purposes, even right to their own institutions. The term 
minority being used in the UN human rights system mainly refers to a national or 
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, according to the UN Minorities Declaration 
concept. All States have one or more minority groups within their national territories, 
characterized by their own national, ethnic, linguistic or religious identity, which 
differs from that identity of the majority population (see 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/internationallaw.aspx) Prof. 
Zoran Pajić is of the opinion that all those that do not belong to one of the three 
constituent peoples are put in an unclear position with undefined rights in the state 
shaped along the ethnic principle“ (Zoran Pajic, „A Critical Appraisal of Human 
Rights Provisions of the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina“, Human 
rights Quarterly, 20 (1), 1998). 
 
 
characteristics. (Art. 3).   
 
Additionally, the law provides for the protection of status, equality, and 
rights of seventeen national minorities that live in BiH,512 and affirms and 
guarantees to members of national minorities the rights to organise and 
gather in order to express and protect their cultural, religious, educational, 
social, economic and political freedoms, rights, interests, needs and 
identities.513 
Furthermore, the law affirms the right of national minorities to use their 
insignia, symbols and language, rights in the field of education, 
information, culture, economic and social rights and political participation, 
providing also for the following penal provision 
 
In accordance with the criminal laws of the entities in BiH, any action, 
encouragement, organisation and aiding and abetting of the activities that 
could imperil survival of a national minority, initiate ethnic hatred, lead to 
discrimination or bringing members of a national minority into unequal 
position shall be prohibited. (Art. 25). 
 
In Article 4, the law recognises the right of national minority members to 
freely choose to be treated or not to be treated as such. It also states that 
individuals may not be put into an adverse position due to such a choice, 
nor be subject to any other form of discrimination on these grounds, 
stressing that assimilation of members of national minorities against their 
will shall not be allowed. 
Members of national minorities have the right to organise and gather in 
order to express and protect their cultural, religious, educational, social, 
economic and political freedoms, rights, interests, needs and identities.514 
According to Article 7, entities, cantons, cities, and municipalities in BiH, 
within the scope of their competencies, shall regulate in detail their laws 
and other rights and duties arising from the law hereto and international 
conventions regulating issues of importance for national minorities. 
Members of national minorities may freely display and bear insignia and 
 
512Albanians, Montenegrins, Czechs, Italians, Jews, Hungarians, Macedonians, 
Germans, Poles, Romas, Romanians, Russians, Rusins, Slovaks, Slovenians, 
Turks, Ukrainians and others who meet requirements of national minority. 
513Art. 5. 
514 Art. 5.  
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symbols of the national minority they belong to, as well as their 
organisations, associations, and institutions. When using insignia and 
symbols referred to in paragraph above, the members of national 
minorities shall also be obliged to display the official insignia and 
symbols of BiH, as well as the symbols and insignia of the entities, 
cantons, and municipalities, in accordance with their regulations.515 The 
State recognises and protects the right of each member of a national 
minority in BiH to use his/her language freely and without any hold-ups, 
both in private and in public, orally and in writing. The right embraces the 
right of a member of national minority to use his/her name in the language 
of minority and to request it to be used as such in public.516 
 
Within the realm of education, the law prescribes that  
 
Entities and cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
shall be obliged to secure within their educational system (pre-
school, primary, secondary) that the members of national minorities 
shall be enabled to have education in the minority language in the 
cities, municipalities, and inhabited areas in which the members of 
national minorities represent an absolute or relative minority. 
Regardless of the number of members of national minorities the 
entities and cantons shall be bound to secure that the members of 
national minority, if they request so, may have instructions on their 
language, literature, history, and culture in the language of minority 
they belong to as additional classes. For the purposes of the 
realisation of rights referred to in Paragraph above the Entity, 
cantonal, city and municipal authorities shall be bound to secure 
funds, means for the education of teachers to teach in the language of 
the national minority, to ensure the space and other requirements for 
the additional classes as well as printing of textbooks in the 
languages of national minorities (Art. 14). 
 
Within the Federation of BiH, the entities and cantons are obliged to 
determine by their legislation the possibilities for members of national 
minorities to establish and preserve their own private institutions for 
education and vocational training. National minorities are obliged to 
 
515 Art. 10. 
516 Art. 11. 
 
 
secure financing of such institutions.517 
 
According to Article 15 of the law, members of national minorities in BiH 
have a right to establish radio and TV stations and to issue newspapers and 
other printed information in the language of the minority they belong to. 
Public service radio and TV stations whose founders are BiH entities, 
cantons, cities, and municipalities shall be obliged to provide special 
programs for members of national minorities in their program schedules 
and they may also provide for other materials in the minority languages. 
Public radio and TV stations in BiH shall secure informative programing 
for members of national minorities in their languages at least once a week. 
The entities and cantons shall identify these rights pursuant to the 
percentile representation of national minorities in the relevant entity, 
canton, city and municipality.518 
Members of national minorities also have the right to establish libraries, 
video libraries, cultural centres, museums, archives, cultural, artistic and 
folklore associations, and all other forms of free cultural expression and to 
preserve their monuments of culture and cultural heritage. The contents in 
national minority languages are to be provided for in the institutions for 
cultural activities in the cities, municipalities, and local communities (or 
inhabited places) in which members of national minorities constitute over 
one third of population. Archives, museums, and institutions for protection 
of monuments of culture and tradition in BiH and its entities have to 
ensure the proportional representation of all national minorities in BiH in 
their programs and contents and shall protect national monirities’ 
monumental heritage and cultural heritage.519 
In the cities, municipalities, and local communities (or inhabited areas) in 
which members of a national minority make an absolute or relative 
majority of population, the authorities are to ensure that the use of 
minority language and the (administrative services) treatment in minority 
language is facilitated in financial and banking institutions and other 
services of the public sector through the payment receipts and forms as 
well as in hospitals, nursing homes, and other social institutions.520 
 
517 Art. 13.  
518Art. 16. 
519 Art. 17. 
520 Art. 18. 
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As far as political participation is concerned, the law states the following: 
The manner and criteria of electing representatives of national minorities 
into parliaments, assemblies and councils in terms of the Article above 
shall be closely regulated by the Election Laws of BiH and the entities, as 
well as the statues and other regulations in cantons, cities and 
municipalities.  
A special law and other regulations of BiH states that entities, cantons, 
cities, and municipalities shall regulate the manner of representation of 
members of national minorities in executive and judicial authorities as 
well as in public services.  
National minority representatives in positions of public authority shall 
represent all national minorities and shall be obliged to protect the 
interests of all national minorities.521 
The BiH Council of National Minorities is entitled to give opinions, 
advice, and proposals to the BiH Parliamentary Assembly on all matters 
regarding the rights, statuses, and interests of national minorities in BiH. 
The BiH Council of National Minorities may delegate an expert to work 
with the Constitutional-Legal Commission and the Human Rights 
Commission in both houses of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly.522 
 
The Roma population is the largest national minority in BiH and is 
marginalized in social, economic and political life. In post-war BiH, the 
Roma population faces many difficulties in exercising their fundamental 
rights and freedoms that are guaranteed by the Constitution of BiH. 
Private property rights and access to social care, education, and 
employment are of particular concern. There are various projects being 
undertaken in order to provide for their full and effective participation in 
the state bodies, to resolve their problems related to housing, health care, 
employment, and education, and to prevent discrimination and ingrained 
biases toward the Roma population.523 
 
There are around 80,000 to 100,000 Roma inhabitants in BiH. It is being 
reported that the Roma population is  leaving country in attempt to attain 
asylum from the discriminatory environment in BiH in the realm of social 
 
521 Art. 20. 
522 Art. 21-22. 




rights, housing, education, and employment. The Roma informative centre 
estimated that as little as one per cent of the Roma population able to work 
is employed. It has also been noted that employers intending to decrease 
labour power first dismiss Roma labour. The Roma population is not 
adequately represented in the public sector despite the constitutional 
provision guaranteeing proportionate representation in public 
institutions.524 
 
Within the Institution of Human Rights Ombudsmen, there is a 
Department for elimination of all forms of discrimination to which 
individuals may file complaints. It also initiates ex officio procedures and 
conducts investigations into cases of discrimination and cases involving 
violations of rights and fundamental freedoms as provided for in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, International Convention on 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Convention on 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Framework 
Convention for Protection of National Minorities, especially in cases 
involving any form of discrimination based on race, colour, gender, 
language, political or other affiliation (opinion), national or social origin, 
or material status.525 
 
There is also a Department for Following of National, Religious and Other 
Minorities Rights that receives and registers complaints concerning 
violations of the rights and freedoms of the members of national, religious, 
and other minorities. This department also monitors the functioning of the 
legislative, executive and judicial authorities relevant to the exercise of 
rights of national, religious and other minorities.  
 
The Department for Following of National, Religious and Other 
Minorities Rights pay special attention to:  
 Promoting rights determined in the Convention on Protection 
of National Minorities and other international standards 
regulating minority rights; 
 
524 Embassy of the United States to Bosna and Hercegovina –Report on Human Rights, 
available at official Embassy web page 
http://bosnian.sarajevo.usembassy.gov/ljudska-prava-2013.html (23.08.2016.). 
525According to 2014 Annual Report on Discrimination Cases in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina produced by the Human Rights Ombudsmen for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
there were 22 cases of discrimination based on ethnic affiliation. 
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 Analyzing legal regulations that treat rights of minorities and 
state in the field, aimed at initiating changes of legal 
provisions and their harmonization with international 
standards of human rights; 
 Protecting members of national minorities: Albanian, 
Montenegrin, Czechs, Italians, Jews, Hungarian, Macedonian, 
Germans, Poles, Roma, Rumanians, Russians, Ruthenians, 
Slovaks, Slovenians, Turks, Ukrainians and others, fulfilling 
conditions from Article 3 (1) of the Law on Protection of 
Rights of National Minorities in BiH; 
 Removing obstacles for consistent application of international 
conventions ratified by BiH.526 
The Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman of BiH may be addressed 
by each natural person or legal entity that has legitimate interests, 
regardless of citizenship, race, gender, religious affiliation, or ethnic 
origin. Complaint filed with the Institution shall not cause any criminal, 
disciplinary or any other sanctions in disfavour of complainant.527 
 
3. Constituent Peoples – Institutionalised Form of Discrimination 
3.1. Discriminatory Constitution Providing for Non-discrimination 
 
Let us take a look into the bizarre concept of constituent peoples. The very 
notion of constitution is developed from the Latin word constitutio, 
meaning “organization,” “system,” “frame,” et cetera. Accordingly, the 
Latin word constitutus means “made” or “created”. The term constituent 
might be roughly translated into local languages (B/C/S) as “creative” or 
“the one that creates/makes/does.” Constituent peoples therefore are those 
 
526http://www.ombudsmen.gov.ba/Default.aspx?id=12&lang=EN (23.08.2016.) 
527 Complaint is filed in writings, by mail, fax, e-mail or through personal contact. 
Complaint should contain brief description of events, facts or decisions that led to 
filing of complaint. Complaint must be signed by complainant or authorized 
proxy. Provision of copies of complaint supporting documentation together with 
the complaint is desirable, if such documentation exists. The Institution may 
refuse to review anonymous complaints for which it considers that they are 
malicious, ill-founded, those in which there is not actual complaint, those that 
would make damage to third parties or those that are filed more than 12 months 




(peoples) that the state’s social quintessence is composed of.528 
 
The Preamble of the Constitution of BiH defines Bosniacs, Croats, and 
Serbs as “constituent peoples” of BiH, while “others” and “citizens” are 
merely mentioned. Obviously, individual rights were granted to the three 
ethnic groups, but not to all citizens. The entities’ constitutions ensured 
that discriminatory concept as such was applied throughout the country 
because Bosniacs and Croats were not considered to be constituent 
peoples in Republika Srpska (RS). In the same fashion, Serbs were left 
without that status in the Federation of BiH. All three peoples were 
constituent nations only at the state level. Unfortunately, these rights 
hardly existed at all as state prerogatives, such as in the police and the 
administration of justice that were bestowed in the two entities. All 
“others” who did not belong to any of the privileged, constitutionally 
recognized ethnic groups were lost along the road. Denying the status of 
constituent peoples to Bosniacs and Croats in the RS and/or to Serbs in the 
Federation of BiH is both in discord with the Constitution of BiH and has 
no historical justification, as it is well known that BiH was at all times 
multi-ethnic society sui generis and a paradigm of “unity and 
tolerance.”529 
At the same time, the Constitution of BiH provides for non discrimination 
clause that reads as follows: 
 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms provided for in this Article 
or in the international agreements listed in Annex I to this 
Constitution shall be secured to all persons in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 




528 Seizovic, Zarije, Constitutuen Peoples and Constitutional Changes, 2nd updated 
edition, Dobra knjiga, Sarajevo, 2014. p. 19. 
529 Seizovic, Zarije, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Concord of Diversity – Compilation of 
Legal Essays, Studio Flaš, Zanica, 2005, p. 11. 
530 Cited from: The Dayton Peace Accords, General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paris, 14 December 1995, Office of Public 
Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State. 
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Despite its [GFAP’s] outstanding ‘ceremonial achievements’ in the field 
of human rights protection of individuals, the entire political structure of 
BiH is based on the principle of exclusive ethnic representation of the 
three ‘constituent peoples’ which, de facto, constitutes a disadvantage to 
the functioning of state and entity institutions whenever minority members 
of a constituent people feel like obstructing decision-making processes.531 
Ethnic, cultural, traditional, habitual, and other components of the 
complicated BiH social milieu is composed of a sophisticated net of 
Bosnian concord of diversity, so the territorial principle taken as a base to 
form an opinion on somebody's ethnic affiliation has neither theoretical 
nor practical rationalization. Thereby any idea and/or theory of "ethno-
cantonisation" or any other "ethno-regionalisation," notwithstanding if it 
comes from "outside" or "inside," is absolutely incompatible with a multi-
ethnic concept of the BiH society and entails latent threat to the survival of 
the State of BiH. Cantonisation, of course, might be a concept of internal 
institutional structure of the multi-ethnic state under the condition that it is 
a civilized state in which any form of diversity cannot be grounds for 
human rights violations.532 
 
3.2. In the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina back in July 2000, the court took the decision to impose duty 
upon the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of 
Srpska533 to amend their constitutions in order to ensure full equality of 
the three “constituent peoples” throughout the state territory.  
As the Dayton Agreement's discriminatory concept of “one state/two 
entities/three constituent peoples” was politically unsteady, the decision 
put an end to the idea of recognising the right of the Bosnian Croats to 
establish their small quasi-state, as it required both entities to be really and 
efficiently multinational. Adversaries of the single Bosnian state 
pronounced the decision to run counter to the Dayton Peace Accords, 
while followers of the idea of a single state considered the decision as a 
breakthrough for institutionalizing improvements upon the existing 
Dayton political architecture that, to their opinion, had to undergo 
constitutional changes.  
 
531 Seizovic, Zarije, Constitutuen Peoples and Constitutional Changes, 2nd updated 
edition, Dobra knjiga, Sarajevo, 2014. p. 15. 
532Ibidem, p. 24. 




However, even though the decision denoted a significant step forward in 
recognizing the same constitutional position of all constituent peoples in 
every part of territory of the state, it did nothing in favour of improving 
the positions of the non-constituent population of BiH. With or without 
the decision, the constitutional position of the non-constituent peoples 
remained the same: they were still non-constituent throughout the 
country.534 
 
3.3. Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
In the case Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,535 the European 
Court of Human Rights established that the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina contains discriminatory provisions. As such, the judgment 
constitutes legal and political disgrace as well as a strong strike upon its 
international position and renown of Bosnia and Herzegovina – even the 
position would be described as rather bad, not to mention its bad renown 
whatsoever. Having delivered such a judgment against it, the political 
establishment of any state belonging to the circle of “Western European 
Democracies” would mobilize all political powers and make all necessary 




534 On constitutional position of „Others“ see more in dr. Iur. Nedim Ademović, 
„Kritički osvrt na poziciju tzv. Ostalih u Ustavu BIHkroz sudsku praksu ustavnog 
suda BIHi Evropskog suda za ljudska prava u Strazburu“ in Abazović, Dino et al 
(ed.), Mjesto i uloga „Ostalih“ u Ustavu Bosne i Hercegovine i budućim 
ustavnim rješenjima za Bosnu i Hercegovinu (Place and role of „Others“ in the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Future Constitutional Settlements 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina), Centar za ljudska prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu, 
Sarajevo, 2010, pp. 125-140. 
535European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Sejdić and Finci v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Applications nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, Judgment, 
Strasbourg, 22 December 2009. The same judgment ECtHR rendered in two similar 
cases: Azra Zornic vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application no. 3681/06, Judgment, 
Strasbourg, 15 July 2014 and Ilijaz Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
(Application no. 41939/07), Judgment, Strasbourg, 9 June 2016. 
536 Seizovic, Zarije, Constitutuent Peoples and Constitutional Changes, 2nd updated 
edition, Dobra knjiga, Sarajevo, 2014. p. 43. 
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What are local politicians are doing with regards to implementation of the 
judgement in the case Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Nothing. The negotiations related to the future organization of the State 
are being held in restaurants throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a 
rather arrogant and unacceptable manner, political talks are transposed 
from Parliamentary benches to restaurants, asserting ugly connotation of a 
tavern-like discourse in administering the state.537 
Such unbearable indolence of ethno-national538 political elites and the 
complete absence of any implementation of the judgment created the per-
ception that Bosnia and Herzegovina is positioned against its citizens-
Sejdić and Finci - taken as a paradigm to all citizens being discriminated 
against!539 The decision confirmed that the BiH Constitution contains a 
discriminatory concept that makes discrimination itself 
institutionalised.540 Therefore, “the political practice in Bosnia can be 
rightly described as the democracy of ethnic oligarchies, not as democracy 
of citizens.”541 
Today's demographic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not match 
 
537Ibidem, p. 46. 
538„Ethnopolitics is somewhat oximoronic term. The meaning of word ethnos implies 
pre-political category of the people referring to its blood origin, heritage, 
tradition [...] The ethnos is bes described as kinship“, Mujkic, Asim, We, the 
Citizens of Ethnopolis, Human Rights Center of the University of Sarajevo, 
Sarajevo, 2008, p. 21. „In Bosnian case Ethnopolitics is very similar to Religious 
nationalism“. Bosnian ethnic groups („constituent peoples“) are basically formed 
along the religious lines as the onli „striking“ difference between the 
communities. In fact, there is a little to their ethnicity besides their 
„religiousness“, Ibidem, p. 23. 
539 Literally: Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Sejdić and Finci. 
540 In December 2009, European Court of Human Rights has declared State 
Constitution and Election law discriminating against Roma and Jewish population in 
BiH. See: Human Rights Watch, Second Class Citizens: Discrimination Against Roma, 
Jews, and OtherNational Minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2012), p. 2. The 
judgement of the European Court has not been implemented almost seven years 
after it had been taken. 
541Mujkic, Asim, We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis, Human Rights Center of the 
University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, 2008, p.18. 
 
 
pre-war percentages542 or the Dayton electoral system, which does not 
provide for the huge number of citizens that do not identify themselves 
with the state, one of the constituent peoples, or who chose not to identify 
themselves at all. Citizens of a civic orientation represent the fourth 
constituent people.543 
 
4.  Conclusion 
The international position and status of national minorities influences the 
position and status of national minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina – 
both with regards to national minority protections as well as to the legal 
framework. According to records and experience of the OSCE, there is 
certain social and political marginalization of the Roma and Jewish 
population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Roma population, traditionally, 
had not been subject to social inclusion, so remains of such status, despite 
acceptable legal framework, can be felt nowadays. As far as Jewish 
population is concerned, taking into consideration its traditional position, 
level of inclusion is much higher in comparison to Roma population. Yet, 
there is also evident discrimination that both national minorities have in 
common due to systemic error of the Dayton constitutional settlement. In 
 
542Statistics show that the 1991 census national break-down was the following: 43,7% 
Bosniacs, 31,3% Serbs, 17,3% Croats and 7,7% of Others. 
543 International Crisis Group (2012) Bosnia’s Gordian Knot: Constitutional Reform, 
Policy Briefing Europe N°68 Sarajevo/Istanbul/Brussels, p. 13. There are opinions that 
the term „Others“, „due to dominant ethnic pattern [...] refers to ethnic minorities: 
Roma, Jewish, Ukrainians, Czech and others that live in BiH“ – see: Asim Mujkić,  
„Ostali – Četvrti konstitutivni element ili strategija demokratske transformacije?“, in 
Abazović, Dino et al (ed..), Mjesto i uloga "Ostalih" u Ustavu Bosne i Hercegovine i 
budućim ustavnim rješenjima za Bosnu i Hercegovinu (Place and role of „Others“ in 
the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Future Constitutional Settlements for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina), Institut za društvena istraživanja – Fakultet političkih nauka 
Univerziteta u Sarajevu, Sarajevo, 2010, p. 80.). It has to be stressed that civic 
principle of organizing state and power as well as advocating „effective“ state model 
definitely are not inherently neutral institutional positions. Those features are being 
inwrought into political conflict of dominant political encampments in which the 
Bosniak side, at least formally, enjoys support to its political position. On the other 
side, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats in any such manoeuvre, which they consider 
rhetoric, see potential undermining of their political elite position, but also 
undermining the multi-ethnic principle. 
bla3 
 
any “normal” European country governed by democracy and the principle 
of the rule of law, such institutional social exclusion of and discrimination 
against national minorities (referred to as “Others”) would be ephemeral 
or would not take place at all.  
The position of national and “constitutional” minorities is intolerable, 
especially in light of the judgement of the European Court of Human 
Rights in case Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, and two other 
cases in which the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was declared 
to be discriminatory as to participation of the minority populations that 
applicants were affiliated with. Almost seven years of impolite limbo has 
passed in which almost nothing has been done in order to abolish 
“institutionalised discrimination.” On the contrary, the concept of 
constituent peoples, especially in the sphere of political participation, is 
being additionally affirmed and emphasised. It is obvious that “[n]ational 
homogenization will still remain the main obstacle to political and 
economic reintegration of the […] society and will be playing significant 
role in continuing disintegration processes throughout the country while 
national (ethnic) identity will very likely be almost sole identification 
model for the […] citizens."544 
 
Under the current constitutional set up, it appears that when ethno-national 
identity is taken as the only (or the strongest) source of citizen 
identification, and when ‘constituent peoples’ is held as a constitutional 
category, the State is essentially non-functional. After the conducting of 
general elections in BiH and the establishment of a new government, it 
seems inevitable to conduct a political, constitutional, and judicial review 
of the Constitution provisions (the entity constitutions included as well) in 
order  to inaugurate and promote of a 'civil' discourse and to negate a 
national/ethnic discourse. It seems important to emphasize that this is not 
the sole discretion of the state of BiH, but it has an international and legal 
obligation to harmonize its legislation and, above all, it’s Constitution, 
with European standards, as directed by the verdict of the Court in 
Strasbourg. If it fails to do so, BiH risks remaining on margins of Euro-
 
544 Zarije Seizovic, "Human Rights Protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the 
Framework of the Dayton Peace Accords with Special View to Non-Discrimination 
Policy", essay written in the course of Summer School "Post-Communist transition and 
the European Integration Processes", organized by Instituto per l’Europa Centro-
Orientale e Balcanica – International Network Europe and the Balkans and Italian 
Ministry of Interior in Cervia, Italy, 4-16 September 2000, p. 12. 
 
 
Atlantic integrations, for which any functional state striving to join must 
have a perfectly organized system of government, rule of law, and 
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